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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I offer a brief overview of the current legislative, regulatory and treaty 
frameworks impacting emergency management in British Columbia, with a particular emphasis 
on Crown-identified First Nation roles. I show that the regime overwhelmingly positions non-
First Nation governments, contractors and other organizations to manage emergencies on behalf 
of First Nations. I explore emergency management as a manifold process that includes protracted 
planning, mitigation and recovery phases, which, unlike emergency response, are carried out 
with lower levels of urgency. I consider Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 (s. 35) Aboriginal 
rights in light of the lack of statutorily prescribed inclusion of First Nations in off-reserve 
emergency management, particularly at the planning, mitigation and recovery phases concluding 
that the jurisprudence to date (including the duty to consult and Aboriginal title) does not appear 
to have revolutionized the regime. While the constitutional status of Aboriginal rights should 
operate to insure adequate First Nation direction in each stage of emergency management, the 
regime continues to restrictively prioritize other constitutional priorities, such as division of 
powers and civil liberties. To better understand the omission, I theorize the lack of Crown 
implementation of s. 35 Aboriginal rights generally as an ‘obligation gap’, highlighting how an 
analysis of s. 35 Aboriginal rights as ‘negative rights’ fails to compel implementation of the full 
scope of Crown obligations implicit within the jurisprudence to date. I then offer a new 
framework for s. 35 as justiciable ‘recognition rights’ and juxtapose ‘recognition rights’ with the 
idea of justiciability of government inaction through a brief comparative analysis of 
socioeconomic rights in South Africa’s constitution and Canada’s constitutional Aboriginal 
rights. 
With a decided emphasis on the obligations of the Crown, this thesis attempts to offer fodder 
to First Nations and legal practitioners seeking to challenge the emergency management 
landscape where First Nations seek an enhanced role in protecting and restoring their respective 
territories in anticipation of, and in the wake of, disaster. For convenience and clarity, 
contemporary geographical and jurisdictional references to the areas now known as Canada and 
British Columbia are used throughout the thesis without intention to detract from the integrity of 
First Nation claims to their traditional and ancestral territories. 
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SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION 
Emergencies and disasters occupy a significant amount of media attention when they occur 
and fuel the imagination in otherwise nondescript times. Large-scale disasters frequently take on 
global interest and often trigger international cooperative response and recovery efforts. Popular 
culture fantasies exploring human response to ‘Armageddon’ abound in film, television and 
literature.1 Details of smaller scale emergencies grace news outlets on practically an hourly basis, 
with journalists covering everything from local automobile accidents to house fires. Coverage of 
larger emergencies can dominate news broadcasts for days or even weeks, resulting in an almost 
continuous account of Canadian experience with all manner of emergencies and disasters.  
In the last two years alone, we have watched the massive devastation wrought by earthquake 
in Nepal, typhoon in the Philippines, pandemic in Africa, and industrial accident in Canada, to 
name only a few sensational disasters. The Nepalese massive earthquake in April 2015 killed 
nearly nine thousand people, injured over 22 thousand more and affected over one third of that 
nation’s entire population (8 of 28 million).2 Nepal’s recovery costs will likely exceed 5 billion 
US dollars.3 Typhoon Haiyan (known in in the Philippines as Typhoon Yolanda) was one of the 
strongest tropical cyclones ever recorded and killed at least 6300 in the Philippines with an 
estimated damage of nearly two billion US dollars.4 On April 4, 2014 Imperial Metals’ Mount 
                                                 
1 See e.g. 2012, 2009, DVD: (Culver City, Cal: Columbia Pictures Industries, 2010); 2012 Movie Review, online: 
IMDb <http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1190080/> (“A frustrated writer struggles to keep his family alive when a series 
of global catastrophes threatens to annihilate mankind”); see e.g. “Apocalypse Preppers” (podcast), online: The 
Discovery Channel <http://www.discovery.com/tv-shows/apocalypse-preppers/> ( a television program also 
available online, features some individuals’ infatuation with emergency/disaster planning); see e.g. “Doomsday 
Preppers” online: National Geographic Channel <http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/doomsday-preppers/> 
(another television program that similarly explores various individuals’ disaster preparation efforts); and see 
“‘Doomsday Preppers,’ the Truth about the Prepper Movement” PRWeb Newswire (14 Feb 2012) General 
Reference Center GOLD online: 
<http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA279973546&v=2.1&u=usaskmain&it=r&p=GRGM&sw=w&asid
=5c7c5661d1a88a0dfc636c1cac490864> ("The truth is 'Doomsday Preppers' is not about the apocalypse, Mayan 
Calendar or end of the world but rather about the lives ordinary Americans who are preparing for life's uncertainties. 
Disasters and emergencies can happen at anytime; they can happen today or 1000 years from now," says Ralston). 
2 Nepal, Nepal Disaster Risk Reduction Portal, online: http://drrportal.gov.np/ at 
<http://apps.geoportal.icimod.org/ndrrip/profile?id=Country&Lang=en>. 
3 “Narrow Minded: Asia can do more to protect itself from the risk of natural catastrophes”, The Economist (13 June 
2015) online: The Economist <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654056-asia-can-do-more-protect-itself-
risk-natural-catastrophes-narrow-minded>.  
4 Republic of the Philippines, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, “NDRRMC Update: 
Updates re the Effects of Typhoon ‘Yolanda’ (Haiyan) PDNA Report” (17 April 2014) online:  
<http://ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/1329/Update_on_Effects_Typhoon_YOLANDA_(Haiyan)_17APR2014.p
df> (The government of the Philippines estimates the total damage in PhP at 89 598 068 634.88 which converts to 
approximately 2 billion US dollars. Other estimates range upward of 3 billion US dollars).  
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Polley tailings pond breached, dramatically spilling 4.5 million cubic meters of slurry and over 
10 million cubic meters of contaminated water into Polley Lake (British Columbia) and 
triggering a local state of emergency.5 The World Health Organization reports that the current 
outbreak of Ebola in West Africa “is the largest and most complex Ebola outbreak since the 
Ebola virus was first discovered in 1976. There have been more cases and deaths in this outbreak 
than all others combined”.6 
While other oil spills have recently occurred, it was only five years ago  that the largest 
accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry took place – the BP oil spill 
flowed for three months, spilling 210 million gallons of crude into the Gulf of Mexico.7 While 
the environmental devastation and loss of animal and marine life was enormous, the results were 
reportedly constrained to killing 11 people and injuring 17 others.8 The Tohoku earthquake and 
tsunami in Japan occurred as recently as 2011, killing 15891, injuring over 6000 and causing the 
disappearance of over 2500 people. The Japanese quake and tsunami caused an immense amount 
of damage (estimates sit at $235 billion US dollars) along with nuclear accidents, positioning 
Tōhoku as the costliest natural disaster in world history.9 
United Nations statistics summarizing disasters losses over the last 10 years put our global 
experience with disaster into stark context: 
                                                 
5 British Columbia, News Release, “Mount Polley Tailings Pond Situation Update” (8 August 2014) online: 
Environment <https://news.gov.bc.ca/stories/friday-aug-8---mount-polley-tailings-pond-situation-update>.  
6 World Health Organization, Media Release, “Ebola Virus Disease, Fact Sheet no 103”, (updated April 2015) 
online: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/; and see The World Bank, Brief, “World Bank Group 
Ebola Response Fact Sheet” (7 July 2015) online: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/health/brief/world-bank-
group-ebola-fact-sheet>  (“This includes restoring basic health services, helping countries get all children back in 
school, farmers back planting in their fields, businesses back up and running, and investors back into the countries. 
We are helping countries reignite their economies, strengthen their health systems, and build back better”. Further, 
The World Bank reports that it continues to respond to the Ebola crisis by “working closely with the affected 
countries, the United Nations, WHO, bilateral, civil society and private sector partners to support response and 
recovery” demonstrating the large scale international cooperative efforts that continue to inform the demands that 
the pandemic has created.). 
7 “10 Largest Oil Spills in History” The Telegraph (7 October 2015) online: The Telegraph 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/newzealand/8812598/10-largest-oil-spills-in-
history.html> (Note: The Telegraph credits popularmechanics.com as the source of their article). 
8 Ibid. (According to the Telegraph: “[t]he spill caused extensive damage to marine and wildlife habitats and to the 
Gulf's fishing and tourism industries. Skimmer ships, floating containment booms, anchored barriers, sand-filled 
barricades along shorelines, and dispersants were used in an attempt to protect hundreds of miles of beaches, 
wetlands, and estuaries from the spreading oil. Scientists also reported immense underwater plumes of dissolved oil 
not visible at the surface as well as an 80-square-mile "kill zone" surrounding the blown well”.). 
9 Bo Zhang, “Top 5 Most Expensive Natural Disasters in History”, AccuWeather.com (30 March 2011) online: 
AccuWeather.com http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/top-5-most-expensive-natural-d/47459?partner=. 
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Over 700 thousand people have lost their lives, over 1.4 million have been injured and 
approximately 23 million have been made homeless as a result of disasters. Overall, 
more than 1.5 billion people have been affected by disasters in various ways, with 
women, children and people in vulnerable situations disproportionately affected. The 
total economic loss was more than $1.3 trillion. In addition, between 2008 and 2012, 
144 million people were displaced by disasters… Evidence indicates that exposure of 
persons and assets in all countries has increased faster than vulnerability has decreased, 
thus generating new risks and a steady rise in disaster-related losses, with a significant 
economic, social, health, cultural and environmental impact in the short, medium and 
long term, especially at the local and community levels. … All countries – especially 
developing countries… are faced with increasing levels of possible hidden costs and 
challenges in order to meet financial and other obligations.10  
Escalating disaster experience worldwide occupying domestic and internal governance regimes 
coupled with the ever-broadening forums for public information exchange (such as social media 
and real time event coverage etc.) insures that catastrophes will continue to capture global 
attention and imagination. 
As a society, it would seem then that we think a great deal about calamity. Yet arguably, that 
thought does not extend far beyond our personal and emotive experience with emergencies as 
transmuted through the sensational lens of media. There is relatively little public debate in 
Canada on the messy governance mechanics of managing large-scale emergencies, particularly 
as to the balancing of competing interests and equitably distribution of management resources. 
Terrorism intelligence debates dominate critical analysis of Public Safety Canada’s enabling 
legislation, policies and strategic priorities, while wide scale funding cuts to provincial disaster 
recovery assistance receive relatively little public scrutiny.11 Yet, all populations in Canada have 
an interest in effective emergency management, as no one is immune from the potentially 
destructive forces of nature, the onset of new disease, or the occasional catastrophic outcomes of 
technical failures and human error causing industrial accidents.  
As a nation, Canada has not yet experienced a “catastrophe”. In the disaster planning 
literature, a catastrophe is understood as “a disaster that results in an economic loss of 2% of a 
                                                 
10 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, GA Res 69/283, UNGAOR, 69th Sess, A/Res/69/283, 
(2015) 1/24 at 3/24 para 4, online: <http://www.preventionweb.net/files/resolutions/N1516716.pdf> [Sendai 
Framework].  
11 Paul Withers, “Nova Scotia to be hit by federal disaster assistance cut” CBC News (23 January 2015) online: 
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/nova-scotia-to-be-hit-by-federal-disaster-assistance-cut-
1.2928829>.  
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country’s Gross Domestic Product”, meaning that “a [two] trillion dollar economy such as 
Canada experiences a catastrophe at a 40 billion dollar event.”12 Yet Canada is a geographically 
large nation that faces many hazards. In disaster planning terms, hazards are those physical 
threats produced by nature that can develop into disasters particularly where people are 
vulnerable or unprepared.13 Not only has Canada not yet experienced a catastrophe, according to 
the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction, Canada is unprepared: “current recovery programs 
are insufficient given they were not designed to manage catastrophic events”.14 
We know through observation of global experience with catastrophes that planning, 
prevention and mitigation reduce vulnerability to hazards, which can in turn lessen the costs of a 
given disaster event in every respect (i.e. lives saved, injuries avoided, infrastructure stability, 
economic loss minimized, social order maintained, etc.). In fact, the new United Nations Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 emphasizes ‘disaster risk management as 
opposed to disaster management’.15 Governments are increasingly interested in disaster risk 
reduction the world over in part because of the growing costs of disaster recovery; since 2000, 
international disaster costs have reached two and half trillion US dollars.16 The Economist 
recently reported on the “insurance protection” gap, which is “the difference between insured 
and uninsured losses when natural catastrophes strike”, stating that of the “$101 billion in global 
economic losses in 2014, nearly half stemmed from floods, cyclones and other disasters in Asia. 
                                                 
12 Public Safety Canada, Fifth Annual National Roundtable on Disaster Risk Reduction, Rethinking Roles in 
Disaster Risk Reduction: Canada’s Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Final Report 2014) at 12-13 [Canada 
RoundTable] (Moderator: Paul Kovacs) (Parallel Session 1: Case Studies: Canadian Extreme of Extremes, Institute 
for Catastrophic Loss Reduction - “Canada hasn’t had a catastrophe yet, but we could. It would most likely be a 
severe earthquake in Vancouver or in Montreal. The scale would be far beyond what Canadians have ever seen. 
Current recovery programs […] will be insufficient because they are not designed for this magnitude.”). 
13 But see Sendai Framework, supra note 10 at 3/24 fn 4 (providing a much more expansive definition of hazard as 
“A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of life or injury, 
property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation. Hazards can include latent 
conditions that may represent future threats and can have different origins: natural (geological, hydrometeorological 
and biological) or induced by human processes (environmental degradation and technological hazards).”). 
14 Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 12 (current recovery programs are insufficient given they were not 
designed to manage catastrophic events). 
15 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction,  Proceedings, Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction in Sendai City, Miyagi Prefecture, Japan (18 March 2015) at 9 [emphasis added] [UN Disaster 
Conference] online: <http://www.preventionweb.net/files/45069_proceedingsthirdunitednationsworldc.pdf>.  
16 Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 13 (at the time of this writing, the total of two and a half trillion dollars 
constitutes 15 cumulative years of disaster losses. The UN figures cited earlier only go back 10 years). 
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Of these, only 8% were covered by insurance…. compared with 60% in America”.17 The result 
of the insurance gap in Nepal, according to the Economist, means that while the earthquake is 
thought to have produced around $5 billion in damage (about 25% of that nation’s GDP), the 
insurance bill will only reach about $160 million dollars. The article alludes to the serious and 
growing problem worldwide of financing disaster recovery. While interagency cooperatives are 
developing and testing new international private insurance schemes to assist governments in 
transferring risk in various spots around the world,18 another significant cost saving measure 
governments are increasingly adopting is serious investment in sound prevention strategies 
before disasters strike.19  
When we understand law and governance as vehicles of social harmony and security, we can 
posit emergency management in its broadest sense as an interesting and compelling area of law 
that merits our attention and diligent public scrutiny. Disaster risk reduction, another phrase for 
reduced hazard vulnerability, is a growing objective around the world. There are strong reasons 
to minimize injury and loss of life, lower costs and reduce social and economic disruption arising 
from a given population’s experience with hazards. When considered in this light, diligent 
emergency management practices are arguably an important, if not an essential, component of 
peace, order and good governance.20 
When we speak of managing emergencies, particularly when we speak of responding to an 
emergency, urgency and gravity are implied. Outcomes are uncertain, stakes can be high and 
expediency in offering and procuring assistance can be determinative in minimizing destruction 
                                                 
17 “Insurance in Asia: Narrow Minded”, The Economist, (13 June 2015) online: The Economist 
<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21654056-asia-can-do-more-protect-itself-risk-natural-catastrophes-
narrow-minded>. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Intuitively we can reason that sound prevention requires thoughtful assessment of hazard risk, careful planning 
and wise investment of resources according to a given government’s priorities for mitigation. 
20 The POGG power is often referenced in terms of a residual power of Parliament to generally make laws outside of 
those areas enumerated as exclusively within the provincial sphere of governance.  However, the peace, order and 
good governance clause also speaks to an important central aim of governance, and is likewise is echoed as such in 
the South African constitution (of significance later in this thesis). See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 
3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 at s 91 [Constitution Act, 1867] (“It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good 
Government of Canada…”); and see Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, No 108 of 1996 s 41 
[Constitution, South Africa] (“All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must a. preserve 
the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic; b. secure the well-being of the people of the 
Republic; c. provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole…”).  
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and loss of life. Canada’s democratic institutions, entrenched rights, and Charter values arising 
from both the written and unwritten portions of Canada’s constitution are not particularly 
conducive to the idea of efficacy in governance, even in emergencies. Canadians must grapple 
with the question of whether some rights can legally and ethically be defied in the interest of 
effective emergency response and disaster recovery. The question is not novel, and the answer 
has varied over time and with changing political sentiment.21 Today, Parliament strikes a balance 
of priorities in the Emergencies Act by outlining specific emergency powers along with specific 
constraints in order to protect Charter rights, Canada’s division of powers, and continued 
democratic governance.  
As I later explore in-depth, completely absent from the statutory framework that seeks to 
protect some of Canada’s key constitutional values during a state of emergency is any overt 
language that speaks to ensuring the priority of s. 35 Aboriginal rights. In fact, as I will 
demonstrate, First Nations are for the most part absent from the regulatory and statutory 
frameworks that operate to manage emergencies generally within British Columbia. While the 
government of Canada has recently set new budgetary priorities on enhancing emergency 
planning and mitigation on-reserve, the landscape is basically silent on the role of First Nations 
in managing emergencies off-reserve, whether within their ancestral territories generally or their 
Aboriginal title territories specifically. As this thesis will explore, there are some nuances where 
there is a measure of First Nation inclusion in emergency management off reserve.22 However, 
                                                 
21 See H. D. Munroe, “Style within the centre: Pierre Trudeau, the War Measures Act, and the nature of prime 
ministerial power” (2011) 54.4 Canadian Public Administration: 531; and see Library and Archives Canada, “Notes 
for a national broadcast, October 16, 1970”, online: Library and Archives Canada 
<https://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/primeministers/h4-4065-e.html> (for a copy of Prime Minister Trudeau’s 
speech regarding invocation of the War Measures Act); War Measures Act, 1914, RSC 1927 c 206, as repealed by 
Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp). 
22 A handful of modern treaties have emergency management provisions. See e.g. Tla’amin Final Agreement, 
Tla’amin Nation and British Columbia and Canada, 21 October 2011 [enters into force April 2016] online: 
<http://www.bctreaty.net/nations/agreements/Tlaamin-Final-Agreement_Initialled.pdf> at s 130 [Tla’amin Final 
Agreement] (“The Tla’amin Nation has: a. the rights, powers, duties and obligations; and b. the protections, 
immunities and limitations in respect of liability of a local authority under Federal and Provincial Law in relation to 
emergency preparedness and emergency measures on Tla’amin Lands”); Tla’amin Final Agreement Act, SC 2014 c 
11; Tla’amin Final Agreement Act, SBC 2013 c 2.  In addition, there are some arrangements for mutual aid in fire 
suppression.  See British Columbia, Emergency Management BC, EMBC Interim Policy and Procedures Bulletin 
Fire Season 2015, “Reimbursement for local government fire services during wildland urban interface fires”, online: 
<http://www.embc.gov.bc.ca/ofc/interface/pdf/reimbursbull.pdf> [BC Fires Bulletin] (where on-reserve First Nation 
fire suppression bodies are characterised as ‘local authorities’ for the purposes of delivery of and compensation for 
fire suppression services); but see British Columbia, Emergency Management BC, Addendum to EMBC Interim 
Policy and Procedures Bulletin Fire Season 2015, “Response Claim Procedures and Eligibility”, online: 
<http://www.embc.gov.bc.ca/ofc/interface/pdf/reimbursad.pdf> (note in particular bulletin no 4 “Pay Invoices – 
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the general all-hazards emergency management statutory and regulatory framework offers 
practically no guidance to public servants, or the public itself, as to the priority of s. 35 
Aboriginal rights in the execution of emergency management activities. 
Perhaps the ultimate test of the strength of rights arises in periods of crisis. Scrutiny as to 
what can be ignored and what is to be upheld at all costs can provide a naked view of the core 
values of society. In practical terms, it might be said that it is easier to ignore poorly understood 
rights than enforce them, especially during an emergency. In examining Canada’s and British 
Columbia’s relationship to First Nations, what is ignored and what is upheld at all costs can 
provide valuable insight into the strength of rights First Nations hold under Canada’s 
Constitution Act, 1982.23  
In line with our social conditioning from popular media’s obsession with disasters, it is 
perhaps tempting to focus on the dramatic aspect of emergencies and our emotive experience 
with response efforts. However, from a law and governance perspective, particularly when 
evaluating the suspension of rights, it is extremely important to understand emergency 
management as a much larger and longer process, as I will set out in detail later in this thesis. 
Planning and mitigating for emergencies requires careful prudence in the allocation and use of 
resources, a measured process that ideally reflects efficacy but does not take place at an urgent 
pace. Risk reduction (through effective planning and mitigation) is currently a central focus 
globally on improving emergency management regimes and those processes occur in advance of 
an emergency event without any of the urgency required during a response effort. Disaster 
recovery likewise can take months, even years.  
As I have indicated above, disasters are extremely economically relevant as well. Not only 
can (uninsured) astronomical costs arise from a single disaster event, the expenditures involved 
in disaster recovery and even protracted mitigation efforts can distort local micro-economies and 
                                                 
local authorities are expected to pay response costs first and then submit a claim”). So while First Nations are to 
some extent included in fire suppression management off-reserve being characterised as ‘local authorities’ for the 
purposes of the policy bulletin, the remuneration for those services is at the behest of available funds overseen by 
the federal Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development as the expectation is that First Nations are 
fiscally able to deliver the services and collect compensation after the fact, as is commonplace in the provincially 
orchestrated emergency fire management strategy. Fiscal exclusion can be a potent barrier operating to exclude First 
Nation from emergency management generally, irrespective that individual policies, such as the one outlined here, 
suggests First Nations are included as ‘local authorities’.  
23 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].  
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actually operate to stimulate an otherwise depressed local economy. For example, in some 
remote communities where resource economies have slowed, boosts in local employment and 
services can arise from largescale recovery efforts where (say) a major highway is rendered 
unusable or other major infrastructure damage has taken place. Or, a boost to a local economy 
can arise from a largescale mitigation project (for example construction of a floodway) with the 
job creation potential and service delivery requirements largescale industrial projects demand. 
The potential for micro-economy stimulation raises important issues as to whether emergency 
management practices could dually serve economic development and capacity building agendas 
currently directed at (and arguably faltering in) remote First Nation communities. 
The timing is ripe to more deeply consider and address First Nation roles in Canada’s 
emergency management framework for many reasons, not least of which is escalating interest in 
emergency management globally. Disaster risk among indigenous populations has captured the 
particular interest of the United Nations Economic and Social Council Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues regarding more inclusive engagement of ‘indigenous peoples in the disaster 
risk reduction process.24 The (3rd) UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction recently 
convened in Sendai Japan and pointedly included priorities respecting indigenous peoples within 
the conference results.25 The outcome of the global conference was the adoption of the new 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-203026 that replaces the Hyogo Framework 
for Action 2005-2015.27 Key sections addressing indigenous peoples in the new framework 
include: 
s. 24(i) Ensure the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge and practices, 
as appropriate, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk assessment and 
                                                 
24 Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Study on engaging indigenous peoples more inclusively in the process of 
disaster risk reduction by respecting linguistic and cultural practices of indigenous peoples known to be at risk, 
UNESCOR, 12th Sess, E/C.19/2013/14 (2013), (Item 3 on the provisional agenda, follow up on the 
recommendations of the Permanent Forum) online: <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/237/85/PDF/N1323785.pdf?OpenElement>. 
25 UN Disaster Conference, supra note 15; contra Report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction Kobe, 
Hyogo, Japan, 18-22 January 2005, UNGAOR, 2005, A/CONF.206/6, 6 at 14 s 3(i) (a) ‘Priorities for Action’, 
online: <http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/official-doc/L-docs/Final-report-conference.pdf> [Hyogo 
Framework 2005-2015] (There is only one reference to indigenous peoples in the Hyogo Framework found in 
s.3(i)(a): “Provide easily understandable information on disaster risks and protection options, especially to citizens 
in high-risk areas, to encourage and enable people to take action to reduce risks and build resilience. The 
information should incorporate relevant traditional and indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage and be tailored 
to different target audiences, taking into account cultural and social factors”.). 
26 Sendai Framework, supra note 10.  
27 Hyogo Framework 2005-2015, supra note 25.  
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the development and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and programmes 
of specific sectors, with a cross-sectoral approach, which should be tailored to 
localities and to the context;28  
s. 27(h) Empower local authorities, as appropriate, through regulatory and financial 
means to work and coordinate with civil society, communities and indigenous 
peoples and migrants in disaster risk management at the local level;29  
s. 36(v) Indigenous peoples, through their experience and traditional knowledge, 
provide an important contribution to the development and implementation of plans 
and mechanisms, including for early warning;30 
More analysis could be done contemplating whether the Sendai Framework reflects the content 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.31 Section 7 of the Sendai 
Framework, for example, adopts language that seems to contradict Indigenous self-governance 
and self-determination: 
While recognizing their leading role, regulatory and coordination role, 
Governments should engage with relevant stakeholders, including women, children 
and youth, persons with disabilities, poor people, migrants, indigenous peoples, 
volunteers, the community of practitioners and older persons in the design and 
implementation of policies, plans and standards.32 
The unfortunate implication of section 7 of the Sendai Framework is that it categorizes 
indigenous peoples as ‘stakeholders’, which is inconsistent with the language and commitments 
implicit in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. More analysis is 
needed to determine the degree of consistency of the Sendai Framework with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Further analysis will likely demonstrate that 
current ideas on the execution of government engagement with Indigenous Peoples in disaster 
management fall short of respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.33 However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is enough to note the growing international 
                                                 
28 Sendai Framework, supra note 10 at s. 24 (i). 
29 Sendai Framework, supra note 10 at s. 27 (h). 
30 Sendai Framework, supra note 10 at s. 36 (v). 
31 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGAOR Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007) [UNDRIP].  
32 Sendai Framework, supra note 10 at s. 7. 
33 And see International Day for Disaster Reduction 2015: ‘Knowledge for Life’, UNISDR, Concept Note, online:  
<http://www.unisdr.org/2015/iddr/documents/IDDR15ConceptNoteFINAL.pdf> (Currently, the United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction is framing the “International Day for Disaster Reduction 2015” as ‘Knowledge 
for Life’ as part of using the day to: “(1) Raise awareness of the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge 
and practices, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk management; (2) Highlight approaches for 
engaging local communities and indigenous peoples in implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction”. The desired outcomes are “1. Greater global awareness of the importance of traditional, indigenous and 
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consciousness of the need for governments to better engage with Indigenous peoples in disaster 
risk reduction governance processes  
On the domestic front, Canada is demonstrating increased awareness of the need to better 
integrate indigenous perspectives in domestic disaster risk reduction. At Public Safety Canada’s 
most recent round table on disaster risk reduction, a session was devoted to “Enhancing 
Aboriginal Planning and Preparedness”.34 The Panel identified that “Aboriginal (First Nations, 
Metis and Inuit) involvement in planning and preparing for disasters varies widely across 
Canada, depending on jurisdiction, cultural group, geography and capacities”.35 The Panel 
further identified that “more personnel are needed to work in First Nation communities on 
[Disaster Risk Reduction, DRR] issues, especially in mitigation and preparation as well as in the 
provision of psycho-social support. Working with the community as a whole was recognized as 
highly important, rather than limiting discussions to selected community representatives”.36 
Consistent with the view of other collaborative bodies, the Panel predicted that the “[f]requency 
of humanitarian crises due to disasters is expected to continue to rise”.37 Yet, highlighting the 
heightened vulnerability of First Nations, the Panel suggested that “[t]he situation for First 
Nations [is]…in a constant state of disaster, where current conditions are not acceptable, let 
alone when faced with disaster”.38 The Panel offered concluding thoughts that hinted at some 
discord: 
                                                 
local knowledge and practices to disaster risk reduction; 2. Inclusion of indigenous people / local communities in the 
design and implementation of national DRR programmes; 3. Public discourse to promote attitudinal and behavioural 
changes towards inclusion of indigenous peoples and consultation at the community level”).  
34 Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 15-16 (“Parallel Session 2: Enhancing Aboriginal Planning and 
Preparedness”, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada & Resilient Communities Working Group – 
Aboriginal Resilience Sub-group).  
35 Ibid. at 15. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. [emphasis added] (“The circle discussion provided the airing of grief and frustration over conditions such as 
waste disposal, potable water, and emergency care. It was strongly voiced that funding for ongoing delivery of 
emergency care training should be made available”); and see James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya – Addendum – The situation of indigenous peoples in Canada UNHRC, 
27th Sess, A/HRC/27/52/Add.2 (4 July 2014), online: <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/countries/2014-report-
canada-a-hrc-27-52-add-2-en.pdf> [Anaya, UNHRC Report] at para 15 (“15. The most jarring manifestation of those 
human rights problems is the distressing socioeconomic conditions of indigenous peoples in a highly developed 
country. Although in 2004 the previous Special Rapporteur recommended that Canada intensify its measures to 
close the human development indicator gap between indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians in health care, 
housing, education, welfare and social services, there has been no reduction in that gap in the intervening period in 
relation to registered Indians/First Nations, although socioeconomic conditions for Métis and non-status Indians 
have improved, according to government data. The statistics are striking. Of the bottom 100 Canadian communities 
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There was agreement on a larger systemic problem but willingness among some to 
work with the resource envelop available. DRR education was highlighted as a 
priority with a focus on learning coming from aboriginal peoples. Although 
following the traditional ways had worked for centuries, current Aboriginal 
approaches need to be adapted to make local community level emergency plans 
considerate of regional geographic differences and traditional knowledge. The Five 
Feather program in Ontario was noted as an example train-the-trainer program 
relying on First Nations ownership of their individual emergency plans.39 
The panel outcomes demonstrate heightened awareness around systemic issues pertaining to 
First Nation (Aboriginal) roles within current emergency management strategies; however, the 
Panel offered limited corrective guidance. Extensive change may be difficult due to the 
limitations of the current governance frameworks themselves, as explored in depth in this thesis. 
With disaster events on the rise globally, the economic consequences of those disasters 
reaching epic proportions, and the United Nations providing some supportive leadership on 
systemic issues in disaster recovery, governments around the world are wisely reviewing their 
emergency management protocols in order to reduce disaster risk and commensurate disaster 
costs.40 Canada is no exception. In 2005 the Government of Canada established a new federal 
department called “the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, over which 
the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, appointed by commission under the 
Great Seal, presides”.41 Following the establishment of the new ministry, Parliament repealed the 
Emergency Preparedness Act42 in 2007 and replaced it with the now authoritative Emergency 
Management Act.43  
I have divided this thesis into two distinctive parts. In the first part, I look to the legislative 
and regulatory frameworks to get a sense of how much guidance is offered to Canada’s, and 
British Columbia’s, public service with respect to the constitutional status of First Nations. I look 
for particular reference to First Nation roles in decision-making (including budgetary and 
financial oversight) and service delivery (emergency management execution as in the 
                                                 
on the Community Well-Being Index, 96 are First Nations and only one First Nation community is in the top 100.” 
[footnotes omitted]). 
39 Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 15-16. 
40 Ibid. at 12-14 (“Although not much can be done to change the hazard, vulnerability can be reduced” at 12). 
41 Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, RSC 2005, c 10 s 2 [emphasis added] [Emergency 
Department Act].  
42 Emergency Preparedness Act, RSC 1988, c 11, repealed by Emergency Management Act, RSC 2007, c 15 s 13. 
43 Emergency Management Act, RSC 2007, c 15.  
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employment and contract as well as the training and capacity building opportunities). To that 
end, I provide a cursory exploration of British Columbia’s emergency management framework, 
specifically emphasizing gaps in First Nation inclusion within the regime. I also provide 
examples throughout the thesis of current fiscal approaches to financing emergency management 
that can actually work against First Nation inclusion particularly in off-reserve emergency 
management. Notably, I have not accessed the internal documents of statutory bodies such as the 
British Columbian Provincial Emergency Program, which may well provide some public servant 
guidance on First Nation engagement (particularly framed as consultation objectives). Nor have I 
undertaken an exhaustive survey of any existing First Nation-specific protocols and the status of 
their implementation. Within the current regime, such protocols would likely mostly exist 
between local authorities and First Nations, with local authorities being a creature of provincial 
statute. Rather, again for the sake of scoping, I have limited my analysis to statutes and 
regulations given their prescriptive function over Crown administration generally and given their 
status as reflective of the constitutional bodies of Parliament and legislatures. 
In the second part of this thesis, I suggest that the relative exclusion of First Nations from 
emergency management off reserve is part of a larger ‘obligation gap’ of the Crown failing to 
implement Aboriginal rights generally, touching on modern treaties as a potential source of 
remedies that remains currently problematic. I also briefly consider the utility of current 
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence toward improving Crown inclusion of First Nations in 
emergency management. I conclude that within the current trend of judicial thought, that 
approach would likely only formalize First Nations in a passive role as ‘the consulted’ instead of 
positioning First Nations in their rightful place as self-determining and self-governing governing 
bodies in their own right. Even the recent Tsilhqot’in decision on Aboriginal title is of limited 
promise as a stopgap solution. That said, its heightening of jurisdictional conflicts over 
management of Aboriginal title territories may offer further legal incentives to clarify First 
Nation emergency management roles off-reserve. 
To understand the ‘obligation gap’ I analyze and critique what appears to be the standing 
philosophical approach to Aboriginal rights in Canadian jurisprudence, which treats those rights 
as ‘negative rights’. I offer a theoretical alternative that philosophically frames s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights as ‘recognition rights’. I then argue for the precedential application of South African 
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socioeconomic constitutional rights jurisprudence, likening South Africa’s socioeconomic rights 
to Canada’s s. 35 Aboriginal rights as both could be understood as ‘recognition rights’. The 
proposition is aimed at challenging Canada’s obligation gap in implementing and enforcing First 
Nations’ Aboriginal rights. This ultimately has implications not only for emergency management 
but also for other governance areas where the Crown does not offer statutory or regulatory 
implementation of s. 35 priorities. I conclude that the missing key in Canada’s current paradigm 
of s. 35 Aboriginal rights and Crown goals of reconciliation is accountability for government 
inaction, which I argue the judiciary could provide if the courts adopted a ‘recognition rights’ 
approach to Canadian Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. 
The focus of my analysis throughout the thesis is confined to the federal and British 
Columbia provincial legislative schemes impacting emergency management of what is 
commonly known as natural disasters within the boundaries of British Columbia. I further 
consider Crown emergency management governance relations with First Nations (government to 
government) specifically, as opposed to offering a more broad analysis that considers Aboriginal 
peoples generally. Each province and territory of Canada has an emergency management 
legislative scheme and specific protocols and agreements with the Government of Canada. Some 
of the British Columbia practices will be consistent with other provinces and territories, and 
others will not. And, of course, all Aboriginal peoples, not just First Nations, have an interest in 
inclusive emergency management structures. As such I hope that parts of this thesis may be 
useful to invoke further critical analysis of the emergency management legal landscape 
throughout Canada as well as informing some further thought and commentary on the current 
status of Aboriginal inclusion in emergency management regimes more broadly. 
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SECTION 2 – FIRST NATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN LEGISLATIVE AND TREATY 
             FRAMEWORKS (BRITISH COLUMBIA) 
2.1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMPONENTS 
The idea of ‘an emergency’ implies crisis and urgency. Citizens typically call upon 
governments to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies that are public in nature 
and scope. As in most areas that involve collective efforts and a pooling of resources, parameters 
of engagement are essential to delineate roles and responsibilities. It is therefore not surprising 
that there exists an entire body of statutory law devoted to categorizing emergencies and 
authorizing their management. In the past decade alone several international and domestic 
changes in emergency management philosophy and practice have emerged. 
Throughout Canada, emergency management is generally understood to involve four distinct 
phases: emergency mitigation (or prevention), emergency preparation (or planning), emergency 
response, and emergency recovery. In An Emergency Management Framework for Canada, the 
federal, provincial and territorial governments of Canada collaborated to produce a common 
approach to various emergency management initiatives and provide a universal definition of each 
component of emergency management.44 
That Emergency Management Framework for Canada clarifies the purpose of emergency 
‘mitigation (or prevention)’ as follows: 
to eliminate or reduce the risks of disasters in order to protect lives, property, the 
environment, and reduce economic disruption. Prevention/mitigation include 
structural mitigative measures (e.g. construction of floodways and dykes) and non-
structural mitigative measures (e.g. building codes, land-use planning, and 
insurance incentives). Prevention and mitigation may be considered independently 
or one may include the other.45 
Mitigation, as such, prioritizes reducing (or eliminating) disaster risk. 
Emergency ‘preparation (or planning)’ according to An Emergency Management Framework 
for Canada is: “to be ready to respond to a disaster and manage its consequences through 
                                                 
44 Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management, An Emergency Management 
Framework for Canada, 2nd ed., January 2011 (Ottawa: Emergency Management Policy Directorate Public Safety 
Canada, 2011) online: Public Safety Canada <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/mrgnc-mngmnt-
frmwrk/mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-eng.pdf> [FPT Framework 2011]. 
45 Ibid. at 4. 
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measures taken prior to an event, for example emergency response plans, mutual assistance 
agreements, resource inventories and training, equipment and exercise programs”.46 A vast range 
of activities aimed at disaster preparedness could thus fall under the umbrella of emergency 
preparedness. 
According to An Emergency Management Framework for Canada, emergency ‘response’ is 
limited to acting “during or immediately before or after a disaster to manage its consequences 
through, for example, emergency public communication, search and rescue, emergency medical 
assistance and evacuation to minimize suffering and losses associated with disasters”.47 
Obviously, effective emergency mitigation and preparedness will deeply impact the effectiveness 
of emergency response. Much emergency preparedness is targeted at effective emergency 
response whereas mitigation focuses on minimizing the final component of emergency 
management, emergency recovery.  
Emergency ‘recovery’, according to the Framework, is: “to repair or restore conditions to an 
acceptable level through measures taken after a disaster, for example return of evacuees, trauma 
counselling, reconstruction, economic impact studies and financial assistance”.48 As the 
Framework explains, the recovery stage (particularly in the area of reconstruction) could itself 
serve as a component of future emergency mitigation.49  
When assessing emergency management regimes, it is important to orient a given 
conversation to the specific emergency management component (mitigation/prevention, 
preparation/planning, response, or recovery) under discussion. As outlined above, each area of 
emergency management has different central objectives and therefore requires distinct regulatory 
considerations and funding strategies. For example, preparation/planning and mitigation 
activities are typically more thoughtful and protracted processes aimed at wisely using current 
resources to offset or minimize future disaster risk, whereas emergency response and recovery 
put emergency plans into action and test mitigation efforts.  
                                                 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. (“There is a strong relationship between long-term sustainable recovery and prevention and mitigation of 
future disasters. Recovery effort should be conducted with a view towards disaster risk reduction.”). 
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In order to posit First Nation engagement in emergency management activities, it is not only 
important to delineate legislative regimes informing all four components of emergency 
management, but also to achieve clarity on legislated conditions that trigger temporary, irregular 
governance processes. For example, emergency response and recovery might require simplified 
decision-making processes for the sake of efficacy—particularly where lives depend on 
emergency responders’ empowerment to act. Careful consideration of what constitutes an 
emergency is necessary to further effective emergency management from a governance 
perspective. 
Honourable Crown consultation with First Nations potentially impacted by a given 
emergency risk requires a mutually informed premise of what constitutes an emergency and the 
measures that will best effect emergency response and recovery. As will later be explored, some 
emergency mitigation and emergency planning requirements are not identified explicitly as such 
in various regulatory schemes, particularly in the area of industrial resource extraction, transport 
and use (processing). First Nation engagement is critical and constitutionally required in all four 
phases of emergency management and could be impaired by the obfuscation of regulatory 
objectives pertaining to emergency management, particularly in the areas of prevention and 
preparedness. 
Given that a central aim of this thesis is to demystify emergency management impacting First 
Nations and their territories, the following sections explore how Canada and British Columbia 
currently define emergencies and surveys legislative decrees on who brokers the responsibility 
and authority over and within the four components of emergency management. The following 
introductory survey of emergency definitions and emergency management jurisdictions is limited 
to federal statutes and acts of the British Columbia legislature. Similar legislated parameters 
governing what is an emergency and how emergencies are governed can be found in the laws 
and regulations of each province and territory of Canada, though they are not explored per se in 
this thesis. For convenience and clarity, contemporary geographical and jurisdictional references 
to the areas now known as Canada and British Columbia are used throughout the thesis without 
intention to detract from the integrity of First Nation claims to their traditional and ancestral 
territories. 
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2.2 CROWN CONCEPTS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION 
  2.2.1 CATEGORIZING EMERGENCIES 
  2.2.1.1 FEDERAL EMERGENCIES 
As earlier related, in 2005 the Government of Canada established a new federal department 
called the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.50 Following the 
establishment of the new ministry, Parliament repealed the Emergency Preparedness Act in 2007 
and replaced it with the Emergency Management Act.51 The repeal and enactment of new 
legislation governing emergency response at the federal level was significant on several grounds. 
Most notably, the newer Emergency Management Act in decreeing the powers of the new 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness created an official planning and 
implementation oversight government body.52 Under the older Emergency Preparedness Act, the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness did not exist. Development and 
implementation of emergency plans as well as coordination of emergency preparedness and 
response among federal “government institutions and in cooperation with provincial 
governments, foreign governments and international organizations” was handled by any given 
minister designated by the Governor in Council53, provided that minister was a member of the 
Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.54  
Other changes between the older and newer federal emergency legislation include a shift in 
emphasis from ‘preparedness’ to ‘management”. Not only has the name of the governing statute 
been changed to specify ‘management’ as opposed to ‘preparedness’,55 ‘emergency 
management’ as a concept is now defined in the federal legislation.56 The definition is important 
                                                 
50 Emergency Department Act, supra note 41 at s 2 [emphasis added].  
51 Emergency Management Act, supra note 43.  
52 Ibid. at ss 3, 4. 
53 See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20, ss. 11, 13 (“The Provisions of this Act referring to the Governor 
General in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor General acting by and with the Advice of the 
Queen’s Privy Council for Canada”; “There shall be a Council to aid and advise in the Government of Canada, to be 
styled the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada; and the Persons who are to be Members of that Council shall be from 
Time to Time chosen and summoned by the Governor General and sworn in as Privy Councillors, and Members 
thereof may be from Time to Time removed by the Governor General”). 
54 Emergency Preparedness Act, supra note 41 at ss 2, 4 [repealed].  
55 See Emergency Management Act, supra note 43 at s 1; see also Emergency Preparedness Act, supra note 41 at s 1 
[Repealed]. 
56 Emergency Management Act, ibid. at s 2 “emergency management”. 
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as emergency management is now the defining legislative priority driving federal accountability 
to our national population as a whole in the preparation of, response to and recovery from 
emergencies. According to the Emergency Management Act, “emergency management” is 
holistic and means “the prevention and mitigation of, preparedness for, response to and recovery 
from emergencies”.57  
The responsibilities of the new Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness are 
expansive. Their extent reflects the deepened attention to emergency management per se under 
the newer legislation. Under the broad heading of “exercising leadership relating to emergency 
management in Canada by coordinating, among government institutions and in cooperation with 
the provinces and other entities, emergency management activities”,58 the Minister’s particular 
responsibilities are detailed at length in the Emergency Management Act,59 although even its 
enumeration is not exhaustive.  
The introduction of a specific office to oversee emergency management as well as the 
enactment of refined duties specific to that office conveys a parliamentary intent to streamline 
emergency management in Canada. In fact, a specific responsibility of the Minister of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness is to promote “a common approach to emergency 
management”60 with particular reference to the “adoption of standards and best practices”.61 This 
is aided by:  
1. the particular responsibility to establish policies, programs and other measures respecting 
the preparation, maintenance, testing and implementation of emergency management 
plans by federal government institutions;62 
2. the broad responsibility to establish policies and programs respecting emergency 
management;63 
3. the authorization to coordinate the Government of Canada’s response to an emergency;64 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. at s 3. 
59 Ibid. at s 4.  
60 Ibid. at s 4(1)(o).  
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. at s 4(1)(a). 
63 Ibid. at s 4(1)(m). 
64 Ibid. at s 4(1)(e). 
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4. the authorization to coordinate with, and support the emergency management of, 
provinces and local authorities,65 including providing assistance to said provinces66 and 
providing financial aid to provinces (as regulated);67 and  
5. the responsibility to promote public awareness,68 conduct research69 and exercises,70 and 
provide education and training71 related to emergency management.  
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness also carries global obligations to 
participate in international emergency management activities in accordance with Canada’s 
foreign relations policies72 and may develop joint plans with the relevant United States 
emergency management authority and likewise coordinate Canada’s response and provisioning 
of assistance to emergencies in the United States.73 
Of particular relevance to this thesis, both the current Emergency Management Act and the 
older Emergency Preparedness Act outline unequivocally a ministerial responsibility to establish 
“the necessary arrangements for the continuity of constitutional government in the event of an 
emergency”74 and to “include in an emergency management plan… any programs, arrangements 
or other measures to provide for the continuity of the operations of the government institution in 
the event of an emergency”.75 The Emergency Management Act as such explicitly contradicts 
any supposition that an emergency might justify the suspension of constitutional government or 
the prima facie discontinuity of government operations. 
                                                 
65 Ibid. at s 4(1)(f). 
66 Ibid. at s 4(1)(i). 
67 Ibid. at s 4(1)(j). 
68 Ibid. at s 4(1)(q). 
69 Ibid. at s 4(1)(p). 
70 Ibid. at s 4(1)(n). 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid. at s 4(1)(k). 
73 Ibid. at s 5; (Though the more recent federal Emergency Management Act empowers the new Minister of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness with a refined scope of responsibilities and authorities, all other federal 
ministers retain the responsibility to prepare, maintain, test and implement emergency management plans specific to 
the self-identified risks (including risks to critical infrastructure) within their respective scopes of authority (Ibid. at 
s 6). It follows that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness does not have exclusive powers to 
liaise with provinces under the auspices of emergency management. In fact, each minister is likewise statutorily 
responsible to include in their emergency management plans “any programs, arrangements or other measures to 
assist provincial governments and local authorities” (Ibid. at s 6(2)(a)) and “any federal-provincial regional plans” 
(Ibid. at s 6(2)(b)).). 
74 Ibid. at s 4(1)(l). 
75 Ibid. at s 6(2)(c). 
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A potentially important question is what Parliament means by “constitutional government” in 
requiring the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Management to establish the necessary 
arrangements to ensure its continuity. Another important question is how the ‘continuity of 
constitutional government section’ in the Emergency Management Act is to be read with the 
Emergencies Act. As alluded to above, Canada’s emergency management statutory framework is 
basically silent on the constitutional priority of s. 35 Aboriginal rights, irrespective that a whole 
new federal department devoted to elevating and improving emergency management throughout 
Canada has been established and well resourced. 
Governance jurisdictions in Canada are notoriously complex and fluid. Rather than act as a 
barrier to First Nation inclusion in emergency management, that fluidity should allow for any 
necessary adjustment of the current roadmap toward First Nation decision-making in emergency 
management to be routed toward ensuring Canada’s s. 35 obligations are met and reconciliation 
objectives achieved. As will be explored later in the thesis, some thought has been put into First 
Nation emergency management within the few modern treaties that have been completed 
between First Nations, British Columbia and Canada.  
Treaty or interim-measures agreements constitute one avenue toward remedying the 
exclusion of First Nations from emergency management within their own respective territories. 
However, on its own, that strategy could place an undue corrective onus on First Nations. 
Negotiations can be long, agreement elusive, and implementation measured at best.  
Implementation in fact is perhaps the most contentious piece of the utility in negotiated 
outcomes. There is a troubling lack of honourable implementation on the Crown’s part of 
established Aboriginal rights, which informs the scope of the omission of s. 35 constitutional 
Aboriginal rights from emergency management frameworks in the first place. In essence, 
throughout this thesis I query whether public servants and contractors who are employed by 
Canada and British Columbia to manage emergencies are even aware of the existence of 
Aboriginal rights, let alone what they should do with those rights as servants of the Crown. 
Canada’s emergency management regime categorizes emergencies rather than trying to offer 
a single expansive definition.76 As such, several ‘emergency’ definitions triggering different 
                                                 
76 Contra Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111, s 1. 
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response strategies are organized under Canada’s Emergencies Act.77 Universal to all 
emergencies categorized under the Emergencies Act is that their character must be that of a 
‘national emergency’. As such, the Emergencies Act almost immediately introduces the 
fundamental category of a ‘national emergency’ as:  
an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that 
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of 
such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a 
province to deal with it, or 
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to 
preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada 
and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada.78 
Each type of emergency categorized under the Emergencies Act must fit within the parameters of 
a ‘national emergency’ in order for the Act to be triggered.79 The Emergencies Act specifies four 
types of emergencies: ‘public welfare emergencies’; ‘public order emergencies’; ‘international 
emergencies’; and ‘war emergencies’. The definition of a ‘national emergency’ is important as it 
prima facie restricts the triggering of this exceptional legislation that works to suspend ordinary 
government measures in favour of temporary ‘emergency measures’ that “may not be 
appropriate in normal times”.80 Another crucial piece of limiting language within the definition 
of a national emergency is the requirement that the situation “cannot be effectively dealt with 
under any other law of Canada”.81 While the concept of “effectively dealt with” is subjective at 
best, one could interpret the national emergency definition as restricting the powers under the 
Emergencies Act to a ‘regime of last resort’. 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Emergencies Act, supra note 21. 
78 Ibid. at s 3.  
79 Ibid. at ss 3, 5, 16, 27, 37 (to meet the definition requirements, the attributes of each of public welfare 
emergencies, public order emergencies, international emergencies, and war emergencies must be “so serious as to be 
a national emergency”).   
80 See ibid. at Preamble. 
81 Ibid. at s 3.  
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1. Types of Emergencies Illustrative Figure 
Figure 1 – Types of Federal Emergencies Categorized under Canada’s Emergencies Act.82 
A “public order emergency” is an “emergency that arises from threats to the security of 
Canada and that is so serious as to be a national emergency”.83 One must look to the meaning 
assigned to ‘threats to the security of Canada’ under section 2 of the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service Act”.84 Again as discussed above, a situation does not constitute a public 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. s 16.  
84 Ibid.; and see Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, RSC 1985, c C-23 s 2 “threats to the security of 
Canada” (“‛threats to the security of Canada’ means (a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is 
detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage, 
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are 
clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person, (c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward 
or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving 
a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and (d) activities directed toward 
undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or 
overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada, but does not include 
lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in 
paragraphs (a) to (d)). 
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order emergency unless it meets the threshold found in the s. 3 definition of a ‘national 
emergency’.85 
The definition of an ‘international emergency’ can be found in Part III of the Emergencies 
Act as “an emergency involving Canada and one or more other countries that arises from acts of 
intimidation or coercion or the real or imminent use of serious force or violence that is so serious 
as to be a national emergency”.86  
Part IV of the Emergencies Act details the meaning of a “war emergency” as “war or other 
armed conflict, real or imminent, involving Canada or any of its allies that is so serious as to be a 
national emergency”.87 
The Emergencies Act defines a ‘public welfare emergency’ as:  
an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent  
(a) fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon, (b) disease 
in human beings, animals or plants, or (c) accident or pollution  
and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a 
breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be 
a national emergency.88 
Each of public order emergencies, international emergencies, and war emergencies involves 
conflict in one form or another while public welfare emergencies expansively include natural 
disasters, epidemics and pandemics, as well as industry related accidents.89 The following 
legislative survey focuses on the specific category of public welfare emergencies within the 
British Columbia regional context. However, it should be noted that parallel concerns on the lack 
of inclusion of Aboriginal perspectives in the understanding and management of public order 
emergencies, international emergencies and war emergencies would necessarily inform any 
treatment of First Nation engagement within management of conflict driven emergencies 
generally. 
                                                 
85 Emergencies Act, ibid. at s 3. 
86 Ibid. at s 27. 
87 Ibid. at s 37. 
88 Ibid. at s 5. 
89 See Public Safety Canada, The Canadian Disaster Database, online: Public Safety Canada 
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/cndn-dsstr-dtbs/index-eng.aspx> (The Canada Disaster Database provides 
an index of a wide plethora of public welfare emergencies experienced throughout Canada).  
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 As alluded to above, while the Emergencies Act is the authoritative federal statute defining a 
‘national public welfare emergency’, other pieces of legislation contribute important content to 
the overarching legislative parameters informing formal emergency management governance 
activities. As will later be explored, the mitigation and preparedness components of public 
welfare emergencies associated with accident or pollution events are typically managed under 
various pieces of industry-specific legislation, often without explicit reference to emergency 
management terminology. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act however does define 
‘environmental emergencies’, thereby adding to the federal repertoire of emergency categories 
and prima facie providing for environmental emergency management outside the Emergencies 
Act.90  
 The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 delineates an ‘environmental emergency’ 
as “an uncontrolled, unplanned or accidental release, or release in contravention of regulations or 
interim orders…of a substance into the environment” or as “the reasonable likelihood of such a 
release into the environment”.91 Integral to a situation falling within the legislative parameters of 
an environmental emergency, the released substance must fall within the regulated list of 
substances found in the Environmental Emergency Regulations.92 
 Depending on the potential scope of impact of a release, an ‘environmental emergency’ 
under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act could also constitute a national public welfare 
emergency as the Emergencies Act definition includes “accident or pollution” “that results or 
may result in a danger to life or property, social disruption or a breakdown in the flow of 
essential goods, services or resources, so serious as to be a national emergency”.93 However, as 
mentioned above, the situation must also be outside the ability of any other law of Canada to 
effectively deal with the situation.94 Further, as will later be explored, an emergency localised 
within provincial boundaries and constituting an aspect of a provincial head of power requires 
                                                 
90 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, RSC 1999, c 33 s. 193 [CEPA]. 
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid. (“’substance’ means…a substance on a list of substances established under regulations or interim orders 
made under this Part”); Environmental Emergency Regulations, SOR/2003-307 s.2 (“For the purposes of the 
definition “substance” in section 193 of the Act, the list of substances consists of the substances set out in column 1 
of Schedule 1 in their pure form or in a mixture that has a concentration equal to or greater than the applicable 
concentration set out in column 2…). 
93 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 5 [emphasis added]. 
94 Ibid. at s 3.  
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the invitation or authorization of the Lieutenant Governor in Council prior to federal execution of 
the Emergencies Act.95 As such, provincial law and resources may be sufficient to manage a 
situation that otherwise might constitute a national public welfare emergency. 
 Further complicating the categorisation of a given emergency situation, the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act’s Environmental Emergency Regulations exclude substances 
dealt with under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act and the Canada Shipping Act.96 
That renders these acts as yet additional significant federal pieces of legislation governing the 
parameters of what constitutes an emergency for the purposes of identifying the appropriate 
regulatory regime governing a particular emergency’s management. So, while certain spills 
could potentially constitute an environmental emergency under the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999, if the spill involves oil or one of the other 1200 or so substances listed in 
the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations,97 the situation does not necessarily trigger 
the environmental emergency protocols per the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
legislative regime—in essence, the CEPA operates as a statute of last resort with respect to 
environmental emergencies.98  
 The Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 and regulations do not define 
‘emergency’ per se. Instead the Act speaks of ‘intervention’99 rather than ‘emergency 
management’ where there may be an actual or anticipated ‘compromise of public safety’.100 That 
                                                 
95 Ibid. at s 14 (see particularly s 14(2) “The Governor in Council may not issue a declaration of a public welfare 
emergency where the direct effects of the emergency are confined to, or occur principally in, one province unless the 
lieutenant governor in council of the province has indicated to the Governor in Council that the emergency exceeds 
the capacity or authority of the province to deal with it”.).  
96 Environmental Emergency Regulations, SOR/2003-307, s 2 (e) (“…unless the substance is being loaded or 
unloaded at a facility”) [CEPA Emergency Regulations]; Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992, SC 1992, c 
34 [TDG Act]; Canada Shipping Act, 2001, SC 2001 c 26.  
97 Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations, SOR/2008-34, Schedule 1, online: Transport Canada 
<http://wwwapps.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/3/sched-ann/schedule1form.aspx> [TDG Regulations] (controlled substances 
database). 
98 CEPA, supra note 90 at  s 200 (2) (“The Governor in Council shall not make a regulation under subsection (1) in 
respect of a matter if, by order, the Governor in Council states that it is of the opinion that (a) the matter is regulated 
by or under any other Act of Parliament that contains provisions that are similar in effect to sections 194 to 205; and 
(b) that Act or any regulation made under that Act provides sufficient protection to human health and the 
environment or its biological diversity”); but see CEPA Emergency Regulations, supra note 96 at s 2 (e) (“…unless 
the substance is being loaded or unloaded at a facility”). 
99 TDG Act, supra note 96 at s 19 (outlining the intervention powers of an ‘inspector’ (s 10, 15) who believes on 
reasonable grounds that there is an actual or potential risk to public safety); and see TDG Act at s 7.1 (identifying 
where the Minister may direct the implementation of an approved emergency response assistance plan).  
100 Ibid. at s 2 (“public safety” means the safety of human life and health and of property and the environment). 
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Parliament intended the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act to regulate emergency 
management is evidenced by the legislative prescription of which substances and minimum 
quantities require an “emergency response assistance plan” prior to transport, as well as 
regulating where the implementation of those plans and ‘incident reporting’ is necessary.101  
 Although the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 does not define emergencies 
explicitly, again because the federal Emergencies Act provides for “accident or pollution” in its 
definition of a ‘public welfare emergency’,102 an ‘unplanned release’ under the Transportation of 
Dangerous Goods Act, 1992 could potentially trigger the declaration of a national emergency.103 
Once again, the Emergencies Act would not come into play unless the situation could not “be 
effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada”.104  Yet, if the emergency impacts moved 
beyond the response capacity of the regulatory body of first resort then potentially the 
Emergencies Act could be triggered.  
 The Fisheries Act provides another federal legislative example of governance situations that 
would otherwise fall under the specific protocols of ‘emergency management’ but for the 
substantial regulatory authorization under the Fisheries Act stipulating controlled or deliberate 
pollution activities.105 Further, the Fisheries Act offers a poignant example of obfuscation of 
disaster management. The terms “deleterious substances” and “deposit” are preferred over 
“pollution” in the Fisheries Act.106 The phrase “serious harm to fish” is a gentler representation 
of “death of fish or any permanent alteration to, or destruction of, fish habitat”.107 Likewise “fish 
habitat” is a deceptively all-encompassing phrase for “spawning grounds and any other areas, 
                                                 
101 See TDG Regulations, supra note 97 at Part 7 and Schedule 1  (Part 7 (ss 7.1-7.13) details: where an Emergency 
Response Assistance Plan (ERAP) is required (s. 7.1); ERAP approval process (s 7.2) of particular note are ss 7.2(g) 
and (h) detailing response capabilities and accidental risk assessment requirements for ERAP approval. There is 
absolutely no mention of First Nation Aboriginal rights protection protocols or delegation of consultation 
requirement in these sections. The omission is significant as industry does not hold the consultation obligation and 
receives its regulatory guidance with respect to its legal requirements for emergency management in the 
transportation of dangerous goods (including any First Nation engagement) through the regulations. TDG regulated 
substances will invariably be transported through First Nation traditional territories putting First Nation 
communities, and their Aboriginal rights, at risk).  
102 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 5. 
103 TDG Act, supra note 96 at s 19.  
104 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 3.  
105 Aquaculture Activities Regulations, SOR/2015-177 s 3 (“An owner or operator of an aquaculture facility may, 
subject to the conditions set out in sections 4 to 14, deposit a deleterious substance specified in section 2 in any 
water or place referred to in section 36(3) of the Act”.); Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c F-14. 
106 Fisheries Act, ibid. at s 34.  
107 Ibid. at s 35 (1).  
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including nursery, rearing, food supply and migration areas, on which fish depend directly or 
indirectly in order to carry out their life processes” (consider the potential enormity of marine 
areas where fish populations carry out these various phases and activities of their life cycles).108 
As such, adopting the language of the Fisheries Act, one could describe the total destruction of a 
community’s essential food fishery from an accidental pollution event as mere ‘serious harm to 
fish from the deposit of a deleterious substance’ as opposed to language connoting a public 
welfare emergency requiring urgent commiserative government action. As with other areas of 
federal jurisdiction contemplating potential emergencies, scope matters. Where the Fisheries Act 
provisions on management of serious harm to fish prove inadequate to manage a particular 
situation,109 then potentially other pieces of emergency directed legislation could be triggered as 
generally outlined above.  
To some extent, the Fisheries Act also functions as a regime of last resort with respect to 
Fisheries Act sanction and enforcement of marine pollution activities, as the Act explicitly defers 
to other Parliamentary acts and regulations that permit the otherwise unlawful pollution 
activities.110 Such an interpretation is of significance where one would otherwise posit the 
destruction of a food fishery as a public welfare emergency.111 In contest with other federal 
                                                 
108 Ibid. at s 2 “fish habitat”; but see Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act, SC 2012, c 19 s. 141 repealing 
Fisheries Act, ibid. at s 34 (1) “fish habitat”, (as such the definition used for the purposes of the text is from the 
general definitions section of the Fisheries Act). 
109 Fisheries Act, ibid. at ss 38(4)-(7.2) (s. 38 (4)-(5) prescribes the notification requirement where either an actual or 
serious and imminent danger of an ‘unauthorized deposit of deleterious substance in water frequented by fish takes 
place; s. 38 (6) prescribes requirement that any person described in subsections (4) and (5) “take all reasonable 
measures consistent with public safety and with the conservation and protection of fish and fish habitat to prevent 
the occurrence or to counteract, mitigate or remedy any adverse effects that result from the occurrence or might 
reasonably be expected to result from it.”; s.38(7.1) empowers inspectors and fisheries officers to respond to a 
situation of (or risk to) serious harm to fish even in the absence of a notification or report on the situation while s.38 
(7.2) gives paramountcy to a Canada Shipping Act response “Any direction of an inspector or fishery officer under 
this section that is inconsistent with any direction under the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency.”); and see Canada Shipping Act, supra note 96. 
110 See e.g. Fisheries Act, ibid at ss 35 (2); 36 (4) (“No person contravenes subsection (3) by depositing or 
permitting the deposit in any water or place of (a) waste or pollutant of a type, in a quantity and under conditions 
authorized by regulations applicable to that water or place made by the Governor in Council under any Act other 
than this Act” (s 36(4)(a) [emphasis added])). 
111 See ibid. at s 36 (3)-(4) (“Subject to subsection (4), no person shall deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious 
substance of any type in water frequented by fish or in any place under any conditions where the deleterious 
substance or any other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of the deleterious substance may enter any 
such water”(s.36(3)) and “No person contravenes subsection (3) by depositing or permitting the deposit in any water 
or place of (a) waste or pollutant of a type, in a quantity and under conditions authorized by regulations applicable to 
that water or place made by the Governor in Council under any Act other than this Act; (b) deleterious substance of 
a class and under conditions… authorized under regulations…” (s.36(4)). 
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statutes that are silent with respect to guidance on protections for s. 35 Aboriginal rights, the 
Fisheries Act does contain at least some promising language relative to Parliamentary respect for 
First Nations’ s. 35 Aboriginal fishery rights at s 6:  
Before recommending to the Governor in Council that a regulation be made in 
respect of …[detailed enumerated list of sections all more or less pertaining to harm 
to fish]…, the Minister shall consider the following factors: (a) the contribution of 
the relevant fish to the ongoing productivity of commercial, recreational or 
Aboriginal fisheries; (b) fisheries management objectives; (c) whether there are 
measures and standards to avoid, mitigate or offset serious harm to fish that are part 
of a commercial, recreational or Aboriginal fishery, or that support such a fishery; 
and (d) the public interest.112 
However, it does not appear that the section particularly respects First Nation self-governance or 
self-determination agency. Rather, it appears that the section essentially operates to inform risk 
assessment criteria in order to guide public servants in the execution of their statutory functions 
while constructively meeting the Crown’s duty to consult. Irrespective that the language of the 
section could be much stronger in terms of respecting First Nations governance of fisheries 
resources, the inclusion of any language at all regarding Aboriginal fisheries is important. The 
inclusion of such language signals Parliamentary recognition that it is possible and perhaps 
necessary to include statutory language protecting and prioritizing Aboriginal rights within 
legislative frameworks. It is perhaps not surprising that the Fisheries Act might set a statutory 
precedent, given the early and prolific case law dealing particularly with the s. 35 makeup of 
Aboriginal fisheries.113 However, much more work is likely needed to achieve wording that 
sufficiently identifies the constitutional priority of s. 35 Aboriginal rights. 
Arguably, section 6 as it is currently drafted reflects persistent dogma that First Nations are 
mere stakeholders (among an enumerated list of stakeholders) within their own territories. This is 
the tone even though section 37 of the Fisheries Act sets out a requirement that the Minister be 
provided information useful to assessing the potential scope of harm an activity may present to 
an Aboriginal food, social or ceremonial fishery, as well as prevention and mitigation 
strategies.114 The interpretive question remains whether otherwise regulated pollution activities 
are exempt from the section 37 requirement. The constitutional status of First Nations is not 
                                                 
112 Fisheries Act, ibid. at s 6.  
113 See e.g. R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075; and see e.g. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507; and see e.g. R v 
Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723. 
114 Fisheries Act, supra note 105 at ss 6 and 37.  
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explicitly identified, nor are Aboriginal rights given the commensurate primacy within the 
language of the legislation.115 
It is insufficient to statutorily prescribe concern for state adduced risks and management 
priorities and omit First Nation self-determination and self-governance agency—all while 
claiming to statutorily reflect the promise of s. 35 Aboriginal rights.116 Self-determination and 
self-governance likely requires First Nations to be their own authors, agents and enforcers of 
assessing and managing risks within their respective territories. While perhaps a step ahead from 
the status quo—federal legislation that generally omits reference to s. 35 Aboriginal and treaty 
rights—the Fisheries Act example would on critical analysis likely fall short as an example of 
statutory respect for s. 35.117 
 In line with other federal acts explicitly engaged in emergency management without express 
language referring to the concept, the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 does not categorize 
emergencies. Rather, it administers and enforces marine “safety”,118 “incidents, accidents and 
casualties”,119”wreck[s]”120, “pollution prevention and response”,121 and “safe operation of 
pleasure craft”.122 Rather than overtly regulating the management of a pollution-driven public 
welfare emergency, the legislative language of the Canada Shipping Act, 2001 requires 
“arrangement with a response organisation” to manage ‘discharges of oil’ (subject of course to 
prescriptions of both vessels and waters as well as discretionary exemptions).123 Evidence that 
                                                 
115 Fisheries Act, ibid. at s 37; and see Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 23 at s 52 (1) (“The Constitution of 
Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.”); and see Paul L.A.H. Chartrand, “Indigenous Peoples: 
Negotiating Constitutional Reconciliation and Legitimacy in Canada” (2011) 19:2 Waikato Law Review 14 at 27 
[Chartrand, Constitutional Legitimacy] (“… it is not only the existence of Aboriginal peoples, and the possession of 
their lands that matters in law and politics. The approach argues that the political action of Aboriginal people 
matters in law and politics [footnotes omitted, emphasis in original]). 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Canada Shipping Act, 2001, supra note 96 at Part 4 ss 104-121. 
119 Ibid. at Part 6 ss 140-151.  
120 Ibid. at Part 7 ss 153-164. 
121 Ibid. at Part 8 ss 165-191. 
122 Ibid. at s 201.  
123 Ibid. at s. 167 ((1) Subject to subsection (2), every prescribed vessel or vessel of a prescribed class shall (a) have 
an arrangement with a response organization in respect of a quantity of oil that is at least equal to the total amount of 
oil that the vessel carries, both as cargo and as fuel, to a prescribed maximum quantity, and in respect of waters 
where the vessel navigates or engages in a marine activity; and (b) have on board a declaration, in the form specified 
by the Minister, that (i) identifies the name and address of the vessel’s insurer or, in the case of a subscription 
policy, the name and address of the lead insurer who provides pollution insurance coverage in respect of the vessel, 
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emergency management is in fact contemplated in the legislative scheme may be inferred from 
the statutory provision that “no person or vessel shall discharge a prescribed pollutant, except in 
accordance with the regulations made under this Part or a permit granted under… the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, 1999)” and that if “a vessel is required by the regulations to have 
a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan, the vessel shall take reasonable measures to implement 
the plan in respect of an oil pollution incident”.124 If however, the situation escalated beyond the 
Act’s management scope it appears the Emergencies Act could be triggered and a national public 
welfare emergency declared. 
 Thus, there are still other federal statutes that may operate in the spectrum of emergency 
management without necessarily adding to emergency categories. The following section looks at 
the legislative language of the British Columbia legislature in the area of emergency 
management. 
2.2.1.2 PROVINCIAL (BRITISH COLUMBIA) EMERGENCIES  
 As outlined above, the federal Emergencies Act defines a ‘public welfare emergency’ as an 
emergency that is caused by either some kind of natural phenomenon (such as fire, flood, or 
earthquake etc.), disease (in any of humans, animals or plants), accident or pollution.125 To 
qualify as an emergency, the situation must either have the potential to present a danger to life or 
property, cause social disruption or disrupt the flow of essential goods, services or resources.126 
The scenarios envisioned as a federal public welfare emergency are in line with the kind of 
events contemplated in the British Columbia Emergency Program Act.127 An “emergency” under 
the British Columbia legislation is:  
a present or imminent event or circumstance that  
(a) is caused by accident, fire, explosion, technical failure or the forces of nature, 
and 
                                                 
(ii) confirms that the arrangement has been made, and (iii) identifies every person who is authorized to implement 
the arrangement. 
124 Ibid. at ss 187-8 [emphasis added]. 
125 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 5. 
126 Ibid. 
127 See Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 1 “emergency”. 
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(b) requires prompt coordination of action or special regulation of persons or 
property to protect the health, safety or welfare of a person or to limit damage 
to property128 
The legislature of British Columbia therefore understands an emergency as circumstances 
requiring swift action and/or special governance due to any of: the forces of nature, fire, 
explosion, technical failure, or an accident, in order to limit property damage and/or to protect 
the health, safety and welfare of persons.  
 A major distinction between the British Columbia conception of an ‘emergency’ and the 
federal definition of a ‘public welfare emergency’ lies in the exclusion of explicit language 
referencing disease in the British Columbia Emergency Program Act definition. One must turn to 
the Public Health Act of British Columbia for legislative language dealing with public health 
emergencies for guidance on what qualifies as an emergency in the sphere of disease and other 
public health related concerns.129 An ‘emergency’ under the Public Health Act is defined as:  
a localized event or regional event that meets the conditions set out in section 52(1) 
or (2) [conditions to be met before this Part applies], respectively;  
“localized event” means an immediate and significant risk to public health in a 
localized area; 
“regional event” means an immediate and significant risk to public health 
throughout a region or the province.130  
The conditions that must be met in order for a situation to qualify as an emergency under the Public 
Health Act are as follows:  
(1) A person must not exercise [emergency powers under the Part 5 of the Public 
Health Act] in respect of a localized event unless the person reasonably believes 
that 
(a) the action is immediately necessary to protect public health from significant 
harm, and 
                                                 
128 Ibid.  
129 Public Health Act, SBC 2008 c 28; and c.f. Wildfire Act, SBC 2004 c 31; and c.f. spar Wildfire Regulation, BC 
Reg 190/2014 (The Wildfire Act and regulations are devoted exclusively to emergency management provisions 
specific to forest and grass fires. As both the Public Health Act and the Wildfire Act contain specific regimes to 
manage specific hazards within the general framework of public welfare emergencies, a detailed critical analysis 
was not done on each legislative regime as part of this thesis as I am attempting to demonstrate a perceived general 
theme of legislative omission of the constitutional priority of First Nations from the emergency management 
frameworks generally and not seeking to necessarily deconstruct here every legislative apparatus involved in public 
welfare emergencies. Further work however could be done to explore critical emergency management regulations 
and statutes in order to ascertain whether and how more can be done within the legislation and regulations to 
prioritize, protect and acknowledge First Nation Aboriginal and treaty rights).  
130 Public Health Act, ibid. at s 51.  
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(b) compliance with this act, other than this Part, or a regulation made under 
this Act would hinder that person from acting in a manner that would avoid 
or mitigate an immediate and significant risk to public health 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), a person must not exercise powers under this Part in 
respect of a regional event unless the provincial health officer provides notice 
that the provincial health officer reasonably believes that at least 2 of the 
following criteria exist:  
(a) The regional event could have a serious impact on public health;  
(b) The regional event is unusual or unexpected;  
(c) There is a significant risk of the spread of an infectious agent or a 
hazardous agent;  
(d) There is a significant risk of travel or trade restrictions as a result of the 
regional event. 
(3) If the provincial health officer is not immediately available to give notice under 
subsection (2), a person may exercise powers under this Part until the provincial 
health officer becomes available.131 
Summarizing the definition of an emergency triggering Part 5 ‘emergency powers’ under the 
British Columbia Public Health Act, we find that a public health emergency contemplates 
significant harm to public health from an event that is either unusual or unexpected, or involves 
an infectious or hazardous agent that is likely to spread, or regionally will likely result in 
restriction of trade or travel. Like the federal Emergencies Act qualifying a ‘national emergency’ 
as beyond the scope or capacity of any other enactment to deal with the event, the Public Health 
Act limits the triggering of emergency powers to situations where application of the other parts 
of the Public Health Act would actually hinder emergency management.132  
 Like the federal regime, British Columbia has passed particular statutory language that 
defines an “environmental emergency”.133 An environmental emergency means “an occurrence 
or natural disaster that affects the environment and includes the following: (a) a flood; (b) a 
landslide; and (c) a spill or leakage of oil or of a poisonous or dangerous substance”.134 
 In order to effectively explore First Nation roles in emergency management of hazards and 
events that fall within the spectra of ‘natural disasters’ as the primary focus of this thesis, it is 
                                                 
131 Ibid. at s 52.  
132 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 3; contra Public Health Act, ibid. at s 52 (1) (b) (“A person must not exercise 
powers under this Part in respect of a localized event unless the person reasonably believes that…compliance with 
this Act, other than this Part, or a regulation made under this act would hinder that person from acting in a manner 
that would avoid or mitigate an immediate and significant risk to public health”). 
133 Environmental Management Act, SBC 2003 c 53 at s 87 (1). 
134 Ibid.  
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useful to delineate the British Columbia statutes that would apply to such a situation at the 
provincial level. As outlined above, the Emergency Program Act and the Public Health Act, 
along with particular subjects dealt with in the Wildfire Act and the Environmental Management 
Act, together outline the legislative parameters of what would constitute a ‘public welfare 
emergency’135 at the federal level which includes all manner of natural disasters and pandemics 
that can flow from such events. The British Columbia legislature provides additional 
terminology in its legislative contemplation of emergency management. In British Columbia, a 
disaster is: 
a calamity that 
(a) is caused by accident, fire, explosion or technical failure or by the forces 
of nature, and 
(b) has resulted in the serious harm to the health, safety or welfare of people, 
or in widespread damage to property136 
A disaster under the British Columbia Emergency Program Act is specific to the outcome of an 
emergency event, and this better relates to the response and recovery components of emergency 
management whereas mitigation and planning might be framed as ‘disaster risk reduction’.  
 British Columbia legislation and regulations sparsely define emergencies outside the 
Emergency Program Act and Public Health Act, with many acts and regulations referring to the 
Emergency Program Act as definitive of the meaning of ‘emergency’.137 Like the federal regime, 
clear parameters defining an emergency are critical to enabling or limiting (as the case may be) 
specific temporary powers designed to effect emergency management governance. Also like the 
federal regime, emergency mitigation and preparedness in industry related accident or pollution 
risk are muddied provincially by regulatory language that largely evades terminology specific to 
emergency management. For example, permit holders under the Oil and Gas Emergency 
Management Regulation qualify situations requiring emergency response by referencing an 
elaborate matrix that uses moderate terms such as ‘incident’, and ‘escalation possible’ and 
‘uncontrolled, with control unlikely in near term’.138  
                                                 
135 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76; Public Health Act, supra note 129; Wildfire Act, supra, note 129; 
Environmental Management Act, ibid.  
136 Emergency Program Act, ibid. at s 1 “disaster”. 
137 Ibid. at s 1. 
138 Oil and Gas Activities Act Emergency Management Regulation, BC reg 204/2013, Schedule D ‘Incident 
Classification Matrix’.  
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 As will later be explored, division of powers considerations stemming from the Constitution 
Act, 1982 inform emergency management authorities federally, territorially and provincially. 
Within the province of British Columbia, emergency response authorities are divided between 
ministries (with respect to a particular ministry’s area of authority), and between the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council and ‘local authorities’. The following section explores what constitutes a 
‘local emergency’.  
2.2.1.3 LOCAL EMERGENCIES  
 As outlined above, the British Columbia Emergency Program Act defines ‘emergency’ and 
‘disaster’ generally. Under the provincial legislation, a ‘local emergency’ exists based on the 
standing legislated definitions of emergency and disaster applied to a more restricted 
geographical and jurisdictional boundary. The Emergency Program Act defines the types of 
situations that constitute emergencies and disasters and then provides additional guidance on 
who constitutes a local authority and the powers of a local authority to declare a state of local 
emergency or respond to a local disaster. Therefore, to understand what constitutes a local 
emergency, one has to appreciate what constitutes a local authority.  
 A local authority means any of a municipal council, the board of a regional district, or a 
national park superintendent.139 Municipalities and regional districts obtain their general 
authorizations through British Columbia’s Local Government Act.140 Regional districts are 
unique decision-making bodies with a specific set of legislatively conveyed authorities over large 
landmasses as opposed to municipal councils whose authorities are limited to municipalities.141 
                                                 
139 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 1 “local authority”.  
140 Local Government Act, RSBC 1996 c 323 at s 5 (“In this Act: …’local government’ means (a) the council of a 
municipality, and (b) the board of a regional district”); and see Local Government Act, at s 1-2 (“The purposes of 
this Act are (a) to provide a legal framework… of local governments to represent the interests and respond to the 
needs of their communities, (b) to provide local governments with the powers, duties and functions necessary for 
fulfilling their purposes, and (c) to provide local governments with the flexibility to respond to the different needs 
and changing circumstances of their communities” s 2 “Recognizing that regional districts are an independent, 
responsible and accountable order of government within their jurisdiction, the purposes or a regional district include 
(a) providing good government for its community, (b) providing services and other things that the board considers 
are necessary or desirable for all or part of its community, (c) providing for stewardship of the public assets of its 
community, and (d) fostering the current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of its 
community”).  
141 Ibid. 
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A ‘local emergency’ is therefore an emergency142 declared by a local authority “relating to all or 
any part of the jurisdictional area”.143 
 Notably, under the Emergency Program Act, a local authority is not a band council or other 
First Nation government body. Later in this thesis, I will explore further the jurisdictional 
implications of the absence of a mechanism for First Nation governments to declare the 
equivalent of an Emergency Program Act local state of emergency within their traditional and 
Aboriginal title territories (off reserve). It warrants noting at this stage however that regional 
districts largely encompass the totality of First Nation traditional and Aboriginal title territories 
collectively in British Columbia. The implication of the powers to declare and manage local 
states of emergency conferred restrictively to regional districts, municipalities and national park 
superintendents could result in the overt exclusion of First Nations from managing critical 
disasters in their own territories. 
2.2.1.4 FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL COLLABORATIVE GUIDANCE ON EMERGENCIES 
The Government of Canada, in cooperation with Canadian provinces and territories, provides 
further guidance on the elements of emergency and disaster in their most recent inter-
jurisdictional cooperative effort to streamline emergency response throughout Canada. Notably, 
First Nations were not part of this cooperative effort, irrespective of the vast areas and 
populations falling under various First Nations’ jurisdiction throughout Canada. 
In An Emergency Management Framework for Canada, an emergency is defined as “[a] 
present or imminent incident requiring the prompt coordination of actions, persons or property in 
order to protect the health, safety or welfare of people, or to limit damage to property or to the 
environment”.144 The definition is essentially the same as that provided in the British Columbia 
legislation with the notable addition of specific concern for damage to the environment. The 
federal/provincial/territorial Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management define disaster, 
however, in much more colourful terms: 
                                                 
142Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 1 (1) “emergency” (“means a present or imminent event or 
circumstance that (a) is caused by accident, fire, explosion, technical failure or the forces of nature, and (b) requires 
the prompt coordination of action or special regulation of persons or property to protect the health, safety or welfare 
of a person or to limit damage to property”). 
143 Ibid. at s 12 (1). 
144 FPT Framework 2011, supra note 44 at 14.  
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Essentially a social phenomenon that results when a hazard intersects with a 
vulnerable community in a way that exceeds or overwhelms the community’s 
ability to cope and may cause serious harm to the safety, health, welfare, property 
or environment of people; may be triggered by a naturally occurring phenomenon 
which has its origins within the geophysical or biological environment or by human 
action or error, whether malicious or unintentional, including technological 
failures, accidents and terrorist acts.145 
Again, particular reference to harm of the environment distinguishes the Canadian confederate 
conception of disaster from that of British Columbia emergency management statutory law. 
Examination of the inclusion or lack thereof of environmental harm in conceptions of 
‘emergency’ and ‘disaster’ could have interpretive consequences as to the scope of response and 
recovery required by statute and regulation regarding catastrophic harm to specific 
environmental resources.  
 I explore statutory processes for declaring a state of emergency later in this thesis. The 
purpose of this section has been to orient my readers as to what constitutes an emergency 
triggering emergency management acts federally and within British Columbia respectively. As 
outlined above, emergency management can be necessary at any of the individual, local, 
regional, national or international level. Emergency definitions are important insofar as they 
trigger a commensurate governance process to cope with the emergency event. 
2.2.2 MANAGING EMERGENCIES   
As discussed above, a universal definition of ‘emergency’ among federal, provincial and 
territorial governments is  “[a] present or imminent incident requiring the prompt coordination of 
actions, persons or property in order to protect the health, safety or welfare of people, or to limit 
damage to property or to the environment”.146 We have seen that the parameters of what 
constitutes ‘an emergency’ impact governance activities posited to manage emergencies. That is 
to say, emergency definitions operate to limit or trigger certain pieces of enabling emergency 
management legislation. We have further seen that emergency management constitutes all of 
mitigation, planning, response and recovery. Many considerations inform emergency 
management jurisdiction, including the type of emergency being managed, the component of 
                                                 
145 Ibid. at 14. 
146 Ibid. at 14. 
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emergency management being executed and the scope of the emergency itself (whether local, 
regional, provincial, national, or international in character).  
As previously stated, the focus of this thesis is limited to examining First Nation inclusion in 
the management of federally defined ‘public welfare emergencies’ in British Columbia. A public 
welfare emergency can arise from any of various categories of natural disasters, disease 
outbreak, accidents or pollution.  Public welfare emergencies can and should be managed at all 
of the mitigation, planning, response and recovery phases. As a result, there is a relatively 
unlimited scope of international organizations, federal and provincial ministries, agencies and 
regulatory bodies potentially involved in the management of public welfare emergencies. Again, 
given thesis scope restrictions, the following section only cursorily explores the various 
legislative, regulatory, policy and conventional frameworks that inform emergency management 
by various agencies in order to more effectively identify general gaps in First Nations 
engagement where a given First Nation may be impacted by a public welfare emergency. 
2.2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
British Columbia falls along the west coast of what is now known as Canada. Canada’s 
economy is driven in large part by natural resource extraction. Trade in, and the requisite 
transport of, natural resources has always defined the make-up of the Canadian (settler) state 
from the time of colonization to the present day.147 Canada’s constitutional make-up has been 
substantially influenced by the extraction, transport and trade in natural resources, as is 
particularly reflected in the division of powers section. However, international treaties and 
conventions are also highly significant to the governance and execution of Canada’s international 
natural resource trade.  
The transport of resources to international destinations takes place by all of ground, rail, air, 
pipeline and water. Where risk is borne by more than one nation state jurisdiction, international 
mechanism are necessary to coordinate risk management. Canada is party to several treaties, 
                                                 
147 See Dwight Newman, Natural Resource Jurisdiction in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) at 4 
– 8. [Newman, Resource Jurisdiction] (For a brief survey of historic and current legal dialogues informing emerging 
natural resource jurisdictional conflicts).  
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conventions, protocols, United Nations working groups and the like that operate to coordinate 
and streamline emergency response efforts at an international scale.148  
For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization is a United Nations specialized 
agency that provides (among other mandates) operational procedures for the dissemination of 
information on volcanic eruptions and associated volcanic ash clouds in areas which could affect 
routes used by international flights through its International Airways Volcano Watch.149 The 
International Civil Aviation Organization further provides crisis management support through 
the Collaborative Arrangement for the Prevention and Management of Public Health Events in 
Civil Aviation that “exists to prevent and manage the spread of communicable diseases that 
cause, or have the potential to cause, a public health emergency of international concern”.150 The 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention) created the 
International Civil Aviation Organization in 1944 with Canada as a signatory.151 The 
International Civil Aviation Organization “works with… Member States and global aviation 
organizations to develop international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) which 
States reference when developing their legally-enforceable national civil aviation regulations”.152 
While Canada’s Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992153is the prevailing instrument 
controlling the safe transportation of dangerous goods and thus affects emergency plans, 
international relations play a role in how dangerous goods are handled in Canada. For example, 
                                                 
148 I thank Stafford Reid (EnviroEmerg Consulting) for enlightening conversations and materials on international 
resolutions that impact Canadian domestic environmental emergency protocols.  
149 United Nations, International Civil Aviation Organization, online: UNICAO 
<http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/crisis-management.aspx>; United Nations, International Civil Aviation 
Organization, Terms of Reference of the IAVWOPSG, online: UNICAO < 
http://www.icao.int/safety/meteorology/iavwopsg/Quick%20Launch%20Menu%20Documents/Terms%20of%20ref
erence.PDF>. 
150 United Nations, International Civil Aviation Organization, Safety, Crisis Management, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/crisis-management.aspx> (United Nations International Civil Aviation 
Organization crisis management page); and see Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 
UNTS 295 online: UNICAO <http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf> [Chicago Convention] 
(for the most recent version, including amendments see ICAO Doc. 7300/9 (9th ed. 2006)) (Article 14 “Each 
contracting State agrees to take effective measures to prevent the spread by means of air navigation of cholera… and 
such other communicable diseases…”). 
151 Chicago Convention, ibid. at 143. 
152 United Nations, International Civil Aviation Organization, About ICAO, online: <http://www.icao.int/about-
icao/Pages/default.aspx>. 
153 TDG Act, supra note 96. 
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in addition to the more recent Basel Convention,154 in 1986 Canada and the United States entered 
into an agreement concerning the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes155 which 
specifies a mere 30 day window to review and reply to notices of hazardous waste movement 
from export country to import country.156 While the agreement indicates that the “export may 
take place conditional upon the persons importing the hazardous waste and other waste 
complying with all the applicable laws of the country of import”, the agreement assumes tacit 
consent to the hazardous waste import where no response is given within the 30 day window.157  
While outside the scope of this thesis, the impact of international agreements on the Crown’s 
execution of its consultation and accommodation obligations to First Nations is ripe for 
exploration. At an international level, another interesting area of analysis would be the collective 
and/or specific risk(s) assumed de facto by indigenous peoples by way of the international 
transport of natural resources, hazardous materials and waste. In the example of Canada and the 
United States transboundary movement of hazardous wastes agreement, one might be challenged 
to surmise how the Crown could possibly fulfill its consultation obligations alone within the 30-
day window that the agreement specifies before tacit consent to the import of the hazardous 
waste is presumed. Further challenging First Nation inclusion in the permitting process, Article 8 
                                                 
154 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 27 May 
2014, UNEP/BRS/2014/3, online: 
<http://www.basel.int/Portals/4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf > (note: Article 11 
allows countries to enter into bilateral/multilateral agreements or arrangements); see Environment Canada, “Canada-
US Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste”, online: Environment Canada 
<https://ec.gc.ca/gdd-mw/default.asp?lang=en&n=EB0B92CE-1#section3.> “[t]he Canada-U.S. Agreement, 
together with its supporting regulatory framework, is compatible with the control procedures under the Basel 
Convention”). 
155 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning 
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Canada and United States, 28 October 1986,  online: 
(consolidated, unofficial text) <http://www.ec.gc.ca/gdd-mw/default.asp?lang=En&n=C59BCC26-1> [Can-US 
Waste Agreement].  
156 Ibid. at Article 3 ((c) “The designated authority of the country of import shall have 30 days from the date of 
receipt of the notice provided pursuant to the date of receipt of the notice provided pursuant to paragraphs (a) and 
(b) of this article to respond to such notice, indicating its consent (conditional or not) or its objection to the export. 
Such response will be transmitted to the designated authority of the country of export. The date of receipt of the 
notice will be identified in an acknowledgement of receipt made immediately by the designated authority of the 
country of import to the country of export.”). 
157 Ibid. at Article 3 ((d) “If no response is received by the designated authority of the country of export within the 
30 day period referred to in paragraph (c) of this article, the country of import shall be considered as having no 
objection to the export of hazardous waste and other waste described in the notice and the export may take place 
conditional upon the persons importing the hazardous waste and other waste complying with all the applicable laws 
of the country of import.”).  
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of the Agreement specifies a mutual commitment to protect the confidentiality of parties 
executing the import and export of a given shipment of hazardous waste.158  
Of particular political interest at this time are conversations regarding the risk associated with 
increasing marine traffic along the west coast of British Columbia in order to support the 
international trade in crude oil originating from Alberta’s tar sands. The International Maritime 
Organization operates as the international umbrella organization streamlining conventions and 
protocols governing marine safety. 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO)159 came into existence in 1948 and self-
defines as “the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security 
of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships”.160 The IMO sets global standards 
for international shipping governing “safety, security and environmental performance” through 
its role of creating “a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, 
universally adopted and universally implemented”. 161 As the IMO describes its own measures, 
“IMO measures cover all aspects of international shipping – including ship design, construction, 
equipment, manning, operation and disposal”.162 The IMO’s primary operational mechanism is 
through the development of international conventions and is responsible for “more than 50 
international conventions and agreements and has adopted numerous protocols and 
amendments”.163 
The majority of conventions adopted under the auspices of IMO…fall into three 
main categories. The first group is concerned with maritime safety, the second with 
the prevention of marine pollution; and the third with liability and compensation, 
                                                 
158 Ibid. at Article 8: (“If the provision of technical information pursuant to articles 3 and 4 would require the 
disclosure of information covered by agreement(s) of confidentiality between a Party and an exporter, the country of 
export shall make every effort to obtain the consent of the concerned person for the purpose of conveying any such 
information to the country of import or transit. The country of import or transit shall make every effort to protect the 
confidentiality of such information conveyed”). 
159 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, 6 March 1948, 4214 UNTS 289 at 3, 4214 UNTS 1520 
at 297, [IMO Convention] online: <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20289/volume-289-I-
4214-English.pdf>; United Nations, International Maritime Organization, online: 
<http://www.imo.org/en/Pages/Default.aspx>.  
160 United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “Introduction to IMO”, online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx>. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
163 United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “Introduction: Adopting a convention, Entry into force, 
Accession, Amendment, Enforcement, Tacit acceptance procedure”,  online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx>. 
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especially in relation to damage caused by pollution. Outside these major groupings 
are a number of other conventions dealing with facilitation, tonnage measurement, 
unlawful acts against shipping and salvage, etc.164 
Of particular importance to the management of a public welfare emergency are the following 
IMO conventions165: 
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by the Protocol of 
1997(MARPOL)166 
 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers ( STCW ) as amended, including the 1995 and 2010 Manila 
Amendments167 
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 
(OPRC), 1990168 
 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to pollution incidents by 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000 (OPRC-HNS Protocol)169 
                                                 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid.; (This list is not exhaustive but only highlights some of the many conventions pertinent to maritime 
emergency management. Please refer to the IMO’s website for further information on the Conventions).  
166 (2 November 1973); see United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)”, online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-for-the-Prevention-of-
Pollution-from-Ships-(MARPOL).aspx> (“The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) is the main international convention covering prevention of pollution of the marine environment by 
ships from operational or accidental causes”…” The Convention includes regulations aimed at preventing and 
minimizing pollution from ships - both accidental pollution and that from routine operations - and currently includes 
six technical Annexes. Special Areas with strict controls on operational discharges are included in most Annexes”:” 
Annex I  Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by Oil”; “Annex II  Regulations for the Control of  Pollution by 
Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk”; “Annex III Prevention of Pollution by Harmful Substances Carried by Sea in 
Packaged Form”; “Annex IV Prevention of Pollution by Sewage from Ships”; “Annex V Prevention of Pollution by 
Garbage from Ships”; “Annex VI Prevention of  Air Pollution from Ships”.). 
167 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers ( STCW ) as 
amended, including the 1995 and 2010 Manila Amendments; see United Nations, International Maritime 
Organization, “International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
1978”, online: IMO <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-
Convention.aspx>. 
168 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC), 1990, 30 
November 1990; see United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC)”, online: IMP < 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Oil-Pollution-
Preparedness,-Response-and-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx>.  
169 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to pollution incidents by Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances, 2000 (OPRC-HNS Protocol), 15 March 2000; see United Nations, International Maritime Organization, 
“Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to pollution incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 
2000 (OPRC-HNS Protocol)”, online IMO: 
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Protocol-on-Preparedness,-Response-and-
Co-operation-to-pollution-Incidents-by-Hazardous-and-Noxious-Substances-(OPRC-HNS-Pr.aspx>. 
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 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties (INTERVENTION), 1969170 
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 1969171 
 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage172 
 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976173 
 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection 
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea(HNS), 1996 (and its 
2010 Protocol)174 
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
2001175  
 Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007176 
                                                 
170 See United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “International Convention Relating to Intervention on 
the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties”, 29 November 1969, online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-Relating-to-
Intervention-on-the-High-Seas-in-Cases-of-Oil-Pollution-Casualties.aspx> (“The Convention affirms the right of a 
coastal State to take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate danger to 
its coastline or related interests from pollution by oil or the threat thereof, following upon a maritime casualty”. 
Subsequent conventions and amendments expand the application to chemicals that “if released, cause serious hazard 
to the marine environment”. Last amended in 2002 “to update the list of substances attached to it”). 
171 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 1969, 29 November 1969; see 
United Nations, International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (CLC)”, online: IMO < 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-
for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx>.  
172 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution Damage (18 December 1971); see United Nations, International Maritime Organization, 
“International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage”, online: IMO < http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-the-Establishment-of-an-International-Fund-for-Compensation-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-
(FUND).aspx>.  
173 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 19 November 1976; see United Nations, 
International Maritime Organization, “Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC)”, online: 
IMO < http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-on-Limitation-of-
Liability-for-Maritime-Claims-(LLMC).aspx>. 
174 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea(HNS), 1996 (and its 2010 Protocol), 3 May 1996; see United Nations, 
International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea(HNS)”, online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Liability-and-
Compensation-for-Damage-in-Connection-with-the-Carriage-of-Hazardous-and-Noxious-.aspx>.  
175 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001, 23 March 2001; see United 
Nations, International Maritime Organization, “International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage (BUNKER)”, online: IMO 
<http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-Convention-on-Civil-Liability-
for-Bunker-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(BUNKER).aspx>. 
176 Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, (18 May 2007); see United Nations, International 
Maritime Organization, “Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks” online: IMO < 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Nairobi-International-Convention-on-the-
Removal-of-Wrecks.aspx>.  
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Again, while outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that what all these 
conventions have in common is a deafening silence on the role of Indigenous peoples in 
prescribed decision-making/permitting processes all governing, in one manner or another, risk 
and risk response to the marine transport of dangerous or deleterious materials. The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples acknowledges that “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.177 The Declaration 
further acknowledges that “Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local 
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions”. Yet, few 
mechanisms operate to include Indigenous peoples in risk management processes, even though a 
particular Indigenous population might be the most vulnerable to the risks that a given 
convention is geared toward. 
The purpose of this section has been to provide a brief glimpse into the array of international 
instruments that operate to manage risk at an international scale and that might impact the 
execution of Canadian domestic public welfare risk management in British Columbia. Other 
areas potentially impacted by international instruments include nuclear safety, air traffic control, 
pipelines, border crossings, disease outbreak, wildfire, and pest management (pine beetle, 
invasive species generally). As previously mentioned, an international law analysis is well 
outside the scope of this writing. However, international relations undoubtedly influence 
Indigenous Peoples’ participation in risk management at the domestic level and scrutiny of 
international instruments for adherence to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples will likely accelerate in the future. In fact, a white paper was recently tabled 
at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues entitled “Engaging Indigenous 
Peoples in Disaster Risk Reduction”, followed by language encouraging better inclusion of 
Indigenous peoples in disaster risk reduction within the new Sendai Framework.178 The authors 
                                                 
177 UNDRIP, supra note 31 at Article 3. 
178 John C. Scott, Daniel Cabello-Llamas, Patricia Bittner “Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Disaster Risk 
Reduction” (a white paper prepared for the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 19-23 May 2013 
(Centre for Public Service Communications, Maryland USA) online: Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction 
<http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/programme/sideevent/view/501> ; and see Sendai Framework, 
supra note 10.  
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professed that an immediate objective of the paper was to ensure that “issues, articulated by 
indigenous people themselves, are considered in the planning and outcomes of the Global 
Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2013 and the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
in 2015”.179 The White Paper, and Sendai Framework that followed, demonstrates an escalating 
conversation at the international level on the participation of Indigenous Peoples in disaster risk 
management.  
2.2.2.2. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POWERS 
Domestic jurisdiction to manage natural disaster, accident or pollution public welfare 
emergencies in Canada reflects to a certain degree jurisdictional boundaries governing 
management of natural resources in Canada generally. Dwight Newman provides a ‘black letter 
law’ exploration of the legal framework determining “which government has the authority to 
regulate and make decisions about the development, management and/or conservation of natural 
resources” that embraces the significant complexity of natural resource management jurisdiction 
in Canada.180 Just as complex as natural resource management jurisdiction in general, the 
substantially interwoven acts and regulations prescribing for the preparation for, mitigation of, 
response to and recovery from public welfare emergencies caused primarily by natural resource 
extraction or use constitutes an enormously complicated jurisdictional regime. 
As previously noted, the determinative federal act outlining which circumstances might 
constitute a statutory public welfare emergency is the Emergencies Act.181 The Emergencies Act 
goes on to specify the steps required to declare a public welfare emergency and trigger the 
special provisions under the Act.182 Section 6 specifies that the declaration of a public welfare 
emergency is: (1) made by proclamation by the Governor in Council183; (2) based on ‘reasonable 
                                                 
179 Scott, Cabello-Llamas, Bittner, ibid. at 2.  
180 Newman, Resource Jurisdiction, supra note 147 at 1. 
181 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at ss 3, 5, 16, 27, 37 (as substantially explored in section 2.1 of this thesis, to 
meet the definition requirements, the attributes of each of public welfare emergencies, public order emergencies, 
international emergencies, and war emergencies must be “so serious as to be a national emergency”). 
182 Ibid. at s 6 (1) (“When the Governor in Council believes, on reasonable grounds, that a public welfare emergency 
exists and necessitates the taking of special temporary measures for dealing with the emergency, the Governor in 
Council, after such consultation as is required by section 14, may, by proclamation, so declare”.) [emphasis added]. 
183 See Canada, Privy Council Office, “Process Guide for Governor in Council Submissions (Other than 
Regulations)”, online: Privy Council Office <http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=secretariats&sub=oic-ddc&doc=gic-gec-eng.htm#II> (Note: the ‘Governor in 
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grounds’; and (3) dependant, in some circumstances, on consultation with the Lieutenant 
Governor in Council of a province.184 A valid public welfare emergency declaration must 
specify: (1) “concisely the state of affairs constituting the emergency”;185 (2) “the special 
temporary measures that… may be necessary for dealing with the emergency”;186 and (3) “if the 
direct effects of the emergency do not extend to the whole of Canada, the area of Canada to 
which the direct effects of the emergency extend”.187 Legislated public welfare emergencies are 
not indeterminate but rather are time sensitive and expire by statute at the end of 90 days, unless 
previously revoked or continued in accordance with the Emergencies Act.188 
The Emergencies Act itemizes the special types of orders and regulations at the disposal of 
the Governor in Council should a public welfare emergency be declared.189 As with the 
proclamation requirements for a public welfare emergency, a standard of reasonableness is 
required by statute before the Governor in Council may effect a special order or regulation to 
deal with the emergency.190 Specific areas of emergency orders or regulations may include: a) 
regulation of travel, and/or area containment;191 b) evacuations and area security;192 c) 
requisition, use or disposition of property;193 d) requisition of essential services;194 e) distribution 
and availability of essential goods, services and resources;195 f) emergency payments;196 g) 
                                                 
Council’ is a common reference to the Governor General of Canada acting on the advice of Cabinet, Cabinet 
ministers, or a Cabinet committee). 
184 Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 6(1) “…after such consultation as is required by section 14…”; s. 14 
“…before the Governor in Council issues, continues or amends a declaration of a public welfare emergency, the 
lieutenant governor in council of each province in which the direct effects of the emergency occur shall be consulted 
with respect to the proposed action”. (2) “The Governor in Council may not issue a declaration of a public welfare 
emergency where the direct effects of the emergency are confined to, or occur principally in, one province unless the 
lieutenant governor in council of the province has indicated to the Governor in Council that the emergency exceeds 
the capacity or authority of the province to deal with it”.). 
185 Ibid. at s 6 (2)(a). 
186 Ibid. at s 6 (2)(b). 
187 Ibid. at s 6 (2)(c). 
188 Ibid. at s 7 (2). 
189 Ibid. at s 8.  
190 Ibid. at s 8 (“While a declaration of a public welfare emergency is in effect, the Governor in Council may make 
such orders or regulations with respect to the following matters as the Governor in Council believes, on reasonable 
grounds, are necessary for dealing with the emergency…”.). 
191 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (a). 
192 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (b). 
193 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (c). 
194 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (d). 
195 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (e). 
196 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (f). 
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establishment of emergency shelters and hospitals;197 h) the assessment of damage to any works 
or undertakings and the repair, replacement or restoration thereof;198 i) the assessment of damage 
to the environment and the elimination or alleviation of the damage.199 
The Emergencies Act provides for notable limitations to the emergency regulatory powers 
itemized in s. 8. Any emergency orders or regulations issued to respond to a public welfare 
emergency expire at the expiration or revocation of an emergency declaration.200 Further, should 
the Governor in Council deem a continuance of a public welfare emergency necessary, all 
emergency orders and regulations made under section 8 must be reviewed, and the Governor in 
Council must determine, on reasonable grounds, whether they continue to be necessary for 
dealing with the emergency, revoking or amending to the extent that they do not so continue.201 
Parliament does eventually play a role in governing a public welfare emergency in that 
proclamations must be laid out before the House of Commons within seven sitting days after the 
proclamation is issued, with the House of Commons having the power of amendment or 
revocation of any of the emergency proclamation itself, emergency orders and/or emergency 
regulations.202  
In addition to the consultation requirements with the lieutenant governor in council of an 
emergency impacted province,203 strict limitations on the Governor in Council’s emergency 
declaratory and regulatory powers, apparently aimed at respecting the jurisdictional competence 
of the provinces, are specified under the Emergencies Act. For example, the Act specifies that: 
“[t]he power… to make orders and regulations…shall be exercised or performed…in a manner 
that will not unduly impair the ability of any province to take measures, under an Act of the 
legislature of the province, for dealing with an emergency in the province”.204 Further, the 
authority of provinces and municipalities over their police forces are strictly protected under the 
Act.205 
                                                 
197 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (g). 
198 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (h). 
199 Ibid. at s 8 (1) (i). 
200 Ibid. at s 15. 
201 Ibid. at s 12 (2). 
202 Ibid. at ss 7, 10, 12 (4), 58, 59, 60, 61. 
203 Ibid. at ss 6, 14.  
204 Ibid. at s 8 (3) (a)(i).  
205 Ibid. at s 9. 
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The Act appears to prioritize inter-jurisdictional cooperation, stating: “[t]he power… to make 
orders and regulations…shall be exercised or performed…with the view of achieving, to the 
extent possible, concerted action with each province with respect to which the power, duty or 
function is exercised or performed”.206 
It is important to note that the Emergencies Act deals with emergency response and recovery 
restrictively. Emergency mitigation, planning and preparation, all increasingly important in 
disaster management strategies, fall outside the scope of the Emergencies Act. In fact, the 
mitigation and planning phases of emergency management are widely dispersed within the 
purview of the myriad respective federal ministries, provincial and territorial authorities 
purporting to exercise any authority over any given area with the potential to experience a public 
welfare emergency. So while a disaster event would theoretically trigger a specific chain of 
events of federal governance response to a specific disaster, preparation for said disaster operates 
in the nebula of multiple government departments and agencies who play various, sometimes 
competing roles in the management of resources, populations and health.  
“Environmental emergencies” are another sort of legislatively defined federal emergency, as 
outlined above. While the Emergencies Act governs response to and recovery from federally 
legislated ‘public welfare emergencies’, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 
governs ‘environmental emergencies’, the distinctions of which are outlined above. The federal 
government’s regulatory powers over environmental emergencies is outlined in s. 200 (1) with 
an important limitation declared in subsection (2): 
[t]he Governor in Council shall not make a regulation under subsection (1) in 
respect of a matter if, by order, the Governor in Council states that it is of the 
opinion that (a) the matter is regulated by or under any other Act of Parliament that 
contains provisions that are similar in effect…and (b) that Act or any regulation 
made under that Act provides sufficient protection to human health and the 
environment or its biological diversity.207  
In other words, the environmental emergency regulatory powers under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act are subservient to any other Act or regulation that provides a 
response mechanism adequate in the discretionary view of the Governor in Council to protect 
human health and the environment or its biological diversity. So, even if an environmental 
                                                 
206 Ibid. at s 8 (3) (a)(ii). 
207 CEPA, supra note 90 at s 200 (2). 
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emergency regulation developed in consultation with the statutorily defined ‘aboriginal people’ 
is in place, that regulation may be overridden at the discretion of the Governor in Council if 
another Act or regulation is identified that could manage the environmental emergency.  
Given the relative low-level status of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
environmental emergency provisions, the few existing statutory requirements to include First 
Nations in any capacity in environmental emergency response are restrictive at best. Further 
complicating First Nation inclusion in the existing statutory emergency management regime 
generally is the sheer complexity of resource and emergency management generally.  
Another complication potentially inhibiting honourable inclusion of First Nation 
governments in particularly the first two stages of disaster management (planning and 
mitigation) at the national level is the tendency of both the federal and British Columbia 
governments to prioritize industry self-regulation in natural resource management legislation. 
Whether in the area of transportation, extraction or export, statutes frequently set out a 
requirement for compliance with professional, industry or regulatory standards without requiring 
direct government supervision or oversight of the implementation—and sometimes even 
development—of those standards. Without a clear statutory requirement to include impacted 
First Nations in the industry-driven emergency management strategies, First Nations have little 
direct leverage with industry to ensure that their communities are sufficiently considered in 
emergency management protocols, particularly in the areas of planning and mitigation where 
government bodies have a lesser direct role. The gap expands as a result of s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights jurisprudence that holds the consultation and accommodation obligations to be exclusively 
the responsibility of the Crown.208 So, for example, a given transport company whose regular 
business is in the transport of dangerous goods is not under a clear and direct obligation to 
include a potentially impacted First Nation in either its emergency planning or its reporting 
structure. Because of the obligation gap, First Nation governments may be the last to know and 
                                                 
208 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at para 53 [Haida] 
(“The Crown alone remains legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and interactions with third 
parties, that affect Aboriginal interests. The Crown may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry 
proponents seeking a particular development; this is not infrequently done in environmental assessments… 
However, the ultimate legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown. The honour of 
the Crown cannot be delegated.”). 
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the last to be involved in the management of a given disaster even when that Nation’s population 
might be the most devastated by the impact.  
2.2.2.3. PROVINCIAL (BRITISH COLUMBIA) EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POWERS 
Understanding British Columbia’s public welfare emergency management regime begins 
with understanding the role of ‘local governance’ in emergency management. As briefly 
considered above, under British Columbia’s Emergency Program Act, a “local authority” means 
a municipal council,209 the board of a regional district,210 or a park superintendent.211 The 
statutory definition of a local authority is in line with the Act’s identification of “jurisdictional 
area[s]” as municipalities, electoral areas and national parks.212Also as previously noted, First 
Nation reserves (as defined under the Indian Act213) are not recognized as a “jurisdictional area” 
nor are Band Councils or other forms of indigenous governance identified as a “local authority” 
under the provincial Act.  
There is a political component to this point, which is outside the scope of this thesis, 
pertaining to the efforts of First Nations seeking to distinguish themselves from statutory ‘local 
governments’, with good cause. In British Columbia, the Local Government Act is the enabling 
legislation of regional districts and municipalities and conveys specific powers, at the behest of 
                                                 
209 Local Government Act, supra note 140 at s 5 (“’municipality’ means, in relation to a regional district, a 
municipality in the regional district and, in the case of the Greater Vancouver Regional District, includes the City of 
Vancouver”). 
210 Ibid. at s 2 (“Recognizing that regional districts are an independent, responsible and accountable order of 
government within their jurisdiction, the purposes of a regional district include (a) providing good government for 
its community, (b) providing the services and other things that the board considers are necessary or desirable for all 
or part of its community, (c) providing for stewardship of the public assets of its community, and (d) fostering the 
current and future economic, social and environmental well-being of its community”). 
211 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 1 “local authority” (“local authority” means (a) for a municipality, 
the municipal council, (b) for an electoral area in a regional district, the board of the regional district, or (c) for a 
national park, the park superintendent or the park superintendent’s delegate if an agreement has been entered into 
with the government of Canada under section 4(2) (e) in which it is agreed that the park superintendent is a local 
authority for the purposes of this Act”); and see Local Government Act, supra note 140 at s. 5 (“’local government’ 
means (a) the council of a municipality, and (b) the board of a regional district”); and see Canada National Parks 
Act, SC 2000 c 32  s 2 (“’superintendent’ means an officer appointed under the Parks Canada Agency Act who holds 
the office of superintendent of a park or of a national historic site of Canada to which this Act applies, and includes 
any person appointed under that Act who is authorized by such an officer to act on the officer’s behalf”). 
212 Ibid. at s 1 “jurisdictional area” (“jurisdictional area means any of the following for which there is a local 
authority: (a) a municipality; (b) an electoral area; (c) a national park”).  
213 Indian Act, RSC 1985 c. I-5, s. 2(1) “reserve” (“reserve (a) means a tract of land, the legal title to which is vested 
in Her Majesty that has been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band…”). 
50 
 
the British Columbia legislature, onto ‘local authorities’.214 Essentially local governments are 
creatures of statute and not creatures of the constitution, which is likely part of the objection to 
framing First Nations as local authorities.215 A local authority’s powers are by nature extremely 
restricted when considered in light of the broad governance and jurisdictional implications of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which speaks to self-
government and self-determination,216 and are even restricted when the self-governance 
implications of Aboriginal title are considered.217 The void created by conveying emergency 
management powers to ‘local authorities’ over First Nation aboriginal title and traditional 
territories is concerning. First Nations are currently in the position of having to depend on lesser 
governments to execute local emergency response and recovery within their Aboriginal title and 
traditional territories. This is in spite of the fact that (even Crown-identified) First Nation 
interests in their territories are far broader than those afforded to ‘local authorities’ under the 
Local Government Act. Particularly if they were more effectively resourced, First Nations are 
also arguably much better positioned as stewards of their territories since time immemorial, and 
as self-governing bodies, to execute the local governance functions of emergency management 
themselves.218  
Further troubling to the current British Columbia emergency management framework that 
premises emergency management through local authorities (and that excludes language 
protecting First Nation constitutional rights) is the standing case law holding that municipal 
governments do not have a duty to consult. As related by Dwight G. Newman: 
                                                 
214 Local Government Act, supra note 140.  
215 See also Chartrand, Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 115. 
216 UNDRIP, supra note 31. 
217 See Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 256 at para 73 [Tsilhqot’in] (“Aboriginal 
title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land 
will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the 
economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land”  para 73 [Emphasis added]) ; 
and see UNDRIP, supra note 31 generally and at Articles 3, 4 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development”. (Article 3); Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways 
and means for financing their autonomous functions.” (Article 4). Aboriginal title is arguably more restrictive from a 
self-governance and self-determination standpoint than the scope UNDRIP instructs). 
218 Local Government Act, supra note 140; and see Environmental Management Act, supra note 133 (for powers 
delegated to municipalities impacting “environmental emergency” disaster risk assessment, response and recovery 
provisions).  
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In Canadian constitutional terms, municipal governments do not have separate 
constitutional status but are creations of the provincial governments. An interesting, 
and possibly even surprising, decision was rendered by the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal concerning municipal governments and the duty to consult in the case of 
Neskonlith Indian Band v. City of Salmon Arm in late 2012. The broad reading of 
the case is that the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that municipal 
governments do not have a duty to consult….The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
was not ready to read in a role of the municipal government to engage in 
consultation where its originating statute did not leave enough room to establish 
such a role… In a  case concerning the actions of a municipal board carrying out 
land development, the Alberta Court of Appeal suggested that a municipal entity is 
not expected to carry out a more extended consultation than that within the 
processes set out for it within its statutes.219  
It is possible then that local authorities in the British Columbia Emergency Program Act 
and the British Columbia Local Government Act would not be held to have a duty to consult 
with First Nations in the execution of emergency management within all of a given First 
Nation’s traditional, Aboriginal title and on-reserve territories, based on the findings in 
Neskonlith Indian Band v. City of Salmon Arm and the broader duty to consult doctrine.220  
The deafening silence respecting First Nations’ constitutional rights within the 
emergency management framework legislation, as will be explored further below, has the 
added impact that even the protections that a s. 35 duty to consult challenge might render 
are unavailable to First Nations impacted by emergency management executed by ‘local 
authorities’ within those First Nations’ own territories. The potential result is disturbing 
given that the provincial government is essentially delegating most of its emergency 
                                                 
219 Dwight G. Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) at 
73-74 [Newman, Consultation]. 
220 Ibid. at 73-74 [footnotes removed]; and see Neskonlith Indian Band v. Salmon Arm (City), 2012 BCCA 379, 
[2012] 4 CNLR 218 generally and at para 10-11, 13, 28, 46-7 [Neskonlith] (detailing the decision’s particular 
implication to First Nation hazard risk management, as the Neskonlith were concerned that the development under 
question would increase their risk to adverse effects from flooding); Emergency Program Act, supra note 76; Local 
Government Act, supra note 140. 
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management powers to local authorities through the Emergency Program Act (and other 
statutes).221 It would seem logical that the duty to consult would likewise be delegated.222  
However, as the Act and regulations are silent on respecting First Nations constitutional 
rights in the execution of emergency management through a local authority, a court may 
well construct a ‘local authority’ duty to consult as outside the processes set out for it.223 
First Nations are essentially hemmed in to governing emergency management restrictively 
within their on-reserve boundaries. This is irrespective of whether a given First Nation has 
an Aboriginal title claim or other Aboriginal rights potentially impacted within that First 
Nation’s broader traditional territories. First Nations’ limited governance scope over 
emergency management throughout their traditional territories is directly tied to provincial 
delegation of environmental management to ‘local authorities’.224 ‘Local authorities’ are 
not First Nations within the emergency management statutory language, and even where 
First Nations are accorded a governance priority over on-reserve emergency management, 
that authority may be overstepped by a ‘local authority’ acting in a response capacity. 
The jurisdictional scope of a local authority in relation to emergency management can be 
both quantitatively and qualitatively significant.225 Obviously, some municipalities will 
                                                 
221 Environmental Management Act, supra note 133 at ss 4, 5, 39(1), 87 (the Environmental Management Act is a 
long and complex piece of provincial legislation that directs land management planning, including environmental 
impact assessments and environmental emergency response over jurisdictional areas constructed to be provincial, 
irrespective that many of the areas contemplated in the Act in fact fall within First Nation traditional and specific 
Aboriginal title territories. In common with other statutes explored in this thesis, there is little to no language 
prioritizing and protecting Aboriginal rights in the statutory and regulatory frameworks).  
222 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76; Local Government Act, supra note 140; Environmental Management 
Act, ibid.; Wildfire Act, supra note 129 (note this legislative list is exemplary, not exhaustive); and see Neskonlith, 
supra note 220 at para 61 (“The argument of the Neskonlith in favour of a municipal duty to consult can be 
described fairly succinctly…the honour of the Crown imposes a constraint on the exercise of authority delegated by 
the Province. If it were otherwise, the Province would be in a position to eliminate or avoid this core principle by 
delegating the decision to its statutory creature, a local government. Such avoidance would not be consistent with 
the honour of the Crown”). 
223 Neskonlith, ibid. at paras 70, 78 (as creatures of statute, municipalities do not in general have the authority to 
consult with and if indicated, accommodate First Nations as a specific group in making the day-to-day operational 
decisions that are the diet of local governments” (para 70);… In my view, even if one assumes that a municipal law 
regulating flood risk for the protection of private property was the kind of law that could engage the duty to consult, 
the potential adverse effect on the Neskonlith is at this stage only speculative”.(para 78)). 
224Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 1 “local authority”. 
225 See Local Government Act, supra note 140 at s 176 (As per the language of s. 176, the “corporate powers” of a 
regional district include contractual powers for the provision of the regional district’s services, operation and 
enforcement of the regional district’s exercise of it regulatory authority, and to further contractual powers with a 
public authority respecting activities, works or services, operation and enforcement, and the management of property 
or interest in property. In addition to its contractual powers, a regional district can: provide assistance for the 
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encompass enormous populations whose needs and interests become paramount during a disaster 
event. For example, earthquake planning is an increasingly pressing political topic within the 
Greater Vancouver Regional District226, which is actually composed of 19 municipalities and an 
electoral area.227 The Greater Vancouver Regional District currently houses a population of 
approximately 2 300 000 people with an average population density of 802.5 persons per square 
kilometer.228 Natural Resources Canada reports that the west coast of Canada is one of the few 
areas in the world where all three types of tectonic plate movement (convergent, divergent, and 
transform) take place, situating the west coast as the most earthquake-prone region of Canada.229 
In the offshore region west of Vancouver Island alone, “more than 100 earthquakes of magnitude 
5 or greater (large enough to cause damage had they been closer to land) have occurred during 
the past 70 years”.230 Given the relatively high population density and scope of seismic activity 
in and around the Greater Vancouver Regional District, earthquake risk management could 
reasonably be considered an important governance responsibility requiring careful forethought 
and coordination.231  
While not at the same population scale, remote rural municipalities and regional district 
boards, as well as national park superintendents, are legislatively entrusted with a wide scope of 
emergency response considerations. Those considerations arise in large part from the sheer 
magnitude of land base under a local authority’s emergency management jurisdiction and the 
consequential necessity for consideration of the elements that must be coped with to effect life-
saving emergency response plans. For example, the Central Coast Regional District is the only 
                                                 
purpose of benefiting the community; acquire, hold or manage and dispose of land, improvements, personal property 
or other property; delegate several of its powers, duties and functions; engage in commercial, industrial and business 
undertakings; and establish commissions); but see Local Government Act, ibid. at s 175 (“A board may only exercise 
or perform its powers, duties and functions within the boundaries of the regional district unless authorized under this 
or another Act.”).  
226 Hereinafter GVRD. 
227 BCStats, Reference Maps, “Interactive Census Geographies”, online: BCStats 
<http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/statisticsbysubject/geography/referencemaps/rds.aspx> [BCStats Map] (for profiles 
of all regional districts in British Columbia.).  
228 Statistics Canada, Focus on Geography Series, 2011 Census, “Census metropolitan area of Vancouver, British 
Columbia”, online: Statistics Canada <http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011/as-sa/fogs-spg/Facts-
cma-eng.cfm?LANG=Eng&GK=CMA&GC=933>.  
229 Natural Resources Canada, Seismic zones in Western Canada, “Background on Earthquakes in Western Canada”, 
online: Natural Resources Canada <http://earthquakescanada.nrcan.gc.ca/zones/westcan-eng.php> [NRC 
Earthquakes Canada]. 
230 Ibid.  
231 See also Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 13. 
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regional district in British Columbia that doesn’t include a municipality. Instead the ~25000 km 
area is divided into five electoral areas with a reported census population of just under 3000.232 
With tourism amenities dispersed throughout the area, as well as ongoing resource extraction 
activities, there are likely challenges in ensuring emergency response is effective even in the 
context of the area’s relatively low population density and rugged landscape.  
In areas like the Central Coast, the impact of adhering to the Emergency Program Act and 
organizing local emergency management activities under a regime that patently excludes band 
councils and other forms of Indigenous governance potentially obstructs delivery of community-
supported emergency management. Figure 2 is a map of the Central Coast Regional District that 
shows populated reserves relative to the expanse of the regional district area. The census-derived 
on-reserve population between the Heiltsuk, Nuxalk and Wuikinuxv nations is approximately 
2000 (concentrated within tiny federal ‘Indian reserves’)233 of the 3000 people reportedly living 
in the entire central coast. Yet the Central Coast Regional District is afforded governance 
authority for emergency management for essentially the entire central coast land base, given that 
reserves constitute a tiny fraction of the land under discussion within the Central Coast Regional 
District area.234 The funding consideration is enormous given traditional cost recovery under the 
Local Government Act, the primarily enabling legislation for local authorities, is by way of 
property tax.235 On-reserve households fall outside the tax base, thus resulting in a flawed 
                                                 
232 Statistics Canada, “Profile, Central Coast, RD, British Columbia, 2011”, online: StatsCan 
<http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/dp-
pd/prof/details/page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CD&Code1=5945&Data=Count&SearchText=Central%20Coast&Search
Type=Begins&SearchPR=01&A1=All&B1=All&GeoLevel=PR&GeoCode=5945&TABID=1>(Total population in 
private households by citizenship: 3175; Registered or treaty Indian: 2005). 
233 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, “Welcome to the First Nation Profiles Interactive Map”, 
online: AANDC <http://fnpim-cippn.aandc-aadnc.gc.ca/index-eng.html> (Population Characteristics Heiltsuk 538 
on reserve population in 2011 1095; Nuxalk 539 on reserve population in 2011 850; Oweekeno/Wuikinuxv Nation 
541 population 150; by adding the total AANDC reported First Nation on reserve population  in the CCRD in 2011  
I estimated a population total of approximately 2095); and see Indian Act, supra note 194 at  s. 2(1) (“reserve” 
(“reserve (a) means a tract of land, the legal title to which is vested in Her Majesty that has been set apart by Her 
Majesty for the use and benefit of a band…” Note however on-reserve statistical information may be suppressed 
therefore Statistics Canada’s and AANDC’s population counts may not be accurate.). 
234 See BCStats Map, supra note 227 (I estimate from a visual survey of the BCStats interactive maps that the 
reserves within the CCRD constitute around 1% of the regional district landmass).  
235 Local Government Act, supra note 140 at ss 803, 804.3, 806.1, 807 (“803 (1) A regional district may recover the 
costs of its services by one or more of the following: (a) property value taxes imposed in accordance with Division 
4.3 [Requisition and Tax Collection]; (b) subject to subsection (2), parcel taxes imposed in accordance with 
Division 4.3 [Requisition and Tax Collection]; (c) fees and charges imposed under section 363 [imposition of fees 
and charges]; (d) revenues raised by other means authorized under this or another Act; (e) revenues received by way 
of agreement, enterprise, gift, grant or otherwise. (2) Parcel taxes may not be used to recover all or part of the costs 
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funding scheme to finance emergency management, particularly at the planning and mitigation 
phases.   
 
Figure 2 – Map of the Central Coast Regional District236 
Outside of an Aboriginal law analysis, a question perhaps worth exploring is whether the 
situation is defensible using purely democratic and equalization principles, particularly in regard 
to population concentrations, the electoral boundaries in regional districts and statutory 
operational funding schemes. In any case, the division of powers between the federal 
                                                 
of a regulatory service. (3) In the case of a service for which an establishing bylaw is required, if all or part of the 
costs are to be recovered by one or more of the methods referred to in subsection (1) (a) to (c), the establishing 
bylaw must indicate which methods are to be used.”); Taxation (Rural Area) Act, RSBC 1996 c 448 at s 15(1)(h) 
“The following property is exempt from taxation: …(h) land and improvements vested in or held by Her Majesty in 
trust for a band of Indians, and either unoccupied, or occupied by a person in an official capacity by the Indians”).  
236 BCStats Map, supra note 227 (the depicted map is accessible by clicking on the PDF link entitled “45 Central 
Coast” located on the webpage indicated in the full citation above).  
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government assuming jurisdiction for on-reserve emergency management and the provincially 
defined regional districts assuming emergency management powers off-reserve creates a 
jurisdictional quagmire for those interested in the safety and wellbeing of their entire local 
community, particularly in those regions of British Columbia where significant proportions of a 
local population inhabit reserves. Earthquake risk, again as an example, is no less a concern in 
the central and northern coastal area than it is to the southern coastal area where the Greater 
Vancouver Regional District lies. In fact, according to Natural Resources Canada, risk of life 
threatening seismic activity is actually greater along the more northern sector of the west 
coast.237 However, the governance and funding strategies for emergency management appear to 
limit the relative earthquake preparation capacity of the central and perhaps north coast. While 
outside the scope of this thesis, a per capita analysis of spending in the area of earthquake risk 
management might provide an interesting comparison on disaster preparedness among 
communities along the entire coast.  
Further complicating jurisdictional conversations governing emergency management is the 
fact of Aboriginal title. In the example of the central coast regional district, Aboriginal title 
claims could potentially encompass a substantial portion, if not all, of the territory provincially 
prescribed as being within the geographical scope of the local authority’s (aka the Central Coast 
Regional District’s) delegated powers. As mentioned, and as will be explored further, First 
Nation jurisdiction over emergency management is largely restricted to on-reserve activities 
except generally in the case where a First Nation has entered a modern treaty that contemplates 
emergency management. Given the scope of authority afforded to local authorities by British 
Columbia to manage emergencies and given the current state of precedent in British Columbia 
on the duty to consult, local authorities are poised to wield a tremendous amount of power over 
the very lives and wellbeing of First Nations—potentially in direct conflict with First Nation 
governance agency implicit in Aboriginal title.  
Risk assessment, planning and mitigating for emergencies, and then rapid decisions around 
targeted response, and maximizing recovery dollars, all fall within the ambit of governance 
matters that not only directly tie to the legal nature of Aboriginal title,238 but also should be 
                                                 
237 NRC Earthquakes Canada, supra note 229.  
238 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 73 (“Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with 
fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the 
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considered in the context of their purpose: minimizing harm and saving lives. From the outset, 
First Nations are constructively precluded from even defining for themselves what potential 
harms might arise during a natural disaster that would be of priority to a given First Nation for 
management in consideration of that First Nation’s particular land and water base, the nature of 
that First Nation’s territories generally, as well as the wellness status of its respective 
community.  
Defining harm is the natural precursor to evaluating risk of that harm. That is part and parcel 
of assessing vulnerability. Planning, mitigation, response and recovery strategies all flow from 
the starting point of what harms we are concerned about and seeking to avoid. A potentially 
important political question is whether any of the risk reduction and recovery priorities laid out 
by the provincial and federal governments were informed by First Nations themselves, 
particularly in the disaster recovery fiscal regulations and guidelines. 239 Notably, the priorities in 
the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements Guidelines do not necessarily reflect First 
Nation-specific ‘survival’ priorities. For example, recovery of a particular resource (say) a local 
fishery that is part of the identity and survival of a given First Nation might have more resonance 
within that First Nation than (say) recovery of a small business or farm. The food fishery might 
serve a similar economic purpose within that First Nation’s customs and could potentially be 
more essential to the wellness of the community as a whole. Only First Nations themselves are 
positioned to identify priority potential harms to their being as Aboriginal peoples. Only First 
                                                 
land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and 
manage the land”).   
239 Public Safety Canada, “Guidelines for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements” (Ottawa: Public Safety 
Canada, 2007) online: Public Safety Canada < http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/gdlns-
dsstr-ssstnc/gdlns-dsstr-ssstnc-eng.pdf> (revised 2015) [DFAA Guidelines] at s 1.2 (“Provincial governments 
design, develop and deliver disaster response and assistance programs within their own jurisdictions. In doing so, 
they establish the financial assistance criteria they consider appropriate for response and recovery. The DFAA are 
intended to support the provinces in: a) providing or reinstating the necessities of life to individuals, including help 
to repair and restore damaged homes; b) re-establishing or maintaining the viability of small businesses and working 
farms; c) repairing, rebuilding and restoring public works and the essential community services specified in these 
Guidelines to their pre-disaster capabilities; and d) funding limited mitigation measures to reduce the future 
vulnerability of repaired or replaced infrastructure”.; see Emergency Management BC, “Disaster Financial 
Assistance Guidelines for Private Sector: Home owners; Residential tenants; Small business owners; Farm owners; 
Charitable organizations” (Victoria: Emergency Management BC, 2012) online: Emergency Management BC < 
http://www.embc.gov.bc.ca/em/dfa_claims/PrivateSectorGuidelines.pdf> [BC DFA Guidelines] (for the British 
Columbia application of the federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements application);  and see Public Safety 
Canada, “Disaster Assistance Programs – List of all federal programs”, online: Public Safety Canada < 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-ssstnc-prgrms/dsstr-ssstnc-prgrms-ll-eng.aspx> 
(for a comprehensive list of federally funded emergency recovery fiscal programs categorized according to 
superseding ministry/department). 
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Nations themselves can be fully effective in planning for, mitigating, responding to, and 
recovering from disasters. 
Not only do ‘local authorities’ assume the delegated authorities of a province around disaster 
management, they also assume the disaster management priorities constructed by the federal and 
provincial government as enshrined in the statutes governing emergency management. Those 
priorities do not necessarily reflect a given First Nation’s perspective on what areas constitute 
priority harms to address in the disaster risk management process and subsequent emergency 
management generally. Instead it would appear, as further laid out below, that First Nations must 
rely on ‘local authorities’ to deliver emergency management response strategies that they have 
had no part in constructing, and no part in executing, within their traditional and Aboriginal title 
territories. It is somewhat astonishing to consider that local authorities can apparently exercise 
this life and death power without having to consult with First Nations at all.240 
As the conversation on Aboriginal title progresses, perhaps further directed dialogue 
addressing authority over emergency management throughout the expanse of Aboriginal title 
territories will take place. The question is an important governance issue, given the apparent 
shortcomings that limit First Nation inclusion within the current British Columbia emergency 
management regime.  
2.2.2.3.1 LOCAL STATE OF EMERGENCY 
According to the Emergency Program Act, “a local authority is at all times responsible for 
the direction and control of the local authority’s emergency response”.241 As such, “a local 
authority must prepare or cause to be prepared local emergency plans respecting preparation for, 
response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters”.242 Notably, the scope of powers 
afforded a local authority encompasses all four phases of emergency management, despite the 
fact that many emergency preparation and mitigation powers are distributed throughout both 
federal and provincial bodies pursuant to general jurisdiction on natural resources and resource 
                                                 
240 It is possible that in a regional district area, the electoral boundaries might allow for a majority First Nation 
population to hold a majority of seats on a given regional district board. However, such a situation merely bypasses 
the intrinsic constitutional problem of First Nations as respective self-determining and self-governing peoples in 
their own right having a steering voice in emergency management within their own respective territories. 
241 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 6 (1).  
242 Ibid. at s 6 (2).  
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extraction. So while a local authority might appear to have significant preparation and mitigation 
powers, those powers are fundamentally limited to disaster preparedness activities not already 
contemplated by other statutory regimes. 
Clearly, a high degree of inter-jurisdictional cooperation is necessary in order to effect a 
reasonably well coordinated local emergency response strategy. This is particularly so when 
considering all four phases of emergency management. Powers to mitigate and prepare for 
emergencies are generally dispersed widely throughout several federal and provincial Crown 
sectors. Useful to coordination is the Emergency Program Act’s further requirement that “a local 
authority that is a municipal council or the board of a regional district must establish and 
maintain an emergency management organization to develop and implement emergency plans 
and other preparedness, response and recovery measures for emergencies and disasters….”243 
Further, a local authority that is a municipal council or board of a regional district may appoint 
committees to advise and assist the local authority and appoint a coordinator for each emergency 
management organization established by the local authority.244 Logic suggests that devoted 
emergency management bodies have a better likelihood of achieving the necessary knowledge 
base and network to effect the best coordinated emergency management strategies possible. 
Importantly, all of a local authority’s powers and duties under the Emergency Program Act 
may be delegated to that local authority’s emergency management organization, coordinator or 
committee(s), except the power to make a declaration of a state of local emergency.245 A 
declaration of a state of local emergency can only be made by a local authority through a bylaw 
or resolution, or by the head of a local authority through an order.246 Although emergency 
declaratory powers are limited, a local authority or even a person designated in a local 
authority’s local emergency plan may cause an emergency plan to be implemented if an 
emergency exists or appears imminent or a disaster has occurred or threatens in the opinion of 
the local authority or designated person.247 The simplified procedure toward that emergency 
                                                 
243 Ibid. at s 6 (3). 
244 Ibid. at s 6 (3.1) - (3.2).  
245 Ibid. at s 6 (4).  
246 Ibid. at ss 1 “declaration of a state of local emergency”, 12; and see Ibid. at s. 12 (3) (“The head of a local 
authority must, before making a declaration under subsection (1), convene a meeting of the local authority to assist 
in directing the response to the emergency”).  
247 Ibid. at s 8.  
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response is as timely as possible appears aimed at prioritising efficacy over bureaucracy during a 
disaster event when time can be critical to save lives. Once again it is important to note that First 
Nations generally do not have a Crown-recognized authority to declare a state of emergency. So, 
they are constructively dependent on municipalities, regional district boards, or national park 
superintendents to make declarations of emergencies taking place within their traditional (and 
Aboriginal title) territories. Further, it may well be that those ‘local authorities’ do not have a 
duty to consult with First Nations regarding said emergency declarations or regarding their 
emergency management execution.248  
Once a state of local emergency has been declared, the local authority is under a statutory 
obligation to make the contents of the declaration known to the population of the affected area by 
means of the most effective form of communication at the local authority’s disposal.249 The local 
authority is further obliged to forward a copy of the declaration to the minster.250 A local state of 
emergency expires after 7 days and requires another bylaw, resolution or order for renewal.251 
The minister’s or lieutenant governor in council’s approval is required to extend a local state of 
emergency beyond the seven day time limit and the minister or lieutenant governor in council 
likewise has the statutory discretion to unilaterally cancel a local state of emergency.252  
After a declaration of a state of local emergency is made, the local authority “may do all acts 
and implement all procedures that it considers necessary to prevent, respond to or alleviate the 
effects of an emergency or disaster”, including: “implement its local emergency plan or any local 
emergency measures; … exercise [some] power available to the minister…; …authorize, in 
writing, any persons involved in the operation of a local emergency plan or program to exercise 
[some] power available to the minister…”.253  
                                                 
248 Newman, Consultation, supra note 219 at 73-74 [footnotes removed]; and see Neskonlith, supra note 220.  
249 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 12 (4) (b). 
250 Ibid. at s 12 (4) (a).  
251 Ibid. at ss 12 (5), (7), (4), (2), (5). 
252 Ibid. at s 12.  
253 Ibid. at s 13 (“(1) After a declaration of a state of local emergency is made under section 12 (1) in respect of all or 
any part of the jurisdictional area for which a local authority has responsibility and for the duration of the state of 
local emergency, the local authority may do all acts and implement all procedures that it considers necessary to 
prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of an emergency or a disaster, including any or all of the following: (a) 
implement its local emergency plan or any local emergency measures; (b) subject to this section, exercise, in relation 
to the part of the jurisdictional area affected by the declaration, any power available to the minister under section 10 
(1) (d) to (l); (c) subject to this section, authorize, in writing, any persons involved in the operation of a local 
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The specific statutory powers of the minister that may be exercised, or delegated, by the local 
authority are:  
- acquire or use any land or personal property considered necessary to prevent, respond to 
or alleviate the effects of an emergency or disaster;254 
- authorize or require any person to render assistance of a type that the person is qualified 
to provide or that otherwise is or may be required to prevent, respond to or alleviate the 
effects of an emergency or disaster;255 
- control or prohibit travel to or from any area…;256 
- provide for the restoration of essential facilities and the distribution of essential supplies 
and provide, maintain and coordinate emergency medical, welfare and other essential 
services…;257 
- cause the evacuation of persons and the removal of livestock, animals and personal 
property from any area … that is or may be affected by an emergency or a disaster and 
make arrangements for the adequate care and protection of those persons, livestock, 
animals and personal property;258 
- authorize the entry into any building or on any land, without warrant, by any person in 
the course of implementing an emergency plan or program or if otherwise considered by 
the [local authority] to be necessary to prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of an 
emergency or disaster;259 
- cause the demolition or removal of any trees, structures or crops if the demolition or 
removal is considered by the [local authority] to be necessary or appropriate in order to 
prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of an emergency or disaster;260 
- construct works considered by the [local authority] to be necessary or appropriate to 
prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of an emergency or disaster;261 
                                                 
emergency plan or program to exercise, in relation to any part of the jurisdictional area affected by a declaration, any 
power available to the minister under section 10 (1) (d) to (l)”); and see ibid. at s 10. 
254 Ibid. at s 10 (d).  
255 Ibid. at s 10 (e). 
256 Ibid. at s 10 (f). 
257 Ibid. at s 10 (g).  
258 Ibid. at s 10 (h).  
259 Ibid. at s 10 (i). 
260 Ibid. at s 10 (j).  
261 Ibid. at s 10 (k). 
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- procure, fix prices for or ration food, clothing, fuel, equipment, medical supplies or other 
essential supplies and the use of any property, services, resources or equipment … for the 
duration of the state of emergency.262 
An important limitation on a local authority’s emergency powers is the Emergency Program 
Act’s caveat that the minister “may order a local authority to refrain or desist, either generally or 
in respect of any matter, from exercising any one or more of the powers” outlined above.263 
While a substantial range of authority exists under the legislation, many of a local authority’s 
executable powers are meaningless without sufficient resourcing to effect the outlined scope of 
authority. The Emergency Program Act contains a cost recovery section aimed at enabling 
compensation for a local authority (or the provincial government) that has expended emergency 
management costs for an emergency that was threatened or caused by the act(s) or omission(s) of 
a person.264  
Simplified procedures to invoke emergency plan implementation are necessary for those 
plans to effectively serve their purpose. The challenge appears to be having sufficient checks and 
balances on the exercise of emergency response powers to ensure the democratic process is by 
and large upheld and sustained. As will further be explored, while the various emergency 
response statutory regimes across federal and provincial governments clearly contemplate 
constitutional principles invoking all of POGG, the Charter and Canada’s division of powers, 
emergency management acts and regulations are silent with respect to upholding the honour of 
the Crown in effecting s. 35 constitutional principles in emergency management. A premise of 
this thesis is that just as a balance can be achieved between efficacy in emergency management 
and adherence to democratic and other essential Canadian constitutional principles, so too can an 
                                                 
262 Ibid. at s 10 (l).  
263 Ibid. at s 13. 
264 Ibid. at s 17 (“If an emergency or a disaster is threatened or caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of 
a person and expenditures are made by the government or a local authority to prevent, respond to or alleviate the 
effects of the emergency or disaster, the person must, on the request of the minister or head of a local authority, pay 
to the Minister of Finance or the local authority the lesser of (a) the portion of the expenditures that is equal to the 
portion of the liability for the occurrence of the emergency or disaster that is attributable to the person, and (b) the 
amount demanded by the minister or head of a local authority. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) relieves a person from 
any other liability”). 
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effective balance between efficient emergency management and adhering to s. 35 Constitutional 
principles be achieved.  
2.2.2.3.2 PROVINCIAL STATE OF EMERGENCY:  
At the provincial level, the minister or lieutenant governor in council may declare a state of 
emergency relating to all or any part of British Columbia by way of an order. The declaration 
must identify the nature of the emergency and the area where the emergency exists or is 
imminent. The minister is then obligated to make the details of the declared emergency known 
by publishing the details of the declaration through a means of communication that the minister 
considers most likely to make the contents known to the majority of the affected population. The 
clock starts ticking after the declaration is made and the emergency statutorily expires after 14 
days, but can be renewed for further periods of not more than 14 days each.265  
Whether or not an emergency has been declared, the minister (or designated person) may 
implement a provincial emergency plan, if, in the minister’s opinion an emergency exists or 
appears imminent or a disaster has occurred or threatens.266 After the declaration of a state of 
emergency, the minister has all the same powers outlined for a local authority above. In addition 
to those powers, a minister may do all acts and implement all procedures that the minister 
considers necessary to prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of an emergency or a disaster; 
may implement a provincial emergency plan or measure; and may authorize, and even require, a 
local authority to implement a local emergency plan or measures.267 In addition, the minister (or 
designated person) has the power to make an order requiring a person to provide assistance, and 
the person named in the order must provide the assistance required by the order.268 
Contravention of the Act or regulations (or an order made in accordance with the Act) could cost 
the offender up to a year of imprisonment and $10 000 fine.269  
                                                 
265 Ibid. at s 9. 
266 Ibid. at s 7 (“The minister or a person designated in a Provincial emergency plan may, whether or not a state of 
emergency has been declared under section 9 (1), cause a Provincial emergency plan to be implemented if, in the 
opinion of the minister or the designated person, an emergency exists or appears imminent or a disaster has occurred 
or threatens”). 
267 Ibid. at s 10.  
268 Ibid. at s 25. The legislation attempts to protect those ordered to provide emergency assistance from losing their 
employment at ibid. at s. 25 (2) (“a person’s employment must not be terminated by reason only that the person is 
required to provide assistance under this section”).  
269 Ibid. at s 27. 
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The Emergency Program Act deals explicitly with potential conflict of laws and affirms the 
Act’s supremacy during a declared state of emergency.270 Additional powers are vested by way 
of the Act’s regulations, which deal largely with the financial matters of an emergency and 
emergency response coordination.271 First Nations are not mentioned, either directly or 
indirectly, throughout the Emergency Program Act.  
The Lieutenant Governor in Council is empowered under the Emergency Program Act to 
make regulations assigning responsibilities to “ministries, boards, commissions or government 
corporations or agencies for the preparation or implementation of all or any part of plans or 
arrangements to deal with emergencies or disasters”.272 Under the Emergency Program 
Management Regulations, not only are First Nations not mentioned in any capacity, missing 
entirely from the list of “Ministers Responsible for Coordinating Government Response to 
Specified Hazards” under Schedule 1 and the “Duties of Ministers and Government Corporations 
in the Event of an Emergency” under Schedule 2 is the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation.273 The omission is significant. The Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation is charged with: 
…pursuing reconciliation with the First Nations and Aboriginal peoples of British 
Columbia. A key component of reconciliation involves building and maintaining 
relationships and partnerships, which create opportunities to collaborate on 
building a strong economy and a secure tomorrow so that all British Columbians, 
including First Nations and Aboriginal peoples, are able to pursue their goals.274  
                                                 
270 Ibid. at s 26 (“Unless otherwise provided for a in a declaration of a state or emergency made under section 9 (1) 
or in an extension of the duration of a declaration under section 9 (4), if there is a conflict between this Act or the 
regulations made under this Act and any other Act or regulations, this Act and the regulations made under this act 
prevail during the time that the declaration of a state of emergency made under section 9 (1) and  any extension of 
the duration of that declaration is in effect”).  
271 Ibid. at s 28. 
272 Ibid. at s 28 (2) (a).  
273 Emergency Program Management Regulation, BC Reg 477/94 at Schedules 1 & 2.  
274 Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, “2015/16-2017/18 Service Plan, February 2015 (Victoria: 
Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2015) at 5 ‘Purpose of the Ministry’ online: 
<http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2015/sp/pdf/ministry/arr.pdf> [MARR Service Plan]; and see MARR Service Plan 
at 9-10 (“‘Goal 1… Performance Measure 5: Liquefied natural gas benefit agreements’—this section deals 
specifically with a potentially catastrophic dangerous good. There is no overt language committing to emergency or 
disaster management strategies, in spite of the fact that the federal government has made a budgetary commitment to 
bolstering on reserve emergency management through Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada’s 
strategic priorities over the next few years. The Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation is arguably in 
line with the federal government’s First Nation economic development priorities, but out of sync with respect to the 
federal priority in emergency management (“Further to the strategic agreements, the Ministry uses tools such as non-
treaty agreements to support First Nations that may be impacted by natural gas development, pipelines or liquefied 
natural gas facilities to ensure they are provided with the ability to participate in this generational opportunity. These 
benefit agreements create greater certainty for all parties by obtaining early support from First Nations, creating 
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In spite of a broad mandate to build relationships and foster reconciliation with First Nations, 
with outcomes aimed at ‘security’ and ‘sustainable, healthy communities’, the Ministry of 
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation astonishingly has no explicit role in British Columbia’s 
coordination of government response to specific hazards. That the key British Columbian 
ministry charged with building relationships with First Nations constructively has no role in 
facilitating the province’s emergency program further challenges First Nations in leveraging an 
emergency management voice in decisions impacting their respective territories.275  
The Emergency Program Management Regulation lays out ministerial responsibility to 
“develop emergency plans and procedures to be followed in the event of an emergency or 
disaster” and specifies that those plans “may include plans and procedures to assist local 
authorities with response to or recovery from emergencies or disasters that are of such magnitude 
that the local authorities are incapable of effectively responding to or recovering from them”.276 
Notably, the Emergency Program Management Regulation specifies that each minister’s 
emergency plans and procedures must “be coordinated and consistent with the emergency plans 
and procedures of every other minister”277 but does not require that emergency management 
plans or procedures be coordinated and consistent with those of First Nation governments 
delivering emergency services on reserve.  
The Emergency Program Management Regulation mandates the creation of an ‘Inter-Agency 
Emergency Preparedness Council’ consisting of at least one appointed representative from each 
of the ministries listed in Schedule 2 of the regulation, which as previously noted does not 
                                                 
partnerships for the development, transportation and liquefaction of natural gas. The Ministry will continue to use its 
innovative and flexible approach, including land, revenue and benefits sharing, strategic engagement and other 
agreements, to ensure First Nations are engaged on liquefied natural gas activities that may impact their Aboriginal 
rights. In addition, to complement liquefied natural gas related agreements, the Ministry will work with First Nations 
to support social and economic wellness such as skills training programs and an Environmental Stewardship 
Initiative.”). 
275 Emergency Program Management Regulation, supra note 273 at ‘Schedule 1’ (for example, under the 
“Geological” hazard group, including hazards such as avalanches (highway and other), debris avalanches and debris 
flows, landslides (highways and other), submarines slides, and land subsidence, “Key Ministries” having an implicit 
regulatory role are “Transportation and Highways, Attorney General, Environment Lands and Parks, Energy Mines 
and Petroleum Resources. As with every other hazard group, listed (Accidents, Atmosphere, Dam Failure, Disease 
and Epidemics, Explosions and Emissions, Fire – Urban and Rural, General, Hazardous Materials, Hydrologic, 
Power Outage, Riots, Seismic, Space Object, Structural, Terrorism, Volcanic, and Wildfire), the Ministry of 
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation is not listed as a key ministry to coordinating government response).  
276 Ibid. at s 3 (1)-(2).  
277 Ibid. at s 3 (3)(a).  
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include the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation.278 The Inter-Agency 
Emergency Preparedness Council is funded by the Provincial Emergency Program and is 
directed to:  
(a) recommend emergency preparedness, response and recovery measures to each 
minister, and 
(b) provide to each minister referred to in Schedule 2 the assistance necessary to 
ensure that that minister’s emergency plans and procedures are coordinated and 
consistent with the plans and procedures of all other ministers and with the 
government’s overall emergency preparedness strategies.279  
Given that the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation is off the list, the Ministry is 
also exempt from the funding strategy devised to coordinate emergency preparedness at the local 
and provincial level. Lack of funding could present another significant barrier to under-resourced 
First Nations struggling to meet the financial demands of regular governance requirements under 
the Indian Act regime—that regime of course is notoriously over-reported and under-funded.280 
That the Province has not regulated a mandate to fund inclusion of First Nations at the Inter-
Agency Emergency Preparedness Council, or even the Ministry charged with building 
relationships with First Nations, is another striking indication that First Nations are overtly 
excluded from emergency management decision-making that could well impact their very lives 
and well-being.281  
Given the statutory makeup of the provincial emergency program, it is perhaps not surprising 
that in British Columbia’s current all-hazard emergency management plan, non-treaty First 
Nations’ role in emergency management is qualified as on reserve and under the authority of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada:  
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) holds legislated 
responsibility for emergency management on First Nation reserves. Through a 
Letter of Understanding with AANDC, EMBC has agreed to support the provision 
                                                 
278 Ibid. at s 5. 
279 Ibid. at s 5 (7). 
280 See Anaya, UNHRC Report, supra note 38. 
281 But see Emergency Management British Columbia, “The All-Hazard Plan, 4/11/2012” (Victoria: Province of 
British Columbia, 2012) online: <http://www.embc.gov.bc.ca/em/hazard_plans/All-Hazard_Plan.pdf> at 43 [BC 
All-Hazard Plan] (“The Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation (MARR) is responsible for aboriginal 
policy and coordination, including treaty and non-treaty agreements. If an agreement impacts the composition or 
responsibilities of emergency management on First Nations reserve land, EMBC of the Ministry of Justice is 
notified and consulted. Before, during and after an emergency the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and 
Reconciliation could be called upon to provide expertise and/or policy direction regarding First Nations 
communities.”). 
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of emergency response and recovery services to First Nations communities when 
requested by either AANDC or the local Band Council.  
The primary link to the provincial emergency management structure for First 
Nation communities during an emergency response is Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada (AANDC).282 
It appears that the ‘Letter of Understanding’ between AANDC and Emergency 
Management British Columbia referred to in the All-Hazard Plan is primarily concerned 
with fiscal responsibility and prescribes remuneration to the Province for its costs in 
delivering emergency management services on reserve.283 
The Auditor General of Canada concluded in her fall 2013 report that responsibility for 
emergency management on reserves among stakeholders is unclear.284 The Audit recommended 
that “Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, working with First Nations, the 
provinces, and other federal organizations, should take the lead role in clarifying federal roles 
and responsibilities so that these can be set out formally in agreements with the provinces and in 
the contribution agreements with First Nations and third-party providers”.285 The ambiguity 
identified by the Auditor General in on-reserve emergency management adds further to the 
complication of including First Nation governments in not only managing emergencies on 
reserves, but in managing emergencies that affect the entire scope of First Nations’ traditional 
territories.  
                                                 
282 Ibid. at 35. 
283 Ministry of Justice, “Financial Management of Emergency Response Costs during Provincial Activations” (5 
April 2013) online: <http://www.embc.gov.bc.ca/em/hazard_plans/Financial_Management_Annex.pdf> at 22 (for a 
flow chart detailing recouping of costs from AANDC: “Where a local authority incurs emergency response costs on 
behalf of a FN community, the local authority can submit an emergency response claim with two task numbers such 
that EMBC is able to extrapolate the First Nations’ emergency response costs for submission to AANDC. In this 
case, the local authority will receive the proceeds of the two claims and distribute the proceeds. EMBC headquarters 
invoices AANDC for all emergency response costs incurred on behalf of FN communities.”); and see AANDC, 
“Emergency Management Information for BC First Nations” (Vancouver: AANDC BC Region, 
VANCOUVR#2314821 - v9) online: <http://www.snuneymuxw.ca/sites/default/files/news/VANCOUVR-
%232314821-v9-EMU_-
_AANDC_BC_REGION_EMERGENCY_MANAGEMENT_INFORMATION_FOR_BC_FIRST_NATIONS.pdf> 
at 4 (“AANDC also works collaboratively with Provincial and Territorial governments (who are responsible for 
operating overall emergency management programs within their respective jurisdictions) for the provision of 
emergency management services to First Nations communities on-reserve.”[emphasis added]).  
284 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 6 Emergency 
Management on Reserves, (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2013) at 6.25-6.37, online: 
<http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201311_06_e.pdf> [Audit Emergency Management]. 
285 Ibid. at 6.37 “Recommendation”. 
68 
 
Under the British Columbia ‘All-Hazard Plan’, treaty First Nations are relegated to the 
status of ‘local authorities’, which as will be reviewed later in this thesis, is consistent with 
the language of modern treaties speaking to emergency management.286 It is also however 
highly inconsistent with the driving political message of individual First Nations and 
umbrella organizations representing First Nations that First Nations are not stakeholders, 
municipalities or other inferior governments to the province or Canada, but are Nations in 
their own right.  
The Minister of Justice and Attorney General (Emergency Management Program) also 
enjoys a wide scope of temporary powers with respect to spending, extended to the minister 
during a declared state of emergency. The Emergency Program Act states: “Any expenditures 
under this Act considered necessary by the minister to implement a Provincial emergency plan or 
Provincial emergency measures, under section 7 or 10 (1)(a), may be paid out of the consolidated 
revenue fund without an appropriation other than this section. Further to discretionary 
emergency spending, the minister also has the power to seek recovery of costs if “an emergency 
or disaster is threatened or caused in whole or in part by the acts or omissions of a person and 
expenditures are made by the government or a local authority to prevent, respond to or alleviate 
the effects of the emergency or disaster”.287 In addition, the minister has the power to provide 
regulated disaster financial assistance to persons who suffer loss as a result of a disaster.288 
Again, given the statutory absence of First Nation recognition – in this case to losses that might 
be particularly incurred by a First Nation impacted by a disaster that was the result of an act or 
omission of a person, First Nations appear to be left out entirely from the disaster management 
funding and cost-recovery cycles for emergencies that take place within their traditional 
territories. 
 
 
                                                 
286 BC All-Hazard Plan, supra note 281 at 33 (“First Nations communities with treaty agreements are local 
authorities under the Emergency Program Act and its regulations. Although not required, some treaty First Nations 
communities have formal agreements with neighbouring jurisdictions regarding emergency services and programs, 
such as the 2009 agreement between the Tsawwassen First Nation and the City of Delta.”).  
287 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 17.  
288 Ibid. at s 20.  
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2.3 FIRST NATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION 
2.3.1 FIRST NATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION ON RESERVE 
The Indian Act continues to empower the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development289 to be “the superintendent general of Indian affairs”.290 Concomitantly, reserves 
continue to constitute an important jurisdictional parameter under the Indian Act. In the 
paternalistic language of the Indian Act, reserves are “held by Her Majesty for the use and 
benefit of the respective bands for which they were set apart, and subject to [the Indian Act] and 
to the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may determine whether any 
purpose for which lands in a reserve are used or are to be used is for the use and benefit of the 
band”.291 The statutory span of uses to which the Minister of Indian Affairs may authorize the 
use of lands in a reserve includes: Indian schools, the administration of Indian affairs, Indian 
burial grounds, Indian health projects, or, with the consent of the council of the band, for any 
other purpose for the general welfare of the band.292 The Indian Act instructs that a band is to 
“ensure that the roads, bridges, ditches and fences within the reserve occupied by that band are 
maintained in accordance with instructions issued from time to time by the superintendent”.293  
In stark contrast to the scope of statutory powers afforded to municipalities, regional districts 
and national parks to declare and manage a local state of emergency under the British Columbia 
Emergency Program Act, First Nation band councils are not directly empowered to declare or 
manage a state of emergency, even on reserve.294 In fact, according to Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada’s National Emergency Management Plan, the ‘authorities and 
legislative requirements’ prescribing AANDC’s scope of responsibilities vests in the fact that 
“[s]ection 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867 prescribes the legislative authority of the 
Government of Canada for “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”. This authority is 
delegated to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada pursuant to 
                                                 
289 The department is now known as Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, however the express 
language of the Indian Act reflects the earlier department name of Indian Affairs and Northern Development; Indian 
Act, supra note 204.   
290 Indian Act, supra note 213 at s 3 (1). 
291 Ibid. at s 18(1).  
292 Ibid. at s 18(2).  
293 Ibid. at s 34(1). 
294 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at ss 12-15, 16-28; ibid. at ss 81 and 83. 
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the Indian Act. Because the Emergency Management Act 2007 “states that each federal minister 
is responsible for the identification of risks that are within or related to his or her area of 
responsibility, including those related to critical infrastructure”, AANDC is required to “prepare 
emergency management plans in respect of those risks; maintain, test and implement the plans; 
and conduct exercises and training in relation to the plans”.295 The Plan further clarifies that: 
AANDC’s Treasury Board Program Authority #330 sets out the management terms 
and conditions for “Contributions for Emergency Management Assistance 
Activities on Reserve”. The Program structure recognizes that the provinces and 
territories have constitutional jurisdiction for emergency management, while the 
federal government has jurisdiction for Indians and lands reserved for Indians.296  
So, the pervasive paternalism arising from the language of s. 91(24) and the continued 
assumption of federal Crown authority over the lives and wellbeing of registered Indians appears 
to restrictively inform the statutory extent of on-reserve emergency management, and disables 
any fundamental recognition of First Nation jurisdictional competency to manage emergencies 
within their own respective territories.  
Further evidence of the overt exclusion of First Nations from any voice in emergency 
management appears in the language of the AANDC Internal Audit Report of the Emergency 
Management Assistance Program, which summarizes key legislation and recent inter-
governmental emergency management milestones. The audit suggests that the collective body of 
federal and federal/provincial instruments characterises Canada’s approach to emergency 
management as:  
an all-hazards, risk based approach to address both natural and human-induced 
emergency situations; four interdependent components (prevention/mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery); shared responsibilities among federal, 
provincial and territorial governments and their partners, including individual 
citizens and communities; and recognition that most emergencies in Canada are 
local in nature and managed by municipalities or at the provincial or territorial 
level.297  
                                                 
295 AANDC, National Emergency Management Plan, (Ottawa: Published under the authority of the Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 2011 at s 1.2 ‘Authorities and Legislative Requirements’, online: 
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1324572607784/1324572653216#c2> [AANDC Emergency Plan].  
296 Ibid. 
297 AANDC, Audit and Assurance Services Branch, Internal Audit Report: Audit of the Emergency Management 
Assistance Program (Ottawa: April 2013), online: < http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-
AEV/STAGING/texte-text/au_ema_1386615085800_eng.pdf > at 4 [emphasis added] [AANDC Internal Audit].  
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First Nations are not mentioned once in this AANDC summary characterizing Canada’s 
approach to emergency management. 
In the Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada and Canadian Polar 
Commission 2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities, AANDC continues to express deference to 
provincial emergency management authorities by describing the AANDC Emergency 
Management Assistance Program as promoting efficiency through “accessing existing resources 
and service of provincial/territorial and First Nation emergency management partners to address 
on-reserve emergencies. EMAP reimburses these partners for eligible expenses”.298  
AANDC’s deference to a province’s or local authority’s jurisdictional authority for 
emergency management is patently clear.  There is left little voice for First Nation populations 
who must live with the outcomes of others’ emergency management strategies. The Indian Act 
effectively dispenses supreme powers to local authorities and provincial governments in 
instances where lands are needed for public purposes—a local authority, provincial government 
or other federal department has a statutory authority to uptake lands for said purposes.299 As 
outlined above, under the British Columbia Emergency Program Act, during a state of 
emergency, a local authority may “acquire or use any land or personal property considered 
necessary to prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of the emergency or disaster”.300 The 
express language of the Indian Act only limits the supremacy of the local authority’s 
jurisdictional capacity over a band council by requiring that the consent and terms of the 
Governor in Council must be adhered to.301  
It would appear by the language of the British Columbia Emergency Program Act read in 
conjunction with the Indian Act that not only does the Crown not recognize a First Nation 
statutory authority for emergency management in that Nation’s Aboriginal title territories off 
reserve, but even on reserve a municipality, regional district, or national park superintendent can 
                                                 
298 AANDC, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada and Canadian Polar Commission, 2015-16 
Report on Plans and Priorities, (Ottawa: AANDC, 2015) online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-
INTER-HQ-AI/STAGING/texte-text/15-16_rpp_pdf_1427220534464_eng.pdf> at 59 (Sub-Program 3.4.6: 
Emergency Management Assistance) [AANDC 2015-16 Budget].  
299 Indian Act, supra note 213 at s 35(1).  
300 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 10(d).  
301 Indian Act, supra note 213 at s 35(1).  
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direct the use of lands and property over the express authority of a band council in the case of a 
declared state of emergency. The statutory limitations on this particular power vests with the 
Governor in Council and not with the First Nation whose land base is afflicted by a disaster.302  
Disaster resourcing for both on reserve and off reserve emergency management contributes 
to the alienation of a First Nation steering voice. As an initial premise: 
 AANDC enters into collaborative agreements with provincial governments to 
ensure that First Nations communities have access to comparable emergency 
assistance services available to other residents in their respective province. Through 
these agreements AANDC provides the funding to cover eligible costs related to 
emergency assistance in First Nations communities while the provincial or 
territorial government provides the service. 303 
While the intent of ensuring that First Nations have access to comparable emergency assistance 
available to other residents is necessary, that outcome does not necessarily have to be at the 
expense of denying First Nations any jurisdictional role in emergency management authority 
and/or delivery of emergency management services. Not only does AANDC’s strategy overtly 
exclude First Nations from steering emergency management within their own territories, but it 
patently redirects resources that might otherwise be spent building capacity within First Nations 
communities for local emergency management while bankrolling provincial and local authority 
assertion of jurisdiction over First Nation lands. 
AANDC’s description of its Emergency Management Assistance budgetary priorities for 
2015-16 assumes that existing emergency management services are adequate to meet current 
disaster risk.304 Contradicting that assumption is the budgetary priority that continues to be 
afforded to the relatively new ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Management in order to 
effect an overhaul of emergency management throughout Canada generally. AANDC itself has 
doubled its projected spending on Emergency Management Assistance for 2015 and beyond 
(from a projected $37 768 388 to $70 252 180 for the 2015-16 fiscal year and from a projected 
                                                 
302 Ibid. (“Where by an Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature Her Majesty in right of a province, a municipal 
or local authority or a corporation is empowered to take or to use lands or any interest therein without the consent of 
the owner, the power may, with the consent of the Governor in Council and subject to any terms that may be 
prescribed by the governor in Council, be exercised in relation to lands in a reserve or any interest therein”).  
303 AANDC Emergency Plan, supra note 295 at 7. 
304 C.f. AANDC 2015-16 Budget, supra note 298.  
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$37 768 388 to $72 192 685 for the 2016-17 fiscal year).305 The budgetary and planning 
priorities collectively present emergency management throughout Canada as in a state of flux. 
In what appears to be a more empowering strategy, AANDC is prioritising supporting First 
Nations “in their efforts to mitigate and prepare for emergencies” by allocating a proportion of 
preparedness funding (15% of the $19.1 million allocated) towards the development and 
maintenance of Emergency Management plans.306 However, Public Safety Canada reports that it 
is “leading the development of a Disaster Recovery Strategy which will establish a blueprint for 
coordinating pre-disaster and post-disaster recovery activities, and will ensure that linkages will 
be made with existing and proposed preparation, mitigation and recovery planning. To advance 
the development of this Strategy, the Department will work with federal partners, provincial and 
territorial counterparts and other key stakeholders”307—but not First Nations, unless, of course, 
the Crown regards First Nations as mere stakeholders in their own territories.  
In the case of an ‘environmental emergency’ under the Canadian Environmental Protection 
Act, 1999, the Act itself provides for some limited First Nation engagement in federal emergency 
management. Section 196 sets out that “[t]he Minister may issue guidelines and codes of practice 
respecting the prevention of, preparedness for and response to an environmental emergency and 
for restoring any part of the environment damaged by or during an emergency”.308 While the 
Minister is required to offer consultation with any Aboriginal government representatives who 
are part of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 National Advisory Committee in 
carrying out the responsibilities of s. 196, consultation with ‘aboriginal people’ is discretionary 
under the Act.309  Notably, a clock is built into the legislation, enabling on a prima facie basis 
                                                 
305 Ibid. at 59 (Sub-Program 3.4.6 Emergency Management Assistance).  
306 However, it is not clear if AANDC intends to spend that money at the community level or (say) on internal 
department training to invoke an ‘incident command system’ among AANDCs regional staff. The budget priority is 
ambiguous, and based on the language of the audit it may be that AANDC will not spend the bulk of the money at a 
First Nation community level. 
307 Public Safety Canada, The Honourable Steven Blaney, P.C, M.P. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness, 2015-16 Report on Plans and Priorities, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2015) at 58 (Sub-Program 
1.4.4 Emergency Recovery, Planning Highlights) online: <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rprt-plns-
prrts-2015-16/rprt-plns-prrts-2015-16-en.pdf> [Public Safety 2015-16]. 
308 CEPA, supra note 90 at s 196.  
309 Ibid. at s 197 (1) (“In carrying out the responsibilities conferred by section 196, the Minister shall offer to consult 
with the government of a province and the members of the Committee who are representatives of aboriginal 
governments and may consult with a government department or agency, aboriginal people, representatives of 
industry and labour and municipal authorities or with persons interested in the quality of the environment or 
environmental emergencies” [emphasis added]).  
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unilateral action where an offer to consult has not been accepted within 60 days. The clock 
applies to all phases of emergency management, including mitigation and preparedness.310  
Given that emergency management continues to be in a state of reorganization generally 
throughout Canada, and given that increasing attention regionally, nationally and internationally 
is being afforded to Indigenous populations as the most vulnerable in the world to escalating 
natural disaster risk, one might conclude that now is the ideal time to tackle dated governance 
structures that assume provincially constructed ‘local authorities’ should have governance 
priorities over First Nations in unsurrendered territories.  
Logic dictates that First Nation governments are the best positioned to centralize emergency 
management, particularly at the ‘community level’,311 because both Canada and the Province of 
British Columbia have a constitutional obligation to consult with First Nations on any matter that 
might infringe their Aboriginal rights. Rather than ignoring the reality of s. 35 and excluding 
First Nations from the emergency management regime, the Crown could consider First Nations 
as the ‘tie that binds’ all Crown bodies, whether federal or provincial. Then it might position 
First Nations through agreement and provisioning of sufficient resourcing for training, 
infrastructure, and inter-agency collaboration as central to disaster preparedness regimes. The 
ripple effect of such a shift in perspective could be enormous, as significant capacity building 
and job creation opportunities would necessarily flow from such acknowledgement. Current 
federal objectives around First Nation economic development could also be nicely served. 
Because the scope of AANDC’s Emergency Management Assistance audit criteria were 
drawn from (and thus limited to) standing applicable legislation, the governance and 
coordination implications of First Nations as outside, and a passive recipient of, the (albeit 
transitional) federal provincial emergency management regime were never explored.312 As such 
                                                 
310 Ibid. at s 197(2) (“At any time after the 60th day following the day on which the Minister offers to consult in 
accordance with subsection (1), the Minister may act under section 196 if the offer to consult is not accepted by the 
government of a province or members of the Committee who are representatives of aboriginal governments”).  
311 Public Safety 2015-16, supra note 297 at 49 ‘Program 1.4 Emergency Management, Planning Highlights’ 
(“Public Safety Canada, in partnership with provinces and territories, has initiated a dialogue on fostering a 
modernized and more sustainable approach to emergency management in Canada. This shift aims at enhancing 
resilience at the community level by emphasizing a proactive approach to building safe and resilient communities”).  
312 AANDC, Internal Audit supra note 297 at 9(‘2.2 Audit Scope’ “Audit criteria were drawn from applicable 
legislation, as well as from the AANDC National Emergency Management Plan (2009). An Emergency 
Management Framework for Canada (Second Edition, January 2011), the Federal Policy on Emergency 
Management (2011), the Federal Emergency Response Plan (2011), the Emergency Management Planning Guide 
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it appears there has been little scrutiny of the machinations of the regime itself as potentially 
exacerbating Indigenous community disaster risk vulnerabilities, when of course the objective 
should be reducing disaster risk as much as possible. 
With the common law affirmation of Aboriginal title, particularly the milestone decision in 
Tsilhqot’in, where the first First Nation in common law history was held by the Supreme Court 
of Canada to have Aboriginal title over a claimed portion of their territories, the urgency of 
resolving the lack of First Nation steering capacity over emergency management throughout their 
Aboriginal title territories is ever more pressing. There exists an ethical as well as a legal 
problem in the breach. No matter that any change in the statutory scheme defining emergency 
management currently appears unlikely, it will be interesting to observe how AANDC deals with 
the question of who is responsible to finance emergency management in Aboriginal title 
territories and who has the commensurate authority to define how that funding will be spent, 
assuming the Crown preserves (at least a stated) priority of ensuring that First Nations have the 
same level of emergency management assistance as every other resident in Canada. 
As will be further explored below, the scope of “consultation and accommodation” 
inventiveness required to overcome the obtusely unconstitutional implications of the statutory 
supremacy of (say) a regional district board over a First Nations government body in an area so 
grave as emergency management is perhaps impracticable. How can those (questionably) 
empowered, and resourced, to effect emergency management services effectively engage First 
Nations in whose territories the emergency management unilaterally takes place when the very 
enabling legislation of those authorities are silent, if not blatantly dismissive, of a First Nation’s 
governance voice? Further, if indeed Neskonlith Indian Band v. City of Salmon Arm stands, it 
may well be that British Columbia local authorities under the Emergency Program Act don’t 
have a duty to consult at all.313 Effected First Nations appear to be in the position of having to 
fight for every level of recognition, from jurisdictional authority to commensurate emergency 
management resourcing. Crown public servants are potentially put in a hopeless position of 
                                                 
issued by Public Safety Canada and Program Authority #330 (Contribution for Emergency Management Assistance 
for Activities on Reserve). Audit criteria were also drawn from Canadian best practices for emergency management, 
including the Canadian Standards Association Standard Z1600 – Emergency Management and Business Continuity 
Programs”).  
313 Newman, Consultation, supra note 219 at 73-74 [footnotes removed]; and see Neskonlith, supra note 220. 
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managing emergencies within First Nations’ territories (where a given recovery phase can take 
months, if not years) without any legislative protocols in place to guide their actions and 
prioritise the voice of the very population who is potentially most impacted by a given disaster. 
In this sense, the emergency management regime could be described as a simmering recipe for 
conflict, waste and alienation. 
The perpetual call for ‘negotiated outcomes’ in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence offers some 
guidance to inform impending emergency management protocols, but as the old saying goes, you 
can’t make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. Particularly at the federal level, the Crown has failed 
for over 30 years now to statutorily implement successive s. 35 Aboriginal rights cases.314 The 
conversation is perpetually left to ‘negotiated outcomes’. Though a philosophical tangent from 
the focus of this thesis, one could explore the question of whether s. 35 jurisprudence as a body 
merely fabricates a legal fiction of reconciliation, where talk is endless and implementation 
elusive as the courts never seem to grapple with the real facts of where First Nation jurisdictional 
authority stands and strike down problematic legislation (or read in First Nations Aboriginal 
rights protections), as is a common remedy in Charter cases. 
2.3.2 FIRST NATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION IN TREATY TERRITORY 
[T]he nation-to-nation relationship became unbalanced when alliances with Aboriginal nations 
were no longer needed, the non-Aboriginal population became numerically dominant, and non-
Aboriginal governments abandoned the cardinal principles of non-interference and respectful 
coexistence in favour of policies of confinement and assimilation — in short, when the relationship 
became a colonial one.315 
- Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
Some First Nations whose ancestral territories fall within what is now widely known as 
British Columbia have a treaty relationship with the Crown. Treaties continue to be an extremely 
important dimension framing the current relationship between the Crown and First Nations.316 
                                                 
314 For example, as demonstrated by the lack of statutory acknowledgment of s. 35 constitutional priorities in the 
emergency management framework surveyed in this thesis. 
315 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Treaties, vol 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 
1996) at 18 [RCAP Report] (“1.1 Treaties are Nation-to-Nation”).  
316 See ibid. at 20-21 (“1.3 Treaties are Part of the Canadian Constitution”; “1.4 Fulfilment of the Treaties is 
Fundamental to Canada’s Honour”); and see ibid. at 10, 17 (“We begin this volume, which concerns the 
restructuring of the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, with an examination of the treaties 
because it has been through treaty making that relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people have 
traditionally been formalized. In our view, treaties are the key to the future of these relationships as well. In this 
volume we address substantive issues such as governance, lands and resources, and economic development. Just as 
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While an investigative analysis of treaties and treaty making is outside the scope of this thesis, 
some consideration of what a treaty is and treaty impact on the governance quagmires that 
currently exist in First Nation emergency management is necessary. Given the purpose of the 
treaty section in this thesis is to provide depth to the broader discussion of the jurisdictional 
authority First Nations are currently ‘permitted’ or empowered to exercise in all four stages of 
the emergency management particularly within the expanse of their traditional territories, I have 
opted to rely primarily on the Report of Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples317 to 
characterise treaties, and treaty history generally in Canada, given “[t]he Commission undertook 
historical and legal research on the treaties on a scale unprecedented in our country’s history”.318 
However, I recognize and value that there are other authors and texts that present other facets of 
contemporary views on treaties in Canada today.  
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People’s offered the following descriptive 
characteristics of treaties in Canada generally. “Treaties (…) are by their nature agreements 
made by nations”.319 “The treaties constitute promises, and the importance of keeping promises 
is deeply ingrained in all of us and indeed is common to all cultures and legal systems.”320 “(…) 
[I]t has been through treaty making that relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people have traditionally been formalized“(…)321 “[T]he treaties are constitutional documents, 
                                                 
those issues were addressed traditionally in the nation-to-nation context of treaties, it is in the making of new treaties 
and implementation of the existing treaties that these issues can be addressed in a contemporary context” (p 10)); 
(“…the making of treaties in the future can and should be open to all Aboriginal nations that choose a treaty 
approach. Many of the future treaties may well be termed accords or compacts or simply land claims agreements. 
But the Commission believes that treaties, by any name, are a key to Canada’s future. .. It is within the treaty 
processes that our substantive recommendations on matters such as governance, lands and resources, and economic 
issues will ultimately be addressed.” (p17)). 
317 See ibid. at 9-10 (The Commission’s Terms of Reference required RCAP to investigate and make concrete 
recommendations concerning “[t]he legal status, implementation and future evolution of aboriginal treaties, 
including modern-day agreements”; and, “[a]n investigation of the historic practices of treaty-making may be 
undertaken by the Commission, as well as an analysis of treaty implementation and interpretation. The Commission 
may also want to consider mechanisms to ensure that all treaties are honoured in the future.”).  
318 Ibid. at 15  (footnote 4 details the expansive treaty related studies that were conducted as part of the research 
program of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples). 
319 Ibid. at 10. 
320 Ibid. at 10; and see ibid. at 24 (quoting from Sioui “What characterizes a treaty is the intention to create 
obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain measure of solemnity.”); R v Sioui, [1990] 1 
SCR 1025 at 1044 [Sioui].  
321 RCAP Report, ibid. at 10. 
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designed to embody the enduring features of the law of the country”.322 The Commissioners 
summarized treaties as sharing the following fundamental attributes:  
- They were made between the Crown and nations of Aboriginal people, nations that 
continue to exist and are entitled to respect. [Treaties are Nation-to-Nation]323 
- They were entered into at sacred ceremonies and were intended to be enduring. 
[Treaties are Sacred and Enduring]324 
- They are fundamental components of the constitution of Canada, analogous to the 
terms of union under which provinces joined Confederation. [Treaties are part of 
the Canadian Constitution]325 
- The fulfilment of the spirit and intent of treaties is a fundamental test of the honour 
of the Crown and of Canada.326  
- Their non-fulfilment casts a shadow over Canada’s place of respect in the family 
of nations.327  
The Commissioners concluded that “the treaties describe social contracts that have enduring 
significance and that as a result form part of the fundamental law of the land. In this sense they 
are like the terms of union whereby former British colonies entered Confederation as 
provinces”.328 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples provided further insight on the role of treaties 
and treaty-making in the constitutional make-up of Canada. The Commissioners viewed treaties 
as having a central role “in fashioning a just and honourable future for Aboriginal peoples within 
Canada and an equitable reconciliation of the rights and interests of Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples”.329 To the Commissioners “(…) treaties (…) represent[] a profound 
commitment by both parties to the idea of peaceful relations between peoples…”330 The 
Commissioners clarified that “[t]reaties were made in the past because the rights of Aboriginal 
                                                 
322 Ibid. at 20.  
323 Ibid. at 22, 18 (“1.1 ‘Treaties are Nation-to-Nation’” (p 18)).  
324 Ibid. at 22, 18 (“1.2 ‘Treaties are Sacred and Enduring’” (p 18)).  
325 Ibid. at 22, 20 (“1.3 ‘Treaties are Part of the Canadian Constitution’” (p 20)).  
326 Ibid. at 22. 
327 Ibid. at 22.  
328 Ibid. at 20-21.  
329 Ibid. at 10. 
330 Ibid. at 11.  
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and non-Aboriginal people occupying a common territory could come into conflict unless some 
means of reconciliation was found”.331 The Commissioners noted: 
Treaty making can enable the deepest differences to be set aside in favour of a 
consensual and peaceful relationship. The parties to a treaty need not surrender their 
fundamental cultural precepts in order to make an agreement to coexist. They need 
only communicate their joint desire to live together in peace, to embody in their 
own laws and institutions respect for each other, and to fulfil their mutual 
promises.332 
The Commissioners also offered an important caution respecting the view that treaties might 
condone subjugation, stating:  
In entering into treaties with Indian nations in the past, the Crown recognized the 
nationhood of its treaty partners. Treaty making (whether by means of a treaty, an 
accord or other kinds of agreements) represents an exercise of the governing and 
diplomatic powers of the nations involved to recognize and respect one another and 
to make commitments to a joint future. It does not imply that one nation is being 
made subject to the other.333 
The Commission reminds us that in contrast to ‘subjugation’, “[t]he parties to treaties must be 
recognized as nations, not merely as ‘sections of society”.334 Further the Commission informs us 
that a treaty need not be named a treaty to be a treaty: “Many of the future treaties may well be 
termed accords or compacts or simply land claims agreements. But the Commission believes that 
treaties, by any name, are a key to Canada’s future”.335 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples generally categorizes treaties as either historic 
or modern.336 To the Commissioners the distinction is most important for the purposes of 
interpretation, particularly where there is conflict over implementation. As detailed in the 
Commission’s report, the courts seem to regard historic treaties as requiring “generous” 
interpretation principles in accordance to the principles set out in the Sioui case, whereas the 
‘modern treaties’ would fall within the interpretive scope of cases in line with Eastmain Band v. 
                                                 
331 Ibid. at 11. 
332 Ibid. at 13. 
333 Ibid. at 18. 
334 Ibid. at 18. 
335 Ibid. at 17. 
336 Ibid. at 27 (“To bring some clarity to our analysis of the jurisprudence, we refer to treaties that should benefit 
fully from the interpretive approach described in the Sioui case as historical treaties. Treaties to which these 
interpretive principles may not apply, such as the Howard and Eastmain cases, we refer to as modern treaties.”); 
Sioui, supra note 320; R v Howard, [1994] 2 SCR 299; Eastmain Band v Canada, [1993] 1 FC 501.  
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Canada.337 The Commissioners explain that jurisprudence since the Sioui decision suggests that 
“signatories of more recent treaties should not benefit from special rules of interpretation 
because of their growing sophistication in matters of negotiation”.338 The Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples clarifies however that there is no hard and fast line between historic and 
modern treaties, nor that treaty interpretation is mutually exclusive between the two types:  
We do not suggest that there is a sharp dividing line between these classes of 
agreements. The historical context of the relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people is relevant to all treaties, as is the general fiduciary relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown described in Sparrow. The treaties 
made before the twentieth century are clearly historical, as are the numbered treaties 
made in relatively remote parts of Canada early in this century (Treaties 8, 9, 10 
and 11). Treaties made in 1975 and later can be characterized as modern. However, 
each treaty is unique, and as the courts have said, the factual context of each treaty 
must be considered when approaching issues of interpretation.339 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples further emphasised that “if the logic of court 
decisions is accepted, it might be said that the written text of an historical treaty is but one piece 
of evidence to be considered with others in determining its true meaning and effect”.340 As the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples noted “[i]t seems illogical to recognize the two-sided 
nature of treaty negotiations but to conclude that the one-sided technical language recorded by 
the Crown is the whole treaty”.341 As such, if considering what implication Treaty 8 (as one of 
the few historic treaties within the jurisdictional boundaries of what is now known as British 
Columbia) has on the signatory First Nations’ involvement in emergency management within 
their traditional territories, the perspectives and oral histories of those impacted First Nations are 
essential to interpreting the commensurate emergency management treaty rights and obligations. 
To this point, a historic treaty right respecting First Nation emergency management has not 
been tested in the jurisprudence.342 It may be that Crown/First Nation treaty interpretation and 
                                                 
337 Ibid. 
338 RCAP Report, supra note 315 at 26. 
339 Ibid. at 27. 
340 Ibid. at 27. 
341 Ibid. at 27. 
342 However, where mitigation is interpreted as ‘risk management’ in a general sense, for example, the risks a 
proposed large scale industrial project bears on the environment and on the exercise of Aboriginal and/or treaty 
rights, it may be that there are judicially defined s. 35 rights protecting (to some extent) First Nations ability to 
mitigate for potential disasters (differently framed along the consultation and accommodation line of cases). 
However, as a self-governance piece, where emergency management is understood as a process in keeping with the 
Constitutional POGG power, there is little in the way of legal authority to date in defining the parameters of what 
First Nation emergency management treaty or Aboriginal rights might look like; see Mikisew Cree First Nation v 
81 
 
implementation dialogues will become increasingly focused on emergency management if there 
is a need for resolution of any emergency management issues taking place in treaty territory. 
Historic treaty interpretation on this matter may become increasingly critical as conversations 
around disaster risk to Indigenous communities domestically and internationally continue to 
escalate and as the pressures from planned and existing resource extraction and transport within 
treaty territories continue to mount. 
Treaty 8 is a historic treaty343 whose treaty territory includes a portion of British 
Columbia.344 The written component of Treaty 8 does not identify emergency management.345 
The implications of Treaty 8 on a signatory First Nation’s treaty rights in emergency 
management within its respective territory requires a broader review of the legal landscape of 
treaty interpretation and a survey of the oral histories and interpretive position of the signatory 
First Nations, which again is beyond the scope of this thesis. The Douglas Treaties (also known 
as the Vancouver Island Treaties) are likewise historic treaties that apply to a portion of territory 
of what is now known as British Columbia.346 Like Treaty 8, evaluation of a treaty right to both 
                                                 
Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 at para 55 -56 [Mikisew Cree] “The 
Crown has a treaty right to “take up” surrendered lands for regional transportation purposes, but the Crown is 
nevertheless under an obligation to inform itself of the impact its project will have on the exercise by the Mikisew of 
their hunting and trapping rights, and to communicate its findings to the Mikisew. The Crown must then attempt to 
deal with the Mikisew ‘in good faith, and with the intention of substantially addressing’ Mikisew concerns 
(Delgamuukw, at para 168). This does not mean that whenever a government proposes to do anything in the Treaty 8 
surrendered lands it must consult with all signatory First Nations, no matter how remote or unsubstantial the impact. 
The duty to consult is, as stated in Haida Nation, triggered at a low threshold, but adverse impact is a matter of 
degree, as is the extent of the Crown’s duty. Here the impacts were clear, established and demonstrably adverse to 
the continued exercise of the Mikisew hunting and trapping rights over the lands in question… the Crown’s right to 
take up lands under the treaty, which itself is subject to its duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate First 
Nations’ interests before reducing the area over which their members may continue to pursue their hunting, trapping 
and fishing rights.”); Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 168.  
343 Treaty No 8, 21 June 1899; see AANDC, “Treaty Texts – Treaty No. 8”, online: AANDC <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028813/1100100028853> [Treaty 8 Area] (for online reprints of the Treaty 8 written text, 
Order in Councils pertaining to Treaty 8 and Reports of Commissioners pertaining to Treaty 8); and see RCAP 
Report, supra note 315 at 27 (“The treaties made before the twentieth century are clearly historical, as are the 
numbered treaties made in relatively remote parts of Canada early in this century (Treaties 8, 9, 10 and 11).”). 
344 Ibid.; and see Treaty 8 Area ibid. online: AANDC <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100029841/1100100029845> (Map from 1900 indicates that the Treaty 8 area includes a 
portion of the northeast corner of British Columbia). 
345 But see RCAP Report, supra note 315 at 35 (“The Commission believes that the unique nature of the historical 
treaties requires special rules to give effect to the treaty nations’ understanding of the treaties. Such an approach to 
the content of the treaties would require, as a first step, the rejection of the idea that the written text is the exclusive 
record of the treaty”); and see Mikisew Cree, supra note 342 at para 54 “Treaty making is an important stage in the 
long process of reconciliation, but it is only a stage. What occurred at Fort Chipewyan in 1899 [concluding Treaty 
No. 8] was not the complete discharge of the duty arising from the honour of the Crown, but a rededication of it”).  
346 See Douglas C Harris, Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British Columbia, 1849-
1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) at 21-22 [Harris, Native Fisheries] (“The agreements known as the Douglas 
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emergency management authority and resourcing under the Douglas Treaties is an interpretative 
question that is outside the scope of this thesis. 
There are few modern treaties in British Columbia.347 Of those that exist, all share a common 
(more or less) approach to emergency management within the terms of the treaties. The Nisga’a 
Agreement was the first of the modern treaties in British Columbia and the first to qualify the 
signatory First Nation as a ‘local authority’ for the purposes of emergency preparedness and 
emergency measures: “Nisga’a Lisims Government, with respect to Nisga’a Lands, has the 
rights, powers, duties, and obligations of a local authority under federal and provincial 
legislation in respect of emergency preparedness and emergency measures”.348 The modern 
treaty further specifies Crown supremacy in the event of a conflict: “Nisga’a Lisims Government 
may make laws in respect of its rights, powers, duties, and obligations under paragraph 122. In 
the event of a conflict between a Nisga’a law under this paragraph and a federal or provincial law 
of general application, the federal or provincial law prevails to the extent of the conflict”.349 The 
modern treaty further clarifies that any emergency declaratory powers exercised by the Nisga’a 
Lisims Government are again subject to the supremacy of federal and provincial law: 
                                                 
Treaties are fourteen land purchases made by James Douglas in his capacity as the Hudson’s Bay Company’s chief 
trader, and then governor of the colony of Vancouver Island, between 1850 and 1854…After minimal discussions, 
Douglas asked the chiefs to place X’s on blank sheets of paper. Following the conclusion of the first nine 
agreements at Fort Victoria between 29 April and 1 May 1850, Douglas wrote to the HBC to explain his 
understanding of what had transpired: “I informed the natives that they would not be disturbed in the possession of 
their Village sites and enclosed fields, which are of small extent, and that they were at liberty to hunt over 
unoccupied lands, and to carry on their fisheries with the same freedom as when they were the sole occupants of the 
country.” He forwarded the “signatures” of the chiefs and asked that the HBC supply the proper conveyancing 
instrument to which the signatures could be attached. Several months later, Barclay replied, approving the 
agreements and sending a template purchase agreement, based on New Zealand precedents, that would become the 
text of the Douglas Treaties.” [footnotes and emphasis omitted]; and see Harris, Native Fisheries at 21, 22 (“The 
land, purchased from Native peoples on Vancouver Island, covered a small fraction of the island, including the area 
around Victoria, the Saanich Peninsula, the future town site of Nanaimo midway up the island, and an area near Fort 
Rupert at its northeastern end” (p 21); and see Figure 1.1 (map depicting Douglas Treaties) (p 22)). 
347 BC Treaty Commission, “Negotiations Update”, online BCTC <http://www.bctreaty.net/files/updates.php > 
(“The BC treaty negotiations process is voluntary and open to all First Nations in British Columbia. There are 65 
First Nations that are participating in or that have completed treaties through the BC treaty negotiations process. The 
65 First Nations represent 104 of the 203 Indian Act Bands in British Columbia. First Nations in the BC treaty 
negotiations process are self-determining, and there are several First Nations that govern or represent multiple 
Indian Act Bands, communities, or hereditary houses, clans or families, or combinations of these”. The BC Treaty 
Commission’s ‘Negotiation Update’ reports that there are 8 First Nations in Stage 6 [Implementation of the Treaty]; 
4 First Nations in Stage 5 [Negotiation to Finalize a Treaty]; 44 First Nations in Stage 4 [Negotiation of an 
Agreement in Principle]; 2 First Nations in Stage 3 [Negotiation of a Framework Agreement]; and 6 First Nations in 
Stage 2 [Readiness to Negotiate]). 
348 Nisga’a Final Agreement, Nisga’a Nation and British Columbia and Canada, 4 May 1999, at 180 ch 11 s 122 
[emphasis added]. 
349 Ibid. at s 123 [emphasis added].  
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For greater certainty, Nisga’a Lisims Government may declare a state of local 
emergency, and exercise the powers of a local authority in respect of local 
emergencies in accordance with federal and provincial laws in respect of 
emergency measures, but any declaration and any exercise of those powers is 
subject to the authority of Canada and British Columbia set out in those federal 
and provincial laws.350 
And finally, the treaty provides a general statement of the supremacy of Crown declaratory 
powers: “[n]othing in this Agreement affects the authority of: a. Canada to declare a national 
emergency; or b. British Columbia to declare a provincial emergency in accordance with federal 
and provincial laws of general application”.351 
It could well be that for the Crown negotiators working on subsequent treaties, the Nisga’a 
Agreement served as a precedent or even a template for subsequent agreements on the particular 
area of emergency management, given the similarity of the pertinent sections from agreement to 
agreement as indicated from the example of the later Maa-Nulth First Nation Final Agreement:  
13.26.0 Emergency Preparedness 
13.26.1 Each Maa-nulth First Nation Government may make laws in respect of its  
  rights, powers, duties, and obligations under 13.26.2 a. 
13.26.2 Each Maa-nulth First Nation Government: 
a. has the rights, powers, duties, obligations; and 
b. the protections, immunities and limitations in respect of liability, 
of a local authority under Federal Law or Provincial Law in respect 
of emergency preparedness and emergency measures on the Maa-
nulth First Nation Lands of the applicable Maa-nulth First Nation. 
13.26.3 Federal Law or Provincial Law prevails to the extent of a Conflict with  
 Maa-nulth First Nation Law under 13.26.1. 
13.26.4 For greater certainty, each Maa-nulth First Nation Government may  
declare a state of local emergency on the Maa-nulth First Nation Lands of 
the applicable Maa-nulth First Nation and exercise the powers of a local 
authority in respect of local emergencies in accordance with Federal Law 
and Provincial Law in respect of emergency measures on the Maa-nulth 
First Nation Lands of the applicable Maa-nulth First Nation, but any 
declaration and any exercise of power is subject to the authority of Canada 
and British Columbia under Federal Law and Provincial Law. 
13.26.5 Nothing in this Agreement affects the authority of: 
a. Canada to declare a national emergency; or 
b. British Columbia to declare a provincial emergency, 
                                                 
350 Ibid. at s 124 [emphasis added].  
351 Ibid. at s 125 [emphasis added]. 
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in accordance with Federal Law or Provincial Law.352 
Section 13.26.3 of the Maa-nulth treaty spells out the status of the Maa-nulth Nation within the 
emergency management framework as having “the powers of a local authority in respect of local 
emergencies… but any declaration and any exercise of power is subject to the authority of 
Canada and British Columbia”.353 Further, federal or provincial law prevails to the extent of a 
conflict with Maa-nulth First Nation law.354 
Each of the Tsawwassen Final Agreement,355 Lheidli T’enneh Final Agreement,356 Yale First 
Nation Final Agreement,357 and the Tla’amin Final Agreement358 likewise have similar 
provisions for emergency management. The First Nations are each respectively characterised as 
a ‘local authority’ for the purposes of emergency management with similar powers of a local 
authority, confined to the treaty geographical area. 
The emergency management provisions in the modern treaties are somewhat surprising given 
the framework constitutes a seeming political departure from the traditional position of many 
First Nations that First Nations are not municipalities or stakeholders.359 It bears noting as well 
                                                 
352 Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement, Huu-ay-aht First Nation, Ka:’yu:’k’t’h’/Che:k’tles7et’h’ First Nation, 
Toquaht Band, Uchucklesaht Band, Ucluelet First Nation (collectively Maa-Nulth First Nations) and British 
Columbia and Canada, 9 December 2006 [Maa-Nulth Final Agreement].  
353 Ibid. at 13.26.4. 
354 Ibid. at 13.26.3. 
355 Tsawwassen Final Agreement, Tsawwassen First Nation and British Columbia and Canada, 6 December 2007, ss 
113-17; and see Tsawwassen Final Agreement, at ch 1 s1, ch 15 ss 1, 2, 11, 12, 13, 14, ch 7 ss 36, 37, 38 
(“Environmental Emergency” provisions detailing similar Crown supremacy clauses as those found  under the 
regular emergency management treaty provisions).  
356 Lheidli T’enneh Final Agreement, Lheidli T’enneh and British Columbia and Canada, 29 October 2006 at ss 
111-115.; and see Lheidli T’enneh Final Agreement, ch 1 s 1, ch 14 ss 4-6 (“Environmental Emergency” provisions).  
357 Yale First Nation Final Agreement, Yale First Nation and British Columbia and Canada, 5 February 2010, ss 
3.26.1; 3.26.5; and see Yale First Nation Agreement, ss 12.13.1; 12.13.2; 14.9.1; 18.1.1; 18.1.2; 18.3.1; 18.3.2; 
18.3.3 (for provisions dealing with other emergency and environmental emergency management provisions).  
358 Tla’amin Final Agreement, supra note 22 at ss 130-134; and see Tla’amin Final Agreement, ss 1, 3, 9-13, 41 (for 
provisions dealing with other emergency and environmental emergency management provisions). 
359 See e.g. RCAP Report, supra note 315 at 18 (“1.1 Treaties are Nation-to-Nation”); and see RCAP Report, supra 
note 315 at 218 (Figure 3.1 Aboriginal, Federal and Provincial Spheres of Jurisdiction – depicting a concept of core 
and periphery spheres of jurisdiction held concurrently by Federal, Aboriginal and Provincial governments. In 
explaining the kinds of powers the envision as falling within the ‘core of Aboriginal jurisdiction’ the Commission 
clarifies “the core includes all matters that are of vital concern to the life and welfare of a particular Aboriginal 
people, its culture and identity; do not have a major impact on adjacent jurisdictions; and are not otherwise the 
object of transcendent federal or provincial concern”. An extremely interesting analysis might be the application of 
the Aboriginal, Federal and Provincial Spheres of Jurisdiction concept to current leading emergency management 
best practices and strategies to ascertain what framework options that would meet both the risk reduction objectives 
of emergency management and the self-determination and self-governance rights of First Nations as exemplified in 
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that a local authority under British Columbia’s Local Government Act has a restricted role given 
a local authority’s powers are restrictively defined by statute. A First Nation operating as a local 
authority might in turn suffer a more limited voice in management of emergencies (than perhaps 
justified using a s. 35 Aboriginal rights analysis) irrespective that a given disaster might have a 
‘downstream’ impact on a given treaty area and/or a given First Nation’s broader traditional 
territories where a particular First Nation might still exercise their Aboriginal rights.  
There is a conflict inherent in the discussion: “[i]f a Provincial emergency plan has been 
implemented under section 7, a local emergency plan may be implemented or its implementation 
may be continued under subsection (1) of this section if and to the extent that the local 
emergency plan is not in conflict with the Provincial emergency plan”.360 The paramountcy of 
the Crown is also highlighted in the above Maa-Nulth First Nation Final Agreement example.361 
However, could an Aboriginal right protection necessitating out of an emergency management 
effort trump the provincial law, irrespective that the treaty speaks to the provincial legal 
supremacy and overtly likens the First Nation to a diminutive local authority? This is a more 
specific question arising out of the general query of whether some rights can be legally and 
ethically infringed in the name of emergency response and disaster recovery. In a way the treaty 
clause presents a severe constriction on the First Nation’s potential to rely on their constitutional 
Aboriginal rights to (say) protect a heritage site at risk in the wake of recovery effort over which 
they have no say. Would an Aboriginal rights claim trump the language of the treaty?  
There might be a temptation on the part of the Crown to address First Nation exclusion from 
emergency management in their Aboriginal title territories in the same manner as has been 
exercised in the modern treaties – that is, to reduce by statute a First Nation to the status of a 
                                                 
the general models put forward by RCAP). My gratitude to Violet Erasmus for many helpful conversations on 
applying the findings detailed in RCAP’s Report to scholarly work and for the helpful reminder of ‘the circles’ 
depicting RCAP’s concept of overlapping jurisdictions). 
360 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 8 (2). 
361 Maa-Nulth Final Agreement, supra note 352 at ss 13.26.3, 13.26.4, 13.26.5 (“13.26.3 Federal Law or Provincial 
Law prevails to the extent of a Conflict with Maa-nulth First Nation Law under 13.26.1”; “13.26.4 …each Maa-
nulth First Nation Government may … exercise the powers of a local authority in respect of local emergencies in 
accordance with Federal Law and Provincial Law …but any declaration and any exercise of power is subject to the 
authority of Canada and British Columbia under Federal Law and Provincial Law” [emphasis added]; “13.26.5 
Nothing in this Agreement affects the authority of: a. Canada to declare a national emergency; or b. British 
Columbia to declare a provincial emergency, in accordance with Federal Law or Provincial Law”).  
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local authority. The same question would arise – would a First Nations’ constitutional aboriginal 
rights stand to protect a First Nations’ interests in the course of emergency management where 
that First Nation has been diminished to the status of (or depending on one’s perspective, 
qualified as) a ‘local authority’? This is perhaps an important consideration for First Nation 
leaders grappling with these issues now and into the future. 
2.3.3 FIRST NATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT JURISDICTION IN ABORIGINAL TITLE TERRITORY 
As indicated above, the British Columbia government currently assumes control of 
emergency management in off-reserve aboriginal title territories, though it remains to be seen 
what will be negotiated from the Tsilhqot’in decision.362 Given that the statutory regime 
governing emergency management is generally silent on non-treaty First Nation inclusion off 
reserve, there appears to be little statutory or regulatory guidance for public servants to include 
First Nations in the emergency management of their respective territories. Further, as planning 
and mitigation are even more jurisdictionally complex, (particularly where industrial activity 
comes to bear) the statutory silence on First Nation constitutional rights further impedes a 
reconciling relationship between First Nations and the Crown premised on honour, while 
increasing First Nation vulnerability to disaster risk. 
 In this first part of my thesis, I have surveyed the enabling federal and British Columbia 
legislation governing emergencies, detailing how some exceptional pieces of legislation for 
emergency contexts are triggered and some of the constitutional limits worked into the scope of 
emergency management. I conclude that completely absent from the framework is a constructive 
recognition and respect for s. 35 Aboriginal rights, which are also constitutional rights. In 
practice, this can mean that Crown servants charged with executing the emergency management 
framework at both the federal and British Columbia level do so without any statutory or 
regulatory guidance as to First Nation roles, constitutional status or priority. In fact, delegated 
emergency management powers to a ‘local authority’ may not even carry a s. 35 consultation 
obligation given the current status of the case law and the absence of any direction to local 
                                                 
362 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 (given the scope of land base powers acknowledged to be in the purview of the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation, it follows that emergency management of their Aboriginal title territories will eventually come 
forward for resolution).  
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governments as to engagement with First Nations, ironically in whose territories the local 
governments operate. 
 It would appear that Aboriginal rights are easily suspended in the name of emergency 
management, whether at the planning and mitigation or response and recovery phases. This 
suspension of rights is most troubling at the planning, mitigation and response phases of 
emergency management which can take years and can involve expenditures in the hundreds of 
millions of dollars, over which First Nations in effect appear to have virtually no say and no 
audit capacity over Crown commissioned and delivered services. The fiscal dimension of 
emergency management contributes to the exclusion to the point that there is perhaps a 
disincentive, on the part of emergency management practitioners and service providers, to 
include First Nations in emergency response and recovery, given the additional complexity of 
emergency management resourcing and temptation to monopolize cost recovery funds. 
 The current scope of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence is not particularly promising to remedy 
the situation – where it applies, a consultation and accommodation obligation could be read to 
entrench First Nations in the passive role of the ‘consulted’ instead of positioning First Nations 
in their rightful place as self-determining and self-governing governing bodies in their own 
right.363 Further, any consultation obligations vest solely with the Crown, yet many emergency 
planning responsibilities are offloaded to industry within the self-regulating industry-specific 
regulations. Without statutory or regulatory direction and oversight on the issue of First Nations’ 
constitutional rights, there does not appear to be a prescriptive remedy for First Nation inclusion 
in the emergency response plans nor even within the impending disaster reporting structures 
should an emergency take place. So, an industrial accident such as a toxic spill could go 
unreported to a First Nation in whose territory the spill takes place, irrespective that that First 
Nation might well be the only population impacted by the spill. 
                                                 
363 As alluded to in note 342, a general ‘duty to consult and accommodate’ respecting a project requiring a Crown 
permit could on a broad reading be described as ‘mitigation’ for potential harm to Aboriginal rights. However, 
further analysis surveying particular project assessment processes (legislative and regulatory frameworks)  is 
necessary to distinguish which of those assessment processes and consultation practices go to a potential 
infringement of an Aboriginal right and which go to managing risk of harm from the project in the case of a disaster 
(i.e. risk to Aboriginal rights of (say) a pipeline operating normally and risk to Aboriginal rights of (say) the pipeline 
exploding and gushing oil into vulnerable area). Only accommodation that spoke to the latter would constitute 
disaster risk mitigation. More analysis beyond the scope of this thesis would need to be done to determine whether 
the Crown is under or has met a consultation and accommodation duty for disaster risk management.  
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Treaty is a potential source of remedy, and emergency management provisions have been 
incorporated into modern treaties signed to date. However, the current political reality in British 
Columbia reflects a great deal of dissatisfaction with the British Columbia Treaty Commission 
and process, with very few agreements being finalized.364 One has to question whether it is 
reasonable or ethical to force First Nations to continue with the status quo while treaty 
conversations are sorted out, a potentially decades-long proposition. Particularly concerning is 
that one of the most critical mitigation projects necessary to improve First Nation disaster risk 
outcomes is to bring First Nation community conditions up to at least Canadian averages, 
thereby lowering vulnerability to hazards and better averting disasters. 
 There may be some interim government-to-government agreements currently operating with 
some success, particularly at the local level in terms of heightening First Nation engagement in 
all four phases of emergency management.365 However, that approach is also suspect given the 
current framework does not provide a direct funding avenue to finance First Nation emergency 
management off reserve. Local governments like municipalities and regional districts and even 
National parks enjoy that fiscal autonomy, but First Nations essentially do not. 
 In the next part of this thesis, I argue for a new theoretical framing of Aboriginal rights aimed 
at challenging the lack of s. 35 recognition implicit in the constructive exclusion of First Nations 
from the emergency management statutory and regulatory framework operating in British 
Columbia. 
                                                 
364 See BC Treaty Commission ‘Negotiations Update’, supra note 347 (only 8 First Nations are at the 
implementation stage of 65 participating First Nations in the BC Treaty Commission process. The 65 participating 
First Nations represent 104 of 203 Indian Act Bands in British Columbia.); and see AANDC, A New Direction: 
Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, by Douglas R Eyford Ministerial Special Representative (Ottawa: 
AANDC, 2015) online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-LDC/STAGING/texte-
text/eyford_newDirection-report_april2015_1427810490332_eng.pdf> (“…only 26 agreements have been finalized 
in 42 years given the expenditure of time and resources on negotiations. From the outset, the comprehensive land 
claims process has been undermined by institutional barriers and process inefficiencies. Today, 75 claims are at 
various stages of negotiation [throughout Canada]. More than 80 per cent of those tables have been in the treaty 
process for longer than ten years, some for more than two decades.  It is costly to maintain negotiations that drag on 
year-after-year. Aboriginal participation is funded through a combination of loans and non-repayable contributions. 
Since 1973, Canada has advanced in excess of $1 billion to Aboriginal groups through loans and contributions. The 
debt burden has become an unsustainable barrier to progress. There is a conspicuous lack of urgency in negotiations 
and in many cases there are sharp differences between the parties about the core elements of a modern treaty. A plan 
needs to be developed to bring negotiations to a close. All parties must be ready to confront hard realities. Not all 
claims appear to be heading to successful resolution”). 
365 In this context I use the term government-to-government as protocols may operate at the First Nation-to-’local 
authority’ level, which is conceptually different from a ‘nation-to-nation’ protocol or agreement. 
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SECTION 3 – EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW, THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 “I have always regarded my academic field’s focus on Aboriginal peoples as being 
exceedingly narrow. The Supreme Court of Canada has fallen into this trap by obsessing 
over the “Aboriginal” in section 35(1). Others have ignored the histories, ideas, 
environments, and economies we share together on this continent. An exclusive focus on 
Aboriginal peoples can treat us as if we were, are, or should be outside history, politics, or 
contemporary culture. In my opinion, this slender view is not healthy or helpful in generating 
holistic relationships”. 
- John Borrows366 
In the previous section, I reviewed the legislative, regulatory and treaty frameworks that 
govern First Nation emergency management in British Columbia. I concluded that 
overwhelmingly, First Nation participation in emergency management is largely restricted to 
‘on-reserve’ matters, either de facto or by legislative, regulatory or policy exclusion. 
The following section explores the implications of constitutional Aboriginal rights on ‘off-
reserve’ emergency management, with particular emphasis paid to underlying theoretical 
tensions informing both the adjudication and implementation of Aboriginal rights generally. 
Theoretical treatment is necessary to identify some root causes of the Crown’s seeming lack of 
deference to First Nation interests off reserve. A theoretical framework also helps to clarify how 
the explicitly recognized ‘duty to consult’ and ‘duty to accommodate’ seem to be understood by 
the Crown, given each are important Aboriginal constitutional rights (that should be) informing 
emergency management off reserve. In the context of the larger theoretical dialogue on the 
constitutional relationship between the Crown and First Nations, the following section also 
briefly explores the apparent deficit in concomitant funding (fiscal federalism) strategies to 
achieve constitutional obligations as they pertain to Canada’s First Nations, particularly affecting 
the areas of off-reserve emergency management. The intent of this section is to offer fodder 
toward the development of new remedial measures that, if adopted or implemented, might better 
serve the Crown in upholding its honour and furthering reconciliation with respect to emergency 
management activities. 
                                                 
366 John Borrows, “Let Obligations Be Done” in Let Right be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the 
Future of Indigenous Rights eds Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, Jeremy Webber (2007: UBC Press, Vancouver, 
Canada) 201 at footnote 1 [Borrows, Obligations].  
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3.1. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS  
Before giving theoretical treatment to Aboriginal rights as developed in the Canadian 
jurisprudential landscape, I wish to propose that there is perhaps always a distortion present in 
discussing existing aboriginal rights exclusively through the lens of Western based laws, legal 
traditions and philosophies.367 First Nations have philosophies, and thus legal traditions, distinct 
from European based traditions.368 Where a First Nation is restricted to an Aboriginal rights 
premise in advancing their ways of being, those ways of being might not ever be accurately 
expressed, and therefore not ever fully respected, given the dialectical constraints of a 
unilaterally Western-based dialogue.369 Rights within and rights on par with the settler state are 
theoretically distinct and evoke different (though perhaps concurrent) streams of political and 
legal discourse.370 This thesis largely explores ‘rights within’ the large political body, legal 
                                                 
367 See e.g., Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255. at 268 [Slattery, 
“Metamorphosis”] (discussing the weaknesses of conceiving Aboriginal title as a ‘Translated Right’ held under 
English common law).  
368 UNDRIP, supra note 31 at Article 5 (“Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so 
choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State”.); RCAP Report, supra note 315 at 1 (“…the 
people who lived here had their own systems of law and governance, their own customs, languages and 
cultures…They had a different view of the world and their place in it and a different set of norms and values to live 
by.”; and see Gordon Christie, “Aboriginal Nationhood and the Inherent Right to Self-Government” (Research 
Paper for the National Centre for First Nations Governance, May 2007) at 2 [Christie, “Aboriginal Nationhood”] 
(“Canadian governments and courts recognize that pre-contact Aboriginal societies possessed their own legal and 
political systems, and that to this day these nations have not surrendered the powers they fully exercised before 
colonial policies undercut their authority.”) [footnotes removed]; and see e.g. Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An 
Invitation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 198-200 (for a treatise on the concept of law 
as definitive of culture, as well as culture as definitive of law. “However it is displayed, however it is applied, we 
can no more comprehend the roles of legal institutions without seeing them as part of their culture than we can fully 
understand each culture without attending to its form of law. In the end, it may be worthwhile, then, to think of law 
as universal in this one sense—as a marvelous entry to the study of the most central of human features, culture itself, 
and hence an open invitation, whatever one’s ultimate interests, to thinking about what and who we are.”).  
369 See Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 
2012) [Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties] (for an in-depth discussion on differential conceptions of sovereignty 
impacting Crown and Aboriginal relations in Canada today); and see Gordon Christie, “Indigeneity and Sovereignty 
in Canada's Far North: The Arctic and Inuit Sovereignty” (2011) 110:2 South Atlantic Quarterly 329 at 330 (“My 
focus is on one word, sovereignty, that serves to ground meaning in the larger story and plays a central role in 
generating and upholding a web of meaning within which are captured the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. I want 
to examine how this word works its magic and to suggest that another word, Indigeneity, not only can help make 
clear how words and stories function in this setting but can also suggest how Indigenous peoples of the Arctic—in 
particular, the Inuit in Canada—can usefully meet stories with stories, words with words”). An analysis on 
philosophical tensions between Indigenous and Western conceptions regarding what the Western legal tradition 
understands as ‘property’ is outside the scope of this thesis.  
370 See Christie, “Aboriginal Nationhood”, supra note 368 at 4 (“At its simplest, rights of self-government exist 
within and under the sovereignty of a larger political body, while rights of self-determination in some ways exist on 
par with the sovereignty of other political bodies.”). 
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traditions and philosophical underpinnings that collectively inform Canada and does not attempt 
to navigate the distinctive philosophies of any First Nation. Rather, I wrote this thesis with the 
hope of contributing to a larger process that would ultimately give First Nations space and 
recognition to advance independently their own philosophies and priorities, on their own terms, 
in conversation informing both the self-governance and self-determination aspects of disaster 
management.  
In 1982, Canada ‘brought home’ its constitution from Great Britain. Prior to the passing of 
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.)371, amendments to Canada’s constitutional makeup required the 
legislative consent of England’s Parliament.372 The historical, political, and legal departure from 
Canada’s colonial status to any European nation remains hugely significant, not least because the 
patriation process marked an ongoing reinvigoration in public thought on what constitutes the 
core elements of Canada. Coupled with the enormous political task of agreeing on an amending 
formula that satisfied federal and provincial representation, additions were made to Canada’s 
written constitution for the purpose of enshrining certain rights considered essential to the 
identity of Canada. As such, Canada’s written constitution now better reflects its essential 
relationship with First Nations in recognizing and affirming “existing aboriginal and treaty rights 
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.”373 
Section 35(1) assures that “[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed”374 with no clarity on the scope and 
content of those rights except that “aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and 
Metis peoples of Canada”.375 As Brian Slattery points out: [T]he sparse wording [of s. 35(1)] 
leaves open a number of fundamental questions. What precisely are Aboriginal rights and what is 
their legal basis? What relationship, if any, do they bear to one another? Do all Aboriginal 
                                                 
371 Canada Act 1982, c.11 (U.K.) (s.1 “The Constitution Act, 1982 set out in Schedule B to this Act is hereby 
enacted for and shall have the force of law in Canada and shall come into force as provided in that Act”; s. 2 “No 
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend 
to Canada as part of its law”).  
372 Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5 c. 4 (Required the consent of Canadian parliament before legislation that 
applied to Canada could be passed in U.K.). 
373 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 23 at s.35(1). 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid. at s.35(2).  
92 
 
peoples have the same set of rights or does each group have its own specific set?”376 Like 
Slattery, governments, including First Nation governments, understood at the time of patriation 
that “[t]hese are difficult questions, which do not allow for simple or pat answers”.377 The 
repealed Part IV of the Constitution Act, 1982 reflected a constitutional commitment, often 
overlooked in Aboriginal rights discourse, to convene: 
a constitutional conference composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first 
ministers of the provinces… [that] shall include in its agenda an item respecting 
constitutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
including the identification and definition of the rights of those peoples to be 
included in the Constitution of Canada, and the Prime Minister of Canada shall 
invite representatives of those peoples to participate in the discussions on that 
item.378  
Though the repealed s. 37 and s. 37.1379 of the Constitution Act, 1982 are not often beleaguered 
in the literature, most practitioners and academics in the field are familiar with the outcome. The 
four Constitutional Conferences held under this section380 failed to produce any definitive clarity 
on the scope and content of s. 35(1), precipitating (or at least exacerbating) the ‘empty or full 
box’ debate.381 As a consequence, the constitutional conversation regarding ‘Aboriginal rights’, 
                                                 
376 Brian Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights” in Let Right be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and 
the Future of Indigenous Rights eds Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, Jeremy Webber (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 
111 at 111 [Slattery, Taxonomy]. 
377 Ibid.  
378 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 23 at s 37(1)-(2).  
379 Ibid. at Part IV.1 (section 37.1), as repealed by s 54.1 (s 37.1 was added by the Constitution Amendment 
Proclamation, 1983 (see SI/84-102), and was repealed on April 18, 1987 by section 54.1 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. Section 37.1(1)-(2) read as follows: “In addition to the conference convened in March 1983, at least two 
constitutional conferences composed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first ministers of the provinces shall 
be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada, the first within three years after April 17, 1982 and the second within 
five years after that date (2) Each conference convened under subsection (1) shall have included in its agenda 
constitutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the Prime Minister of Canada shall 
invite representatives of those peoples to participate in the discussions on those matters”). 
380 Parliament of Canada, Constitutional Conferences, online: Parlinfo 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Compilations/Constitution/ConstitutionalConferences.aspx> [Parlinfo] (March 15-
16, 1983 Subject: Amendment to the Constitution Act, 1982 respecting aboriginal rights. Note: Present at the 
conference were federal government representatives along with their counterparts from the provinces and Northwest 
Territories, and delegates from national native groups; March 8-9, 1984 Subject: Entrenchment of aboriginal rights 
in the Constitution: native self-government, sexual equality,  title and  treaty rights, land and resources for 
communities; April 2-3, 1985 Subject: Entrenchment of the principle of native self-government in the Canadian 
Constitution; March 26-27, 1987 Subject: Entrenchment of the principle of native self-government in the Canadian 
Constitution. No agreement was reached at this fourth and final conference mandated by section 37.1 of the 
Constitution); and see Charlotte Town and Meech Lake Accord conferences as well as later first minster meetings 
convened to discuss Aboriginal issues as listed on the ParlInfo webpage cited herein).  
381 Louise Mandell & Leslie Hall Pinder “Tracking Justice: The Constitution Express to Section 35 and Beyond” in 
Patriation and its Consequences: Constitution Making in Canada eds Lois Harder & Steve Patten (Vancouver: UBC 
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far from the ‘reconciliation’ concept more recently advocated by the judiciary and touted as a 
policy objective of governments, has hitherto proven a vicious and expensive adversarial contest, 
mediated by the Courts, that arguably has no end in sight. 
Slattery explains: “[s]ince 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has delivered a series of 
decisions that furnish many important pieces of the puzzle. However, the pieces still lie scattered 
about in a somewhat disconnected fashion.”382 Since the definitive discourse of Aboriginal rights 
has largely fallen on the judiciary, Slattery goes on to “fit them together and fill in the gaps, so as 
to provide” what he calls a “coherent taxonomy of Aboriginal rights in Canada”.383 It would 
seem that as opposed to an empty or full box, s. 35.1 is more akin to a looking glass – one that 
has been shattered into infinite pieces where we consider scattered and irregular fragments to 
guess at our reflection as a reconciled whole.  
Slattery identifies two overarching ‘classes’ of rights, ‘specific’ and ‘generic’ aboriginal 
rights.384 Drawing from leading case law, he explains that specific rights are those rights “whose 
existence, nature, and scope are determined by factors that are particular to each Aboriginal 
group”385 and “[a]s such, they vary in character from group to group.”386 He clarifies that 
“different Aboriginal groups may have similar rights, but this is just happenstance. It does not 
flow from the nature of the right”.387 Slattery’s conception of ‘specific rights’ can be read as an 
analysis that strives to respect the unique and independent identities of each First Nation in 
Canada. In contrast, ‘generic rights’ to Slattery are rights “of a standardized character that [are] 
basically identical in all Aboriginal groups where [they] occur[ ]. The fundamental dimensions of 
                                                 
Press, 2015) 180 at 197 (“The courts have interpreted section 35 in unfolding layers of dynamic jurisprudence, 
which no one imagined. The premiers thought the word “existing” meant “extinguished”, and argued that the 
provision was an empty box in R. v. Sparrow (1990). But the Supreme Court of Canada held the opposite: “existing” 
means “unextinguished”. In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (2004) the court held that section 35 holds the 
promise of reconciliation of “pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty” (Haida Nation 
v. British Columbia [Minister of Forests] at para. 20).”). 
382 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376 at 111. 
383 Ibid.; and see Brian Slattery, The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 595 
[Slattery, “Generative Rights”] (for further details of Slattery’s conception of ‘generic’ and ‘specific’ Aboriginal 
rights). 
384 Slattery, Taxonomy, ibid. at 111. 
385 Ibid. at 112. 
386 Ibid. at 114. 
387 Ibid. 
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the right[s] are determined by the common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights rather than by the 
unique circumstances of each group”.388  
So, in accordance to Slattery’s taxonomy of Aboriginal rights, the Heiltsuk right to 
commercially sell herring row on kelp is a specific right to the Heiltsuk Nation, owing to the 
application of the Van der Peet test to the activities advanced as a right to the Courts in 
Gladstone.389 By contrast, Aboriginal title is a generic right.  Aboriginal title is: 
the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy 
of the land: the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the 
land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land…[with] an important 
restriction – it is collective title held not only for the present generation but for all 
succeeding generations…it cannot be alienated except to the Crown or encumbered 
in ways that would prevent future generations of the group from using and enjoying 
it. Nor can the land be developed or misused in a way that would substantially 
deprive future generations of the benefit of the land.390 
Aboriginal title is a generic right because it would basically have the same character for any First 
Nation that could successfully establish its claim.  
By way of application of his analysis to various principles out of the leading case law, 
Slattery goes on to extrapolate a number of other ‘generic aboriginal rights’391, including:  
 the right to conclude treaties392 
 the right to customary law393 
 the right to honourable treatment by the Crown394 
 the right to an ancestral territory (Aboriginal title)395 
 the right to cultural integrity396 
 the right to self-government397 
                                                 
388 Ibid. (“Generic rights are of a uniform character whose basic contours are established by the common law of 
Aboriginal rights. All Aboriginal groups holding a certain generic right have basically the same kind of right. The 
essential nature of the right does not vary according to factors peculiar to the group.”). 
389 Ibid. at 112; Van der Peet, supra note 113 at paras. 46 and 60; Gladstone, supra note 113. 
390 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at paras 73-4. 
391 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376 at 114-5 (Slattery’s analysis leads to ‘abstract rights’ which he describes as 
‘uniform’, and therefore ‘generic’ (applicable to all First Nations). 
392 Ibid. at 115-6. 
393 Ibid. at 116. 
394 Ibid. at 116-8. 
395 Ibid. at 118. 
396 Ibid. at 118-120. 
397 Ibid. at 120-1; contra Delgamuukw, supra note 342; contra R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821.  
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Only two of these rights—the right to honourable treatment by the Crown (consultation and 
accommodation, the honour of the Crown) and the right to an ancestral territory (Aboriginal title) 
—have been implicitly decreed by the Supreme Court of Canada. Most Aboriginal rights tested 
in Canada’s highest court are better categorized as ‘specific rights’ under Slattery’s analysis. 
Each of the other generic Aboriginal rights Slattery lists are sometimes conceded, though not 
necessarily respected, by the Government of Canada.398 
Slattery emphasizes that generic rights are “abstract rights” with a “uniform character, which 
does not change from group to group”.399 He explains “[g]eneric rights are not only uniform in 
character; they are also universal in distribution. They make up a set of fundamental rights 
presumptively held by all Aboriginal groups in Canada…It is presumed that every Aboriginal 
group in Canada has these fundamental rights, in the absence of valid legislation or treaty 
stipulations to the contrary”.400 To Slattery, generic and specific rights are osmotic, given 
“[s]pecific rights…arise under the auspices of generic rights and assume different forms in 
different Aboriginal groups, depending on the particular circumstances of each group”.401 He 
explains their relationship as follows: 
Just as all generic rights give birth to specific rights, so also are all specific rights 
the offspring of generic rights. In other words, there are no “orphan” specific rights. 
The reason is that generic rights provide the basic rules governing the existence and 
scope of specific rights. So an Aboriginal group cannot possess a specific right 
                                                 
398 Slattery, Taxonomy, ibid.  at 115, 114-121; Haida, supra note 208 at paras 16-25 (the honour of the Crown); and 
see Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 (Aboriginal title); and see AANDC, The Government of Canada’s Approach to 
Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government Part I Policy Framework: 
The Inherent Right of Self-Government is a Section 35 Right, online: AANDC <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844> (“The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of 
self-government as an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It recognizes, as 
well, that the inherent right may find expression in treaties, and in the context of the Crown's relationship with treaty 
First Nations. Recognition of the inherent right is based on the view that the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the 
right to govern themselves in relation to matters that are internal to their communities, integral to their unique 
cultures, identities, traditions, languages and institutions, and with respect to their special relationship to their land 
and their resources. The Government acknowledges that the inherent right of self-government may be enforceable 
through the courts and that there are different views about the nature, scope and content of the inherent right. 
However, litigation over the inherent right would be lengthy, costly and would tend to foster conflict. In any case, 
the courts are likely to provide general guidance to the parties involved, leaving it to them to work out detailed 
arrangements. For these reasons, the Government is convinced that litigation should be a last resort. Negotiations 
among governments and Aboriginal peoples are clearly preferable as the most practical and effective way to 
implement the inherent right of self-government.”).  
399 Slattery, Taxonomy, ibid. at 128. 
400 Ibid. at 123 [emphasis in original]. 
401 Ibid. at 128. 
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unless it is rooted in a generic right. By the same token, the scope of a specific right 
cannot exceed the basic dimensions of the generic right that engenders it.402 
Slattery illuminates a third, intermediary category of rights that vest somewhere between generic 
and specific rights: “[r]anged between basic generic rights and specific rights are rights of 
intermediate generality, which relate to specific subject matters”.403 To Slattery the generic “right 
of cultural integrity fosters a range of intermediate generic rights, which relate to such matters as 
livelihood, language, and religion. These intermediate rights give birth to specific rights, whose 
character is shaped by the practices, customs, and traditions of particular Aboriginal groups”.404  
When applied to a Canadian legal analysis of the strength of a potential Aboriginal rights 
claim, Slattery’s idea of generic rights is useful toward identifying the kinds of infringements 
that might occur in the course of Crown emergency management within First Nation territories – 
infringements that might be justiciable according to Canadian legal norms. As we have seen in 
the first part of this thesis, practitioners and legislators alike categorize emergency management 
into four distinctive categories: planning, mitigation, response, and recovery. We have also seen 
that First Nations are by and large prima facie excluded within the regulatory frameworks 
governing Canada’s and British Columbia’s emergency management framework.405 What 
follows is a very general survey of some ‘generic’ rights that may be implicated in a dispute 
                                                 
402 Ibid. at 123. 
403 Ibid. at 128; (Using the example of the generic right to honourable treatment by the Crown, Slattery explains that 
the generic right (honourable treatment by the Crown) “operates at a high level of abstraction and harbours a range 
of intermediate generic rights relating to different subject matters, such as the creation of Indian reserves or the 
protection of existing reserves. These intermediate rights, in turn, engender myriad specific fiduciary rights vesting 
in particular Aboriginal groups, whose precise scope is determined by the concrete circumstances in which they 
arise” at 121-22). 
404 Ibid. at 122. 
405 However, again I note here that there may well be existing protocols functioning between particular First Nations 
and specific local authorities and/or the Crown in right of British Columbia and/or the Crown in right of Canada that 
speak to emergency management on a case by case basis. It is unclear whether there is any Crown inventory of those 
protocols (particularly those that may operate at the ‘local authority’-First Nation level), evaluation strategies (i.e. 
audit criteria to determine strength of utility), or whether the Crown attempts to streamline said protocols to meet 
any ‘gold standards’ in emergency response and/or best practices in emergency management generally. I have opted 
to restrict my research to the emergency specific statutory and regulatory frameworks operating in British Columbia, 
including those respecting modern treaties, and not to attempt to assemble an inventory of emergency management 
protocols, as perhaps interesting and useful as such a project might be. I likewise avoid case examples given the 
those examples could not justify the apparent lack of any material effort to universally accept and respect First 
Nations as an integral governance body in relation to the management of emergencies within their respective 
territories at the statutory and regulatory levels. As Gordon Christie remarked: “[a]ll too often while successful 
actions are restricted to the ‘victorious’ Aboriginal nation, all nations are exposed to the setbacks. Defeats become 
precedents, while victories are nearly always restricted to the particular situation” (Christie, “Aboriginal 
Nationhood”, supra note 368 at 3).  
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regarding the Crown’s handling of any or all of the four phases of managing an emergency 
impacting a given First Nation population and/or its territories. An infinite number of specific 
rights potentially are, or may be, infringed during Crown emergency management (particularly 
where that management is unilateral) and within Slattery’s framework, specific rights flow from 
generic rights.406As such, the following cursory and general exploration is limited to a ‘generic 
rights’ analysis. 
As all four phases of emergency management require governance for execution it follows 
that self-governance is impaired where First Nations do not have a steering voice in managing 
emergencies within their respective territories. The first part of this thesis details the 
jurisdictional framework currently governing emergency management within British Columbia. 
As seen, except in the very few cases where a First Nation has concluded a modern treaty with 
the Crown specifying emergency management, First Nations in BC are largely restricted to 
emergency management activities on reserve. First Nation exclusion takes place irrespective of 
the fact that in many cases the Crown-made reserves are a ‘postage stamp’ in comparison to a 
given First Nation’s traditional territories and that in many cases First Nations have asserted 
Aboriginal title to those traditional territories. Therefore, generally speaking, where First Nations 
in BC do have a governance voice over emergency management that voice is restricted to a 
fraction of their territory. Or, in the case of modern treaty First Nations, those Nations are 
qualified as a lower level of government relative to the Crown, treated in some respects like local 
governments.407 Further, even where the Crown permits First Nations to exercise some 
emergency management activities on reserve, the conceptual approach is to have the province 
deliver the services and recoup their costs from the Department of Indian Affairs: 
All provincial and territorial emergency response and recovery costs incurred on 
First Nations reserve lands will be assumed by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada for all natural disasters that occur on or after April 1, 2014.408 
                                                 
406 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376 at 123 (“Just as all generic rights give birth to specific rights, so also are all 
specific rights the offspring of generic rights. In other words, there are no “orphan” specific rights. The reason is that 
generic rights provide the basic rules governing the existence and scope of specific rights. So an Aboriginal group 
cannot possess a specific right unless it is rooted in a generic right. By the same token, the scope of a specific right 
cannot exceed the basic dimensions of the generic right that engenders it”). 
407 See e.g. Maa-Nulth Final Agreement, supra note 352 at ss 13.26.0-13.26.5 (as outlined above under section 2.3.2 
‘First Nation Emergency Management in Treaty Territory’). 
408 DFAA Guidelines, supra note 239 at “Interpretive Bulletin 4: First Nation Reserves”, online: Public Safety 
Canada <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/gdlns-dsstr-ssstnc/index-eng.aspx#s9>.  
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As the old adage says, he who holds the gold, makes the rules. In the case of the Crown in right 
of British Columbia, emergency management is steered through their Provincial Emergency 
Program (PEP), which typically parachutes in specially trained Crown servants into disaster 
areas.409 The specialized Crown servants exercise prescribed special powers under emergency 
management legislation to take immediate and tangible action and irrespective of the outcome or 
result of those actions they are generally speaking protected by a host of indemnifications.410 
Regulatory priorities found in the fiscal arrangements aimed at financing emergency recovery 
costs can result in the infringement of all of Aboriginal title, cultural integrity and customary law 
generic rights described by Slattery (as well as the plethora of ‘specific’ rights that might flow 
from these ‘generic’ rights).411 
The Disaster Financial Assistance Program (BC) tiers into federal funding once cost and 
population thresholds have been met. So, for the first $3 per population of eligible disaster 
recovery costs occurring off reserve, the government of Canada pays nothing and the impacted 
provincial government pays the entire costs. For the next $6 per population of eligible disaster 
recovery costs, the federal government contributes 50%. For the next $6 per population of 
eligible disaster recovery costs, the federal government contributes 75%. For the remainder of 
the costs, the federal government pays 90%.412 
The Disaster Fund Assistance Program is a cost sharing strategy to finance emergency 
response and recovery. As discussed, the federal guidelines further prescribe that provincial 
                                                 
409 See e.g. British Columbia, Emergency Management BC, B.C. Earthquake Immediate Response Plan (Victoria: 
Emergency Management BC, 2015) at 22 (figure 2) online: PEP <http://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/public-safety-
and-emergency-services/emergency-preparedness-response-recovery/provincial-emergency-planning/irp.pdf> (for a 
detailed framework of how Emergency Management BC plans to respond to the case of a catastrophic emergency. 
The protocols demonstrate how resources [are] will be organized in the event of an earthquake disaster and how 
support for local authorities is delivered. The Plan indicates that it was designed to be applied to other types of 
catastrophes or to earthquakes occurring in other regions than the GVRD and Victoria and area).  
410 These are discussed further in Part I of this thesis.  See e.g. Emergency Program Act, supra note 76 at s 18; and 
see e.g. Emergencies Act, supra note 21 at s 47. 
411 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376 at 116, 118-120, 123.  
412 Public Safety Canada, Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA), at Appendix A and B online: 
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rcvr-dsstrs/dsstr-fnncl-ssstnc-rrngmnts/index-eng.aspx> (it is 
perhaps noteworthy that the federal/provincial cost sharing formula was cut significantly in the 2015 budget. The 
new guidelines operate at $3, $6, $6 eligible provincial expense thresholds (per capita of population) whereas the 
cost-sharing formula prior to Feb 1 2015 operated at $1, $2, $2 eligible provincial expense thresholds (per capita of 
population). The effect of this budgetary cost in a $20 million dollar event (eligible response and recovery costs) 
amounts to a $4 million shift from federal financial assistance onto provinces who will have to find some other 
mechanism to offset disaster response and recovery costs that federal government used to cover under the old cost-
sharing formula).  
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governments (and their selected contractors and consultants) will be compensated 100% by the 
Department of Indian Affairs for any costs incurred in responding to emergencies on reserve.413 
Given the provincial Crown preemptively holds all the cards (any money they spend in 
accordance to the disaster fund guidelines will be compensated); a First Nation’s ability to 
prescribe emergency management appears to be restricted to the pleasure of the provincial 
Crown. A First Nation could not feasibly execute an emergency response and recovery strategy 
in the absence of resourcing to pay for the substantial cost associated with disaster recovery.  
In the vacuum of prescriptive language calling for the direct inclusion of First Nations in 
emergency management over their traditional (particularly Aboriginal title) territories, the 
provincial Crown appears to assume a unilateral governance and implementation role in off 
reserve emergency management generally.414 As previously noted, one of the only ministries 
without a current role listed in the British Columbia emergency program regulations is the 
Department of Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation.415 As such, it does not appear that the 
British Columbia Crown makes any serious effort to include First Nations in emergency 
management within their territories. And given the priority given to Crown emergency response 
and recovery servants and contractors (through the Disaster Assistance Fund priorities), there 
appears to be a disincentive to finance local First Nation emergency response and recovery 
crews.  
Tsilhqot’in clarified that Aboriginal title includes “the right to decide how the land will be 
used … and the right to proactively use and manage the land”.416 First Nations, having governed 
their respective territories for thousands of years, potentially offer long-term knowledge of the 
land base.  That knowledge is extremely helpful in streamlining recovery efforts that involve any 
engineering of the environment as part of the emergency recovery process. For example, it is not 
uncommon that in flood recovery efforts a streambed may be graded and/or a whole river system 
                                                 
413 DFAA Guidelines, supra note 239 (“All provincial and territorial emergency response and recovery costs 
incurred on First Nations reserve lands will be assumed by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
for all natural disasters that occur on or after April 1, 2014”). 
414 As noted elsewhere in this thesis, there may be examples of some First Nations playing a cooperative emergency 
management role (i.e. shared jurisdictions) through protocols. Researching such protocols was outside the scope of 
this thesis.  
415 Emergency Program Regulations, supra note 273 at Schedule 1.  
416 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at paras 73-4. 
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intermittently riprapped. Ensuring use for future generations417 involves consideration of how the 
land functioned for past and current generations (i.e. landslides, droughts, river routes, weather 
patterns, fish runs etc.). Where First Nations are restricted from steering response and recovery 
efforts, not only may there be an infringement of Aboriginal title, site-specific rights may be 
compromised. For example, there may be spiritual and historical sites in need of special care 
during reconstruction efforts.  Similarly, priority may be warranted to particular areas for food, 
social, ceremonial purposes. Or, in the case of a claim to Aboriginal title, there may be rights in 
relation to a whole plethora of land/marine use objectives, including economic development.  
Recovery costs can reach into the tens of millions. There is a lost opportunity to build First 
Nation employment capacity and further local economic development agendas when First 
Nations peoples and their respective corporations and governance bodies are excluded from the 
recovery and response phases of emergency management. Reasoning that disaster recovery could 
also reasonably involve recovering a local economy, it is bizarre that emergency management in 
the recovery phase is not overtly capitalized upon to buttress local service providers within First 
Nation communities who may be struggling to secure financing to further their economic 
development plans. For example, if there were a line item in the Disaster Financial Assistance 
Arrangements that stated (say) ‘where a local First Nation contractor or service provider can be 
called upon to provide a recovery service, that contractor will be given the right of first refusal 
for delivery of the service’ Canada and British Columbia could further concomitant federal 
priorities around equalizing on and off reserve quality of life indexes, while still meeting even a 
strict reading of the disaster recovery agenda. 
The Indian Act does not specify emergency management. From the Crown’s vantage point, 
empowerment to govern or participate in emergency management on reserve appears to be at the 
pleasure of AANDC. It holds the obligation and presumed authority by virtue of the 
government’s implementation of s. 91.24 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the authority of the 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Ministry who devolves its responsibilities among 
Canada’s federal ministries.418 AANDC, like all federal ministries, is responsible for ensuring 
that it meets the prescribed emergency preparedness protocols set out by Public Safety 
                                                 
417 See ibid. (the SCC restricted Aboriginal title: “Nor can the land be developed or misused in a way that would 
substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land”.). 
418 Emergency Department Act, supra note 41. 
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Canada.419 AANDC then passes on the mandate to develop emergency plans onto First Nations, 
and likewise set the guidelines for access to AANDC-controlled funding to meet the mandate. 
There is little First Nation autonomy in on-reserve emergency management and practically no 
First Nation directed off-reserve emergency management (except in those cases where a specific 
emergency management protocol has been made with a First Nation that has been tested, 
implemented and functions) – a situation hardly congruent with a right to self-government.  
Where the Crown has not adequately consulted with and accommodated a First Nation, 
particularly in the planning, mitigation and recovery phases of emergency management, that 
Nation’s right to honourable treatment by the Crown is infringed. There is potentially an 
argument that in some cases emergency response is so urgent that lives might be lost or other 
severe, preventable consequences might arise if standard consultation and accommodation 
approaches were undertaken during an emergency response effort. Even emergency response 
however could be conducted without infringing a First Nation’s right to honourable treatment. 
One strategy involves response protocols that reflect the current jurisdictional authorities in 
the emergency management frameworks and approaches First Nation engagement during 
planning phases of emergency management to meet consultation and accommodation 
obligations. Another approach would be in the realignment of emergency management 
jurisdictional authorities where First Nations were respected as the governing bodies of their 
respective traditional territories and managed emergencies for the region concerned accordingly. 
This would require honourable implementation of a requisite fiscal strategy to redirect resources 
that would have been spent on (say) regional district emergency management. Other approaches 
could be developed where honourable treatment of First Nations is prioritized. 
While planning, mitigation and recovery are pillars of all emergency management 
frameworks legislated federally and in British Columbia, unlike emergency response (the fourth 
pillar) they are executed with the luxury of time. As such, arguments that consultation with First 
Nations might fetter emergency management efforts are misguided. While it may be that the 
Crown, on a case-by-case basis, might make an effort at consultation and accommodation, the 
prima facie framework is silent on First Nation engagement. As such, there is little in the public 
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domain to evaluate and compare in order to develop streamlined approaches (minimizing harm 
and avoiding waste) and to cultivate best practices with respect to ensuring impacted First 
Nations are adequately engaged in all phases of emergency management to meet the Crown’s 
consultation and accommodation obligations. 
Of course, the examples of generic rights that might be infringed during Crown emergency 
management discussed above are not exhaustive. Given the distinctive nature of each First 
Nation and their territories, differences in potential conflict of uses and management priorities 
are potentially broad. The purpose of this section was to provide an exemplar of the kinds of 
conflicts that may well come to litigation in the near future, particularly in light of the recent 
headlining Mount Polley dam breach that has arguably resulted in greater public scrutiny on the 
role First Nations play in industrial related emergency management activities. 
Whether considering infringement of specific or generic rights arising from Crown directed 
emergency management, there is the potential for a ripple effect to take place negatively 
impacting Slattery’s ‘intermediate-generic rights’, like livelihood, language and religion. The 
point is that emergency management—though constrained to an event (as opposed to regular 
day-to-day governance—is not benign and can have a long-term negative impact if conducted 
without diligence to the rights of respective impacted populations. A high level of attention is 
placed on this matter in emergency management legislation as far as the constitutional rights 
under scrutiny are ‘democratic freedoms’. The same vigor and attention however has not been 
paid to the potential constitutional infringement of Aboriginal rights in the course of Crown 
exercise of special ‘emergency powers’. 
3.2. RIGHTS OR OBLIGATIONS?  
John Borrows demonstrates that one can reframe Slattery’s portrayal of generic and specific 
rights as conclusive obligations held by the Crown. He explains, “Crown obligations mirror the 
generic and specific nature of Aboriginal rights”.420 For example, Borrows characterizes “the 
generic right to honourable treatment by the Crown”421 as “a general obligation for the Crown to 
treat Aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably and to ensure that Aboriginal peoples are not 
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exploited”.422 Borrows explains that as such, Crown obligations “toward Aboriginal peoples are 
now firmly part of Canada’s constitutional fabric.”423 
Borrows offers an expansive categorization of Crown obligations specific to Canada’s 
constitutional law. Crown constitutional obligations owed to First Nations thus include:  
recognition; affirmation; reconciliation; non-extinguishment without consent; 
prevention of the perpetuation of ‘historic injustice suffered by Aboriginal Peoples 
at the hands of colonizers’; not imposing unjustifiably unreasonable limitations; not 
imposing unjustifiably undue hardships; not unjustifiably denying preferred means 
of Aboriginal people exercising rights; minimal impairment; allocating resources to 
Aboriginal peoples; conserving resources for Aboriginal peoples; protecting the 
safety of Aboriginal rights users; ensuring economic and regional fairness; 
measuring historic reliance on resource use for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
people; structuring discretion; giving priority (which varies with nature of right); 
providing for Aboriginal participation in resources development; government 
reducing economic barriers for Aboriginal peoples; managing change honourably; 
compensation; consultation; accommodation; administrative law procedural 
safeguards; legislative dispute resolution legislation; mitigation strategies; 
promoting federalism, democracy, rule of law, and protection of minorities; not 
violating Aboriginal individual’s Charter rights.424 
One has only to survey the list to reflect that by Borrows’ apt characterization of s. 35(1) 
jurisprudence, Crown obligations to First Nations are considerable. Given that the source of 
these obligations is Canada’s constitution should give them particular weight and priority. Yet, 
as Borrows reveals “it sometimes appears as though governments do not consider themselves as 
possessing significant obligations towards Aboriginal peoples. Aboriginal peoples persistently 
protest the Crown's approach to Aboriginal and treaty rights and yet the Crown often responds as 
if it does not have legal obligations to Aboriginal peoples".425  
For example, the June 2014 Supreme Court of Canada Tsilhqot’in decision, held, for the first 
time in the history of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, that a First Nation possessed the right of 
Aboriginal title.426 In the wake of commentary, news articles, industry reaction and publicised 
First Nation leadership meetings following the landmark decision, the CBC reported on August 
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425 Ibid. at 206-7; and see Gordon Christie, “’Obligations’, Decolonization and Indigenous Rights to Governance” 
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16, 2014 (a full six weeks after the release of the decision): “[a]ccording to a Freedom of 
Information request filed with the provincial government by The Canadian Press, [BC] 
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation Minister John Rustad has not received a single briefing 
note, memorandum, email or other internal communication regarding the court case over the 
past year”.427 As for the federal government response to the new ruling, Cheryl Casimer (First 
Nations Summit) reportedly remarked “the First Nations Leadership Council, which includes the 
summit, the B.C. Assembly of First Nations and the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs, hasn't heard a 
word from Ottawa aside from a press release sent to media the day of the decision”.428  
As the early apparent government response to Tsilhqot’in reflects, ‘the obligation gap’ 
constitutes a divide within the Crown itself that frustrates a cohesive, discernable (to the average 
member of the public), and enforceable constitutional relationship between First Nations and the 
rest of Canada.429 Whether that relationship is framed in accordance to ‘reconciliation’, ‘treaty 
federalism’, ‘indigenous diplomacy’ or ‘Crown/First Nation relations’; the legislative, executive, 
and judicial arms of government each seem to be preoccupied with their own independent 
analysis as to what ‘the Crown’ should do with respect to Aboriginal rights. 
The following section will attempt to understand ‘the obligation gap’ from a theoretical 
standpoint in the hopes of elucidating some solutions aimed at improving current government-to-
government practices generally as those practices pertain to the implementation of rights and 
obligations, emphasising emergency management  rights and obligations issues specifically. 
 
 
                                                 
427 “B.C. Aboriginal Leaders Talk Strategy Over Ruling: Hundreds of Chiefs, Lawyers, and Native Representatives 
Gather in Richmond B.C.”, Canadian Press (16 August 2014) online: CBC News 
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429 Compare Christie, Indigeneity and Sovereignty, supra note 369 (Christie characterizes escalating interest in the 
Arctic as a ‘threat’ of ‘second generation colonialism’ and frames his academic analysis as offering a strategy for 
‘resistance’. I find it difficult to accept Crown language suggesting goals of ‘reconciliation’ when leading 
indigenous theorists appear compelled to treat contemporary Aboriginal rights dialogues as ‘resistance’ strategies to 
avert yet another example of colonialism.  A clear disconnect exists between the Crown self-portrayal as honourably 
reconciling with indigenous peoples in Canada and at least some indigenous legal experts’ view on the veracity of 
that ‘honourable reconciliation’).  
105 
 
3.3. THEORIZING OBLIGATIONS 
Ask not what the government can do for you, ask why it doesn’t. 
- Attributed to Gerhard Kocher, author 
Borrows’ observation that “governments do not consider themselves as possessing significant 
obligations towards Aboriginal peoples is poignant and should not be ignored. Understanding 
government reluctance to admit constitutional obligations in the context of rights may reflect a 
theoretical bias toward liberalism and the individual in how the Crown in right of the judiciary, 
executive, and legislatures regard ‘Aboriginal rights’.  
In Isaiah Berlin’s Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford in 1958, he 
outlines his seminal work on delineating ‘positive’ from ‘negative’ freedoms.430 Berlin clarifies 
that liberty or freedom (used interchangeably) can be understood in accordance to two 
fundamentally different questions. He states: ‘[t]he answer to the question ‘Who governs me? Is 
logically distinct from the question ‘How far does government interfere with me?’431 It is in this 
difference, says Berlin, “that the great contrast between the two concepts of negative and positive 
liberty” consists.432  
Summarizing giants in philosophy, Berlin extrapolates the specific features of negative and 
positive liberty that render the two concepts of freedom incongruent. Focusing, in part, on the 
vastly influential thinking of John Stuart Mill in modern political discourse, Berlin highlights 
some concerning features of the ‘negative’ sense of liberty. In elucidating “[w]hat made the 
protection of individual liberty so sacred to Mill?”433 Berlin writes:  
The defence of liberty consists in the ‘negative’ goal of warding off interference. 
To threaten a man with persecution unless he submits to a life in which he exercises 
no choices of his goals; to block before him every door but one, no matter how 
noble the prospect upon which it opens, or how benevolent the motives of those 
                                                 
430 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) 
118 [Berlin, Liberty] (I am extremely grateful to Professor Michael Plaxton for instructive conversations in the area 
of the philosophy of law and for introducing me to Berlin’s piece which became foundational to my theoretical 
treatment of Aboriginal rights in this thesis). 
431 Ibid. at 130. 
432 Ibid. at 130. 
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who arrange this, is to sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with a life of 
his own to live.434 
Berlin explains that the ‘negative’ sense of liberty has three important and overriding 
characteristics: the first pertains to an inconsistency in Mill’s portrayal of liberty (basically that 
“Mill’s argument for liberty as a necessary condition for the growth of human genius falls to the 
ground)435; the second is that the doctrine is comparatively modern in so far as “[t]here seems to 
be scarcely any discussion of individual liberty as a conscious political ideal (as opposed to its 
actual existence) in the ancient world”;436 and the third is that “liberty in this sense is not 
incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government”. 
Berlin placed important weight on the third characteristic, explaining: 
Just as a democracy may, in fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many 
liberties which he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly 
conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure 
of personal freedom. The despot who leaves his subjects a wide area of liberty may 
be unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care little for order, or virtue, or 
knowledge, but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less than 
many other regimes, he meets with Mill’s specifications. Freedom in this sense is 
not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government. Self-
government may, on the whole, provide a better guarantee of the preservation of 
civil liberties than other regimes, and has been defended as such by libertarians. 
But there is no necessary connexion between individual liberty and democratic 
rule.437 
Applying Berlin, a theoretical account of the s. 35(1) jurisprudence to date might simply be that 
the courts have been overwhelmingly concerned with constructing a negative rights regime 
particular to aboriginal peoples. Borrows notes the Supreme Court of Canada’s obsession with 
“the Aboriginal” in Aboriginal rights,438 which becomes much more explicable when one 
extrapolates from Berlin’s summary of the ‘goals’ of negative freedom to frame the judicial goals 
that seem to inform Aboriginal rights jurisprudence:  
We must preserve a minimum area of [Aboriginal] freedom if we are not to 
“degrade or deny [their] nature’. [Aboriginal peoples] cannot remain absolutely 
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free, and must give up some of [their] liberty to preserve the rest. But total self-
surrender is self-defeating [the result is assimilation and there would be no need for 
s. 35(1)]. What then must the minimum be? That which [an Aboriginal person] 
cannot give up without offending against the essence of his [Aboriginal] nature. 
What is this essence? What are the standards which it entails? This has been, and 
perhaps always be, a matter of infinite debate. But whatever the principle in terms 
of which the area of non-interference is to be drawn, whether it is that of natural 
law or natural rights, or of utility or the pronouncements of a categorical imperative, 
or the sanctity of the social contract, or any other concept with which [Aboriginal 
peoples] have sought to clarify and justify their convictions, liberty in this sense 
means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always 
recognizable, frontier.439  
In this light, the Court’s obsession with ‘the Aboriginal’ in s. 35(1), as well as their particular 
long-standing focus on governmental ‘justification of infringement’ of ‘integral aspects of 
distinctive cultures’ can be understood as predictable legal precedent toward elucidating the 
“shifting, but always recognizable, frontier” of Aboriginal “negative” freedoms as protected by s. 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Also in this light, we can understand Slattery’s taxonomy of 
Aboriginal rights as an exemplar of negative aboriginal rights thesis in action. Again referencing 
Berlin, ‘specific’ and ‘generic’ rights are philosophically determined in accordance with either 
particular or general ‘threats’ to the ‘degradation’ or ‘denial’ of ‘Aboriginal nature’ at the hands 
of the state, while balancing [and thus affirming] ‘necessary’ state interference implicit to 
overarching governance. From Berlin’s theoretical lens, Crown obligations implicit to a negative 
rights construct are limited to prescriptive actions which further non-interference (to a point) 
where Crown goals and policies impair ‘aboriginality’, without any obligation of advancing 
Aboriginal peoples own goals and policies per se. 
In considering the political and legal ambiguities informing the Crown’s relationship with 
Aboriginal sovereignty, Felix Hoehn’s observations on the jurisprudential history dealing with 
Aboriginal rights in Canada reflects a ‘negative rights’ experience of First Nations’ constitutional 
standing: 
It is not surprising that courts felt bound to accept assertions of Crown sovereignty, 
but by doing so the courts perpetuated a paradigm that did not treat Aboriginal 
peoples as equals and left them at the mercy of such “rights” as could be recognized 
by courts in spite of Crown sovereignty, not by virtue of their own sovereignty. This 
approach necessarily led to a limited theory of Aboriginal rights that demoted the 
status of Aboriginal nations from sovereigns to mere occupants, reflecting the 
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centuries-old ethnocentric premise that North America was legally vacant land 
when the settlers came.440  
Hoehn’s observation suggests that the jurisprudential history informing s. 35 Aboriginal rights as 
‘negative liberties’ is the result of the Crown’s denial of First Nation sovereignties. The lack of 
recognition implicit in the denial of First Nation sovereignty “did not treat Aboriginal peoples as 
equals”, “demoted the status of Aboriginal nations” and perpetuated “the centuries-old 
ethnocentric premise that North America was legally vacant land when the settlers came”.441  
The contest between sovereignties has profound implications in terms of appreciating real-
world tensions between Berlin’s negative and positive liberty. Gordon Christie captures three 
integral aspects of contemporary treatment of sovereignty in reference to settler-state 
relationships with the Arctic and its peoples:  
First, sovereignty is understood as denoting territorially based power, the ability to 
act in relation to defined lands (and not, for example, directly in relation to persons, 
objects, or events). A nation-state holding sovereign power does so in relation to its 
defined territory and enjoys under this power the highest degree of deference in 
relation to decisions it makes. Second, all other decision-making bodies either 
within or outside this territory must accede to the decisions made by this sovereign 
power within the scope of its territory. Finally, accession to decisions made by the 
sovereign applies to all within the territory, generating obligations on all to follow 
its commands—authority is conceived of as designating a right held by the 
sovereign to be obeyed by all parties.442 
As Christie relates, the sovereign holds power in relation to its defined territory and enjoys under 
this power the highest degree of deference in relation to decisions it makes; accession by all 
other decision making bodies within and without the defined territory is assured; and the 
sovereign enjoys an internal assurance of authority, that is the right to be obeyed by all parties 
within the territory.443 Putting aside for the moment that, as Christie relates, there are differential 
conceptions of a territorially based relationship to lands, water, life within and each other 
inherent to indigenous philosophies and legal traditions, jurisdictional authority over a precisely 
defined territorial boundary is supreme where the euro conception of a sovereign power is 
evoked. Deference to a sovereign’s jurisdictional supremacy means no scope of justifiable 
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infringement [interference] with the sovereign’s power need be considered as sovereignty is the 
conveyance of absolute authority in British imperial based legal traditions. 
Eurocentric assertions of ‘sovereignty’ find power and political content in the philosophical 
conception of positive liberty. Berlin suggests that ‘positive liberty’ is another, perhaps weightier 
conception of freedom or liberty, just as significant to philosophical and thus political reason as 
the ‘negative’ conception of liberty. While the negative conception of liberty asks ‘How far 
should government interfere with Aboriginal peoples and their territories?’ the positive liberty 
conception of Aboriginal rights is concerned with ‘Who governs Aboriginal peoples and their 
territories?’”.444 If we apply Berlin, the inherent tension between negative and positive liberty is 
at the philosophical root of tensions frustrating reconciliation, where we understand 
reconciliation as per Hoehn’s view as reconciling Crown and Aboriginal sovereignties. 
Berlin emphasises the enormous division in the two conceptions of liberty, of particular 
relevance to contemporary Aboriginal rights discourse stating, “[T]he desire to be governed by 
myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as 
deep a wish as that of a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire 
for the same thing”.445 Berlin explains positive liberty: 
[t]he ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, 
not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not 
of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by 
reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, 
as it were from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not 
being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other 
men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, 
that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them… I wish, 
above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own 
ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and 
enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.446 
Basically, the distinguishing feature of positive liberty is that it prioritizes self-determination.  
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Berlin acknowledges “[t]he freedom which consists in being one’s own master, and the 
freedom which consists in not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men, may, on the 
face of it, seem concepts at no great logical distance from each other—no more than negative 
and positive ways of saying much the same thing.”447 However, as Berlin illuminates, the history 
of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ notions of freedom diverged dramatically until coming into direct 
conflict with one another.448 Berlin believed that positive liberty taken to its logical conclusion 
ultimately results in coercion and domination, as demonstrated in various experiments with its 
more well-known disciples, nationalism, communism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism.449 As 
Berlin explains, many of the unfavourable outcomes of ‘positive’ liberty historically stem from 
the fundamental challenge of distinguishing between self-governance by appeal to a ‘higher self’ 
or ‘ideal’ versus a ‘lower’, ‘empirical’ self, governed by passion, desire, or immediate 
pleasures.450 The result is an impersonation that equates “what X would choose if he were 
something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses”.451 Those who 
adopt this view are in a position “to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, 
oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge 
that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, 
self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom—the free choice of his ‘true’ albeit often 
submerged and inarticulate, self”. 
Just as Berlin’s negative rights summary sheds light on the theoretical underpinnings 
informing much of s. 35 Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, so too does his positive liberty thesis 
inform the unfortunate paternalistic relationship that frames the Crown’s relationship to First 
Nations that led to the need for constitutional protection of First Nation freedoms in the first 
place. 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was established in 1991 “to study the 
evolution of the relationship between Aboriginal peoples (First Nations, Inuit and Métis), the 
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government of Canada and Canadian society as a whole”.452 Their work took years: “Over a 
period of five years, the Commission held 178 days of public hearings, visited 96 communities, 
heard briefs from over 2000 people, commissioned more than 350 research studies, and reviewed 
numerous past inquiries and reports”.453 It is by far the most comprehensive process considering 
Canada’s relationship with Aboriginal peoples to date, and arguably the most inclusive in terms 
of diversity of perspectives informing the Commission’s final report. As a consequence of its 
mandate, much of the Commission’s work involved elucidating the extent and consequences of 
Canada’s preparedness to ‘ignore the actual wishes’ of Aboriginal peoples.454 It also considered 
Canada’s readiness to bully,455 oppress456 and even torture,457 particularly in the savagery of 
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treatment toward children in the residential school system. These were all in the name of an 
assimilationist agenda to ‘civilise the Indian’ and foster his ‘higher self’ into a likeness of the 
settler state, as heart-wrenchingly detailed in Volume 1: Looking Forward, Looking Back. 458 
Irrespective of efforts to constitutionalize Aboriginal rights and the still poorly developed 
legal and political principles of ‘reconciliation’459 and ‘the Honour of the Crown’460, largely 
unacknowledged is the glaring “obligation gap”461 that can not only frustrate First Nation 
exercise of secured ‘negative’ liberties. The Crown seems eager to prioritize ‘non-interference’ 
(where obligations might be contested) and ‘justified interference’ where a Crown objective is 
sought, as opposed to ‘recognition’ of First Nations as self-determining (sovereign) peoples 
requiring a more sophisticated treatment of constitutional relations. Where Crown obligations are 
considered in this light, Berlin’s caution on paternalism couldn’t be more relevant: 
Paternalism is despotic, not because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, 
unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because it ignores the transcendental reason 
embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human 
being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not necessarily 
rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be recognized as such 
by others… I may feel unfree in the sense of not being recognized as a self-
governing individual human being; but I may feel it also as a member of an 
unrecognized or insufficiently respected group: then I wish for the emancipation 
my entire class, or community, or nation, or race or profession. So much can I desire 
this, that I may, in my bitter longing for status prefer to be bullied and misgoverned 
by some member of my own race or social class, by whom I am, nevertheless, 
recognized as a man and a rival—that is as an equal—to being well and tolerantly 
treated by someone from some higher and remoter group, who does not recognize 
me for what I wish to feel myself to be.462 
Berlin instructs that reaction to despotic rule (whether overtly tyrannical or paternalistic in 
character) fuels longing for another, third ‘hybrid form sort of freedom’463: 
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What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply 
unhampered liberty of action for their members [negative rights], nor, above 
everything, equality of social or economic opportunity [though still a necessary and 
important objective], still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic state 
devised by the rational lawgiver [which might by necessity be acceded to as an 
interim measure]. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition … as an 
independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending 
to act in accordance with it (whether it is good or legitimate, or not), and not to be 
ruled, educated, guided, with however light a hand, as being not quite fully human, 
and therefore not quite fully free.464  
Berlin struggled to define the space between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedoms, indicating that 
some used to the term ‘social freedom’, which he says is close but not quite correct.465 I have 
elected to call that third type of freedoms ‘recognition rights’ to draw out the argument I am 
advancing here. Insofar as the Crown continues to frustrate what we can frame from Berlin as the 
                                                 
it is difficult to specify more precisely), describe it as a hybrid form of freedom; at any rate as an ideal which is 
perhaps more prominent than any other in the world today, yet one which no existing term seems precisely to fit. 
Those who purchase it at the price of their ‘negative’, Millian freedom certainly claim to be ‘liberated’ by this 
means, in this confused, but ardently felt, sense… No doubt every interpretation of the word liberty, however 
unusual, must include a minimum of what I have called ‘negative’ liberty. There must be an area within which I am 
not frustrated…It is not a demand for Lebensraum for each individual that has stimulated the rebellions and wars of 
liberation for which men were ready to die in the past, or, indeed, in the present. Men who have fought for freedom 
have commonly fought for the right to be governed by themselves or their representatives—sternly governed if need 
be…but in a manner which allowed them to participate, or at any rate to believe that they were participating , in the 
legislation and administration of their collective lives…It is the non-recognition of this psychological and political 
fact (which lurks behind the apparent ambiguity of the term ‘liberty’) that has, perhaps, blinded some contemporary 
liberals to the world in which they live. Their plea is clear, their cause is just. But they do not allow for the variety of 
basic human needs. Nor yet for the ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one 
ideal also leads to its contrary.” [emphasis added]). 
464 Ibid. at 156 (“…when I demand to be liberated from, let us say, the status of political or social dependence, what 
I demand is an alteration of the attitude towards me of those whose opinions and behaviour help to determine my 
own image of myself. And what is true of the individual is true of groups, social, political, economic, religious, that 
is, of men conscious of needs and purposes which they have as members of such groups.”). 
465 Ibid. at 160 (“Provided the answer to ‘Who shall govern me? is somebody or something which I can represent as 
‘my own’, as something which belongs to me, or to who I belong, I can, by using words which convey fraternity and 
solidarity, as well as some part of the connotation of the ‘positive’ sense of the word freedom (which it is difficult to 
specify more precisely), describe it as a hybrid form of freedom, at any rate as an ideal which is perhaps more 
prominent than any other in the world today, yet one which no existing term seems precisely to fit.”).  
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‘recognition rights’ of Aboriginal peoples in Canada— to deny as it were Aboriginal 
‘sovereignties’466—legal and political conflict will surely continue to be the norm.467 
Aboriginal rights understood in reference to Berlin’s hybrid ‘recognition rights’ can be better 
understood by referencing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
as an interpretive tool.468 For example, the first article states “Indigenous peoples have the right 
to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms…” and could be likened to Berlin’s reference to a need for ‘fraternity’— in essence the 
article constitutes a declaration that Indigenous peoples are part of humanity.469 Article 2 
declares “Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and 
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their 
rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity” which could be equated to 
Berlin’s reference to a need for ‘association on equal terms’.470 Article 3 states “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” which could 
be likened to Berlin’s account of a need for ‘solidarity’.471 Article 5 declares “Indigenous 
                                                 
466 Compare Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 151 (“It is not surprising that courts felt bound to 
accept assertions of Crown sovereignty, but by doing so the courts perpetuated a paradigm that did not treat 
Aboriginal peoples as equals and left them at the mercy of such “rights” as could be recognized by courts in spite of 
Crown sovereignty, not by virtue of their own sovereignty. This approach necessarily led to a limited theory of 
Aboriginal rights that demoted the status of Aboriginal nations from sovereigns to mere occupants, reflecting the 
centuries-old ethnocentric premise that North America was legally vacant land when the settlers came. The Supreme 
Court of Canada…has now recognized prior Aboriginal sovereignty over territories on this continent. At the same 
time, the Court has acknowledged that Crown assertions of sovereignty cannot be recognized as legitimate unless 
founded on a treaty. This lays a solid foundation for a new paradigm of Aboriginal law based on the equality of 
peoples, and it will finally satisfy long-standing calls to abandon a foundation for Canadian sovereignty that relies 
on false beliefs about the superiority of European nations.” [footnotes and emphasis omitted]). 
467 Compare ibid. at 155 (“However, [recognition of Aboriginal sovereignties] is only legal recognition. The true 
urgency in reconciling sovereignties comes from the need to allow Aboriginal peoples to find ways to heal from the 
harm they have suffered from the long failure of settlers to treat them as equals. This failure harmed Aboriginal 
peoples, their communities, and their institutions; it also damaged the relationship between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians. Reconciliation will allow Aboriginal Canadians to take an equal part in the political and 
economic development of Canada. This will benefit all Canadians.”).   
468 UNDRIP, supra note 31(The Declaration informs part of an important body of international law that is outside 
the scope of this paper. However, the fact of the existence of the Declaration is in itself significant to this thesis in 
that Western based Courts do not have to broaden their theoretical approach to understanding the nature of 
Aboriginal rights (apart from ‘negative rights’) as ‘recognition rights’ in a vacuum. There are legal instruments, such 
as UNDRIP that offer recognition content to a philosophical rights analysis which may be helpful in distinguishing 
Aboriginal rights as something more than  collectively held  ‘negative rights’, which, as I argue throughout this 
section, is the theoretical premise currently monopolizing s. 35 rights jurisprudence).  
469 Ibid. at Article 1; Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 158. 
470 UNDRIP, ibid. at article 2; Berlin, ibid. at 158. 
471 UNDRIP, ibid. at article 3; Berlin, ibid. 
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peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social 
and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the State” which is in line with Berlin’s reference 
to ‘mutual understanding’. The relevant quote from Berlin is as follows:  
Yet it is not with individual liberty, in either the ‘negative’ or in the ‘positive’ senses 
of the word, that this desire for status and recognition can easily be identified. It is 
something no less profoundly needed and passionately fought for by human 
beings—it is something akin to, but not itself, freedom; although it entails negative 
freedom for the entire group [consistent with a concomitant need for negative rights 
reading of s. 35 Aboriginal rights], it is more closely related to solidarity, fraternity, 
mutual understanding, need for association on equal terms, all of which are 
sometimes—but misleadingly—called social freedom…472  
Much of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ content is in line 
with the vague place between positive and negative freedom that Berlin identifies as including 
solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, and need for association on equal terms. The United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is also consistent with other content 
Berlin identifies as part of recognition – union, closer understanding, integration of interests, a 
life of common dependence and common sacrifice, particularly concentrating on the 
Declaration’s preamble. 
I wish to emphasize here that in adopting Berlin’s theoretical framework, I am contemplating 
Crown/Aboriginal relations within the construct of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the 
predominantly Western liberal philosophical precepts that have largely informed its evolution. 
There are more considered theoretical avenues that effectively challenge the restrictive paradigm 
of sequestering an indigenous/settler state relationship to the narratives of the settler-state. Those 
avenues are beyond the present scope, given that I am attempting to identify a particular vacuum 
in Crown obligations specific to First Nation exclusion in emergency management off reserve 
that even the most conservative reading of Aboriginal constitutional rights could serve to 
ameliorate. 
As Berlin warns, no amount of ‘negative’ freedom can compensate for a lack of ‘social 
freedom’, or recognition, and in fact the paternalism implicit in benignly repressing a people ‘for 
their own good’ is despotic. Crown actions that operate to censure First Nation self-
                                                 
472 Berlin, ibid. 
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determination goals mark Canada’s ongoing advancement of its own ‘positive liberty’ relative to 
Canada’s relationship with First Nations and their territories. As such, couched in Borrows’ 
observation that “Aboriginal peoples persistently protest the Crown's approach to Aboriginal and 
treaty rights and yet the Crown often responds as if it does not have legal obligations to 
Aboriginal peoples”473 lies the more disturbing reality that contrary to ‘reconciling’ with First 
Nations, the Crown insidiously continues a legacy of oppression.  
I do not wish to be read as professing that the negative liberties inherent in Aboriginal rights 
discourse in Canada, and the concurrent Crown obligations they demand, are not important, or 
even essential. Nor am I suggesting that equality of social and economic opportunity are 
dispensable components of constitutional Aboriginal rights.  In fact, much more could and 
should be done in Canada with respect to affirmative action strategies aimed at both the 
individual and community level to address disparity in social and economic opportunity. What I 
am suggesting, echoing Berlin, is that limiting constitutional Aboriginal rights discourse, 
particularly where ‘obligations’ are concerned, to a ‘negative rights’ goal ultimately results in 
further repression of Aboriginal peoples’ ‘recognition rights’. That repression is not only 
‘dishonourable’, but it deters reconciliation and at its worst perpetuates despotic paternalism and 
other forms of oppression. 
Hoehn is hopeful that Haida marked a change in the jurisprudential and thus legal landscape 
that informs Aboriginal constitutional rights. He states: 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests) has now recognized prior Aboriginal sovereignty over territories on this 
continent. At the same time, the Court has acknowledged that Crown assertions of 
sovereignty cannot be recognized as legitimate unless founded on a treaty. This lays 
a solid foundation for a new paradigm of Aboriginal law based on the equality of 
peoples, and it will finally satisfy long-standing calls to abandon a foundation for 
Canadian sovereignty that relies on false beliefs about the superiority of European 
nations.474  
However, in the recent Tsilhqot’in decision, the Supreme Court of Canada diminished the import 
of their prior acknowledgement of Aboriginal sovereignty by emphasising the ‘radical title’ 
vested in the Crown underlying Aboriginal title territory—the common legal concept used to 
                                                 
473 Borrows, Obligations, supra note 366 at 206-7. 
474 Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 151. 
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delineate First Nation interest in their unsurrendered, unceded ancestral territories. The ‘negative 
liberties’ approach prevailed and the title right is measured in accordance to an application of 
court-adduced ‘Aboriginality’ to the land and water in question with a well-defined justification 
measure to, in Berlin’s words, ‘identify the frontiers of non-interference’. 
A potentially overlooked consequence of framing First Nation rights according to ‘negative 
liberties’ to the exclusion of First Nation ‘recognition rights’ is that First Nation interests become 
increasingly characterized in accordance to Western legal and philosophical concepts. The 
individual negative liberties philosophy underlying Aboriginal rights jurisprudence the Courts 
have used to date forces First Nations to reframe and thus distort their claims in order to advance 
the ‘right’ in question within the prescribed precedential format - as negative liberties. In this 
way, the goal of recognition implicit in the idea of First Nation ‘recognition rights’ is fettered 
and the consequence for the First Nation perspective that informed the assertion of the right can 
be ‘death by a thousand cuts’. 
For example, the progression of the doctrine of Aboriginal title in the Courts has proven 
increasingly reflective of rights akin to fee simple475, which (ironically) was born of ‘the great 
legal fiction’ that William the Conqueror owned all of England, and owned it personally, after 
the Norman conquest of Anglo Saxon England in 1062. Fee simple is the largest bundle of rights 
available to a fee holder as against the Crown, who has retained underlying title to real property 
under British common law these thousand years.  Those who are unfamiliar with the particular 
legal nuances characterising the decades-long struggles for recognition of Aboriginal title in the 
courts might understandably be surprised to hear that Aboriginal title in the celebrated 
Tsilhqot’in context means “it cannot be alienated except to the Crown”476 given that “[a]t the 
time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all 
the land in the province”. Eyebrows might arch further to hear that the oft-touted ‘sui generis’ 
nature of ‘Aboriginal title’ stemming from the ‘Crown’s special relationship with Aboriginal 
                                                 
475 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 73 (“Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with 
fee simple, including: the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the 
land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and 
manage the land” [emphasis added]) contra Delgamuukw, supra note 342 at para 190 (stating Aboriginal title “is not 
equated with fee simple ownership; nor can it be described with reference to traditional property law concepts”, as 
cited in Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 72).  
476 Tsilhqot’in, ibid. at 74.   
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peoples’ is in fact delineated from understanding “[t]he Aboriginal interest in land” as a “burden 
[on] the Crown’s underlying title”.477 Finally, eyes might blink in surprise to know that really 
nothing of Aboriginal peoples informs the concept of Aboriginal title at all – ‘it is what it is’, a 
new type of tenure necessary because of ‘the special relationship of the Crown with Aboriginal 
peoples’ but wholly, and exclusively, informed by the legal traditions and philosophies of the 
settler state. 
While inarguably an enormous stride for Aboriginal rights (particularly when framed as 
negative liberties), Tsilhqot’in potentially takes us further away from recognition of Indigenous 
legal systems and philosophies that inform First Nation property constructs and further away 
from the sovereign aspirations that often inform Aboriginal title conflicts in the first place.478 By 
constructing Aboriginal title as a ‘negative liberty’, the Court has assured the Crown’s continued 
“right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the government can justify this in the broader public 
interest”.479 As such, Crown certainty is assured in Aboriginal title areas throughout Canada 
given that, as Slattery put it, “[g]eneric rights are not only uniform in character, they are also 
universal in distribution. They make up a set of fundamental rights presumptively held by all 
Aboriginal groups in Canada…”480 It follows that the Supreme Court of Canada has, while 
constructing and advancing an Aboriginal negative right, also entrenched a legal mechanism 
securing the Crown’s positive liberty to continue to encroach on the Aboriginal ‘recognition 
rights’ (to define and govern their territories in accordance to respective Indigenous legal 
traditions and philosophies), wherever and whenever title might be proven or claimed. In 
contrast to Hoehn’s hope that Haida sparked “a new paradigm of aboriginal law based on the 
equality of peoples”,481 Aboriginal title arguably is not recognition of Aboriginal sovereignty. 
Rather, it is another, albeit more obsequious, paternalistic legal concept that is rooted in 
Canada’s asserted positive liberty over the lives and territories of First Nation peoples. 
                                                 
477 Ibid. at para 69.  
478 See also Christie, “Indigeneity and Sovereignty”, supra note 369 (Sovereign aspirations may be a misnomer 
appreciating Gordon Christie’s challenge to Eurocentric monopolization of relations to territory and governance as 
‘sovereignty’. Christie argues that there are indigenous understandings of territorial based relations that are as 
legitimate as the sovereignty model, though underrepresented).  
479 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 71.   
480 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376 at 123 [emphasis in original]. 
481 Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 151.  
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Further, as Gordon Christie instructs, the idea of sovereignty itself is an imported Eurocentric 
concept that tends to monopolize all conversations and resistance to Crown dominance.482 
However, as Christie notes, the fact of indigeneity makes alternative narratives and ways of 
understanding a relationship to territory and each other possible. Christie rhetorically queries 
“[a]re there really no other sensible ways that the sovereign claims of a nation state might be 
challenged?” and then answers: 
…there are indeed sensible challenges but that their sensibility emanates from a 
very different vantage point. From this point, analysis is positioned so we can 
clearly see that the sovereignty model is but one way of making sense of how people 
can think of themselves in relation to one another and to land. That this vantage 
point can be reached only by way of the terrain of Indigeneity validates these sorts 
of challenges. It is the very fact of the Indigeneity of the Inuit—of their status as 
separate meaning-generating communities, living within other larger narrative 
structures they create—that makes this sort of resistance both possible and 
appropriate.483 
Appreciating Christie’s portrayal of the complexities inherent to competing sovereignties, 
particularly given ‘sovereignty’ is “but one way of making sense of how people can think of 
themselves in relation to one another and to land”484 accentuates the enormous shortcomings of 
currently favoured constitutional processes. These processes are overwhelmingly entrenched in a 
negative liberties interpretation of Aboriginal rights. 
Understanding the theoretical framework that informs contemporary engagement with 
Aboriginal constitutional rights assists in identifying the root of the ‘obligation gap’ pervasive in 
the Crown’s relationship to First Nations. Whether speaking of a lack of implementation of hard-
won ‘negative liberties’, the implicit denial of Aboriginal sovereignties, the quagmire of 
abandoned, stalled or failed treaty negotiations, the ongoing paternalistic and oppressive legacy 
of the Indian Act governance regime, or the lack of implementation of existing treaties, impact-
benefit agreements and interim measures, the ‘obligation gap’ grievances (to name a few) are 
profound. It is well beyond the scope of this project to attempt to consider in depth the vast body 
of tensions frustrating reconciliation (and much has already been done by the Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples). Yet, what many instances of the ‘obligation gap’ prima facie have in 
common is that they are rooted in the same precept that regards Aboriginal constitutional status 
                                                 
482 Christie, “Indigeneity and Sovereignty”, supra note 369 at 339. 
483 Ibid. at 339-40.  
484 Ibid. 
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as yet another mere expression of negative freedom from the state, where the Crown qualifies its 
relationship with Aboriginal peoples in terms of a ‘shifting frontier’ of non-interference. 
Recognition, reciprocity, and reconciliation are challenging ideals to merge within a framework 
that defines relationships as obstructions. 
Echoing Berlin, the body of work my profession excels in extolling “spring from, and thrive 
on, discord”.485 He writes “[w]here ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means, 
and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of being settled by experts or 
machines like arguments between engineers or doctors”.486 So it is, if the content of s. 35 rested 
on accord, emphasis could shift to the important area of implementation which would reflect, 
rather than define, the illusive prospect of ‘reconciliation’. 
Accord, however, does not necessarily mean ascription to the same goals or objectives. In a 
bid for pluralism, Berlin reassures us that: 
…human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry 
with one another. To assume that all values can be graded on one scale, or that it is 
a mere matter of inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our 
knowledge that men are free agents, to represent moral decision as an operation 
which a slide-rule could, in principle, perform… In the end, men choose between 
ultimate values; they choose as they do, because their life and thought are 
determined by fundamental moral categories and concepts that are, at any rate 
over large stretches of time and space, a part of their being and thought and sense 
of their own identity; part of what makes them human.487 
Perhaps those of us that hail from the settler state contribute to reconciliation by careful 
reconsideration of what it is that constitutes our own identity, by vigilance in assessing and 
reassessing our own moral categories and concepts, particularly those that purport to justify 
continued unilateral assertion of Crown sovereignty. Surely the honour of the Crown is nothing 
less than those virtues that define our own thought and sense of what makes us human. As Sákéj 
Henderson advises, we must build a post-colonial world where caring and love supersedes 
everything.488 
                                                 
485 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 118.  
486 Ibid.  
487 Ibid. at 171-2. 
488 James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN 
Recognition, (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2008) at 102 (“To unfold Canada’s future – indeed, the global future – 
we have to care enough to reimagine and remake it into an extraordinary postcolonial nation. To create a just 
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Irrespective of any individuals’, or groups’, favoured philosophical treatment of Aboriginal 
rights and reconciliation, whether as a manifestation of liberal pluralism or within the 
philosophical and legal realms of indigeneity, Berlin advises careful consideration of the 
philosophy that informs political relations. He writes “…when ideas are neglected by those who 
ought to attend to them—that is to say, those who have been trained to think critically about 
ideas—they sometimes acquire an unchecked momentum and an irresistible power over 
multitudes of men that my grow too violent to be affected by rational criticism”. Berlin believed 
that: 
…political theory is a branch of moral philosophy, which starts from the discovery, 
or application, of moral notions in the sphere of political relations…to understand 
such movements or conflicts is, above all, to understand the ideas or attitudes to life 
involved in them, which alone make such movements a part of human history, and 
not mere natural events. Political words and notions and acts are not intelligible 
save in the context of the issues that divide the men who use them. Consequently 
our own attitudes and activities are likely to remain obscure to us, unless we 
understand the dominant issues of our own world.489 
Adopting Berlin’s premise we find that there is a pragmatic reason to better engage First Nations 
in the management of emergencies within their traditional territories. We must invariably 
conclude that the ‘obligation gap’ is morally repugnant, despotic in fact, whether in the 
governance and delivery of health, education, or emergency management services (to name a 
few), and will continue to frustrate reconciliation. 
Experience to date demonstrates that understanding Aboriginal rights restrictively as 
‘negative liberties’ held by Aboriginal peoples as against the Crown bypasses, to the immense 
convenience of the settler state, the fundamental problem of realizing First Nation self-
determination490 within a constitutional framework that: (1) denies legislative capacity to any 
                                                 
society, truth has to prevail over dogma, creativity over impossibility, constitutionalism over domination, hope over 
experience, prophecy over habit, kindness over the impersonal, place over time, solidarity over individualism, 
serenity over vulnerability, and caring and love over everything.”). 
489 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 120-1. 
490 See UNDRIP, supra note 31 at Article 3 (Canada endorsed the Declaration in 2010); but see AANDC, “Canada’s 
Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” online: AANDC 
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142> (In Canada’s statement of support, particular 
reference is made to Canada’s arguably ‘narrow’ view as to the implications of UNDRIP domestically: “Although 
the Declaration is a non-legally binding document that does not reflect customary international law nor change 
Canadian laws, our endorsement gives us the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to continue working in 
partnership with Aboriginal peoples in creating a better Canada.” [Emphasis added]. In essence, Canada equates its 
endorsement of UNDRIP as a vague commitment to ‘continue working in partnership with Aboriginal peoples…’).  
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institution but the Crown legislatures;491 (2) exhaustively divides jurisdictional capacity and 
fiscal authority exclusively within the Crown; and (3) limits judicial authority over the issue of 
the constitutionality of the Crown’s behaviour to the Crown itself. 
Arguably, achieving ‘reconciliation’ involves both Hoehn’s conception of ‘sharing 
sovereignties’492 and an understanding of that other hybrid type corollary of liberty framed here 
as ‘recognition rights’. In the context of settler-state/Indigenous relationships, these could be 
understood through engagement with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. ‘Sharing sovereignties’ with its corollary requirement of ‘recognition’ 
would shift constitutional dialogues from adversarial disputes over non-interference to 
conversations of collaboration particularly lacking (and particularly impacting) in the areas of 
First Nation legislative authority, First Nation fiscal equalization and First Nation adjudication. 
I have argued that reconciliation (understood as reconciling Crown and Aboriginal 
sovereignty) is continually frustrated by the philosophical precepts underscoring s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights jurisprudence. Using the work of Isaiah Berlin, I have posited that the predominance of a 
liberal philosophical bias held by the courts in framing s. 35 Aboriginal rights, has the effect of 
largely limiting Canada’s constitutional relationship to First Nations to a fluid frontier of non-
interference by a superintending Crown. I have further argued that the ‘obligation gap’ 
materialises from the same theoretical root that frustrates reconciliation between Canada and 
First Nations. Jurisprudential philosophical bias that limits s. 35 interpretation to repeatedly 
defining the scope and frontier of that fluid area of non-interference arguably diverts 
theoretically, politically and pragmatically from appeals for recognition, interaction, 
collaboration, reciprocity and contribution. 
 
 
                                                 
491 Guy Règimbald and Dwight Newman, The Law of the Canadian Constitution (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 
2013) at 11, para 1.27 [Régimbald and Newman, Constitution] (“Parliament enjoys the power to legislate, and no 
legislation may be made except by Parliament or a provincial legislature” at para 1.27); and see Reference re: 
Initiative and Referendum Act (Man), [1919] AC 935 (PC) [as cited in Régimbald and Newman].  
492 Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 155 (“Negotiation also allows the parties the greatest 
flexibility for finding the means for sharing sovereignty, land, and resources. This may include allowing the 
“original” title to an Aboriginal nation’s territory to remain with the nation or crafting terms on which this title may 
be shared with the Crown.”). 
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3.4. THE THEORETICAL IMPACT OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND CROWN OBLIGATIONS ON  
        EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The next section explores the field of Aboriginal rights of particular interest in emergency 
management. It applies first the theoretical lens of negative liberties to flesh out some of the 
barriers to effective First Nation participation in off-reserve emergency management that could 
be correctable by a mere commitment to implement existing Aboriginal rights within the current 
emergency management framework. It then considers a deeper realm of corrective measures that 
require a theoretical shift in jurisprudence toward the ‘gray nether’ of a ‘recognition’ 
interpretation of s. 35 Aboriginal rights. 
3.4.1 ‘NEGATIVE’ ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Applying both Slattery’s taxonomy of generic and specific rights and Borrows’ reciprocal 
conception of Crown obligations, emergency management activities can be organized in 
accordance to the Aboriginal ‘generic’ and ‘specific’ rights held by First Nations who may be 
impacted by a given emergency, and to the concomitant obligations held by the Crown in 
relation to those rights.493 As outlined above, emergency management is typically organized into 
four distinct policy areas: mitigation, planning/preparation, response and recovery. Aboriginal 
rights and title are impacted in all four phases. 
3.4.1.1 THE IMPACT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE ON CROWN JURISDICTIONS494 
A full 41 years after the Supreme Court of Canada alerted Canadians that “Aboriginal land 
rights survived European settlement and remain valid to the present unless extinguished by treaty 
                                                 
493 Slattery, Taxonomy, supra note 376; Borrows, Obligations, supra note 366. 
494 I again wish to acknowledge that the presentation of the arguments in this thesis constitute a largely ‘one-sided’ 
and Western based perspective of concepts relied on throughout. However, I am indeed continuously troubled by the 
apparent departure that can occur between First Nation and Crown specific understandings of the legal concepts 
flouted in s. 35 (1) dialogues. For example, there may be a remarkable expanse between Crown servants and First 
Nation leaders on the meaning of a term like ‘Aboriginal title’. Those operating from within the confines of Crown 
driven jurisprudence recognize that Aboriginal title has a specific legal meaning as a particular sort of legal right 
that is constrained by Canada’s constitution, Canadian and general common law jurisprudence and western notions 
of the philosophy of law. First Nations operating from within their own legal systems and philosophies may well 
ascribe a meaning to the term much more akin to ‘sovereignty’ than to the jurisprudential guidance on the nature of 
‘Aboriginal title’. While I have approached this thesis largely within the constraints of Canadian legal doctrine, I 
acknowledge such does not necessarily reflect a balanced (reconciled) perspective of what Aboriginal title is or how 
(or which) First Nation interests should be served by Aboriginal title claims in their territories. 
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or otherwise”,495 and 17 years after the same Court articulated the test for Aboriginal title,496 the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation proved its own claim for Aboriginal title to the satisfaction of Canada’s 
highest court and in the process facilitated greater clarity in the law as to what Aboriginal title is 
and the rights it conveys.497 The Chief Justice summarized: 
 Aboriginal title confers the right to use and control the land and to reap the 
benefits flowing from it.  
[…] 
 Once Aboriginal title is established, s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 permits 
incursions on it only with the consent of the Aboriginal group or if they are 
justified by a compelling and substantial public purpose and are not inconsistent 
with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the Aboriginal group; for purposes of 
determining the validity of provincial legislative incursions on lands held under 
Aboriginal title, this framework displaces the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity.498 
The Supreme Court of Canada’s clarification on the law of Aboriginal title, examination of the 
impact of claims to Aboriginal title on the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate, as well as 
the Court’s finding that in Tsilhqot’in “the Province’s land use planning and forestry 
authorizations were inconsistent with its duties owed to the Tsilhqot’in people”499 warrants 
caution in considering the implications of Aboriginal title, and claims to Aboriginal title, on 
emergency management law. 
Notably, in Tsilhqot’in the Chief Justice dismissed the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 
approach of applying a narrow ‘site-specific occupation’ test for Aboriginal title.500 She stated in 
justifying the Court’s rejection of the site-specific occupation test that: “the Court of Appeal’s 
approach results in small islands of title surrounded by larger territories where the group 
possesses only Aboriginal rights to engage in activities like hunting and trapping”.501 Ironically, 
that description effectively summarizes the current jurisdictional constraints many First Nations 
are forced to cope with under the current emergency management regime where their only de 
                                                 
495 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 citing Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313.  
496 Delgamuukw, supra note 342. 
497 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217. 
498 Ibid. at para 2. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid. at para 28. 
501 Ibid. at para 29. 
125 
 
facto ‘islands of authority’ vests in limited emergency management decision-making over on-
reserve matters, as outlined in the first part of this thesis. 
In summarizing the test for Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in, Chief Justice McLachlin states: 
The claimant group bears the onus of establishing Aboriginal title. The task is to 
identify how pre-sovereignty rights and interests can properly find expression in 
modern common law terms. In asking whether Aboriginal title is established, the 
general requirements are: (1) “sufficient occupation” of the land claimed to 
establish title at the time of assertion of European sovereignty; (2) continuity of 
occupation where present occupation is relied on; and (3) exclusive historic 
occupation. In determining what constitutes sufficient occupation, one looks to the 
Aboriginal culture and practices, and compares them in a culturally sensitive way 
with what was required at common law to establish title on the basis of occupation. 
Occupation sufficient to ground Aboriginal title is not confined to specific sites of 
settlement but extends to tracts of land that were regularly used for hunting, fishing 
or otherwise exploiting resources and over which the group exercised effective 
control at the time of assertion of European sovereignty.502 
 When one considers the overarching task of “identifying how pre-sovereignty rights and 
interests can properly find expression in modern common law terms” in the course of 
establishing Aboriginal title, it follows that an important task in evaluating the degree of 
legislated infringement on claimed Aboriginal title lands is to identify how (and whether) that 
legislation properly, and effectively, reflects modern Aboriginal rights and interests. 
The Chief Justice of Canada clarifies the legal nature of Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in.503 She 
begins with a summary of Justice Dickson’s concurring judgement in Guerin v The Queen,504 
stating: 
At the time of assertion of European sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or 
underlying title to all the land in the province. This Crown title, however, was 
burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who occupied and 
used the land prior to European arrival. The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one 
owned the land prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in 
Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation (1763), R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 1. The Aboriginal interest in land that burdens the Crown’s underlying title 
is an independent legal interest, which gives rise to a fiduciary duty on the part 
of the Crown.505 
                                                 
502 Ibid. at para 50. 
503 Ibid. at paras 69-72. 
504 Guerin v The Queen, [1984] 2 SCR 334 at 379-82 [Guerin]. 
505 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 69. 
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The Chief Justice continues with a summary of the Court’s findings on the legal nature of 
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw, explaining: 
…Aboriginal title gives “the right to exclusive use and occupation of the land…for 
a variety of purposes”, not confined to traditional or “distinctive” uses (para. 117). 
In other words, Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the land: Guerin, at p. 382. 
In simple terms, the title holders have the right to the benefits associated with the 
land – to use it, enjoy it and profit from its economic development. As such, the 
Crown does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal title land.506  
The Chief Justice then explains that all that remains of the Crown’s radical or underlying title to 
lands held under Aboriginal title is (1) “a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown to Aboriginal people 
when dealing with Aboriginal lands”; and (2) “the right to encroach on Aboriginal title if the 
government can justify this in the broader public interest under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982”.507 
The Chief Justice concludes on behalf of the Court (in a rather ambiguous statement 
somewhat typical of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence) that “Aboriginal title is what it is – the 
unique product of the historic relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group in 
question”.508 This statement, of course, building upon the idea first espoused in Van der Peet and 
later emphasised in Delgamuukw that the Crown’s underlying interest in Aboriginal title lands is 
a “process of reconciling Aboriginal interests with the broader public interests under s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982”.509 
                                                 
506 Ibid. at para 70 citing Delgamuukw, supra note 342 at para 117, and citing Guerin, supra note 504 at 382. 
507 Tsilhqot’in, ibid. at para 71 [emphasis added];and see Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20 at s 109  (“All Lands, 
Mines, Minerals, and Royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick at 
the Union, and all Sums then due or payable for such Lands, Mines, Minerals, or Royalties, shall belong to the 
several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, 
subject to any Trusts existing in respect thereof, and to any Interest other than that of the  Province in the same” 
[emphasis added]). 
508 Tsilhqot’in, ibid. at para 72. 
509 Ibid. at para 71, [emphasis added]; and see Delgamuukw, supra note 342 at 81-2 (“The justification for this 
special approach can be found in the nature of aboriginal rights themselves. I explained in Van der Peet that those 
rights are aimed at the reconciliation of the prior occupation of North America by distinctive aboriginal societies 
with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory. They attempt to achieve that reconciliation by 
“their bridging of aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultures” (at para. 42). Accordingly, “a court must take into account 
the perspective of the aboriginal people claiming the right. . . . while at the same time taking into account the 
perspective of the common law” such that “[t]rue reconciliation will, equally, place weight on each” (at paras. 49 
and 50). In other words, although the doctrine of aboriginal rights is a common law doctrine, aboriginal rights are 
truly sui generis, and demand a unique approach to the treatment of evidence which accords due weight to the 
perspective of aboriginal peoples. However, that accommodation must be done in a manner which does not strain 
“the Canadian legal and constitutional structure” (at para. 49)); and see Van der Peet, supra note 113 at paras 42, 49, 
50. 
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A successful Aboriginal title claim may certainly impact the management of emergencies in 
First Nation territories. However, it bears noting that Crown emergency management or aspects 
of it may meet the threshold to justify infringement of Aboriginal title according to 
Tsilhqot’in.510 In fact, arguably few other potential areas would so neatly fit within the judicially 
derived justification criteria: certainly saving lives and homes in an emergency could be 
constructed as a “compelling and substantial purpose” and could account for the priority of the 
infringed Aboriginal interest under the fiduciary obligation imposed on the Crown.511 Again 
however emergency management involves a spectrum. For example, planning, mitigation, 
response and recovery and what might be regarded as ‘justifiable infringement’ during the 
response phase might not amount to precedent for justifiable infringement during the planning 
phase. As such, any evolving jurisprudence testing the boundaries of the ‘islands of non-
interference’ in emergency management would at this stage be fluid at best. More analysis will 
be required in the time to come as the particular ‘specific rights’ aspects of the ‘generic 
Aboriginal title right’ plays out in the jurisprudence and beyond. 
As previously noted, generally speaking, in the Province of British Columbia, most (if not 
all) First Nations’ reserves encompass only a very fractional percentage of said Nations’ 
traditional territories.512 Certainly where the decision-making in question pertains to priorities in 
emergency planning, mitigation, response and recovery, Nations have a much broader and 
intensive interest in emergency management within their traditional territories than the current 
Crown driven regime allows for. Just as said ‘islands of title’ are incongruent to Aboriginal title, 
the current regime that results in ‘islands of authority’ over emergency management are 
incongruent to honourable recognition of Aboriginal rights and title generally. 
Non-interference (or a ‘negative rights’ theoretical premise) logically results in precluding 
the exercise of Aboriginal rights except where a First Nation has ‘won’ a ‘positive rights’ 
struggle.  In the example of Aboriginal title, a conflict could arise where a given First Nation has 
exercised a ‘positive right’ in developing comprehensive land and/or marine management plans 
                                                 
510 Tsilhqot’in, ibid. at paras 77-88.  
511 Ibid. at para 77 (“To justify overriding the Aboriginal title-holding group’s wishes on the basis of the broader 
public good, the government must show: (1) that it discharged its procedural duty to consult and accommodate; (2) 
that its actions were backed by a compelling and substantial objective; and (3) that the governmental action is 
consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the group”).  
512 See e.g. BCStats Map, supra note 227 (pdf link to “45 Central Coast”) (Figure 2 on page 55 of this thesis). 
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that exclusively prioritizes the values and interests of that particular First Nation. Where Canada 
and British Columbia likewise continue to assert their own ‘positive rights’ to manage the same 
land and/or marine areas, whether in the more restrictive sense of managing for disasters or the 
more broad sense of general land and/or marine use priorities that meet the standard of “a 
compelling and substantial public purpose and are not inconsistent with the Crown’s fiduciary 
duty to the Aboriginal group”,513 implementation of a given First Nation’s ‘preferred method of 
enjoying the right [of Aboriginal title]’ by way of implementation of their own land and/or 
marine use plans could be frustrated, particularly where the Crown disagrees as to where the 
correct ‘boundary of non-interference’ lies. Arguably, the ‘justifiable infringement test’ specific 
to Aboriginal title solidified in Tsilhqot’in,514 will challenge First Nations seeking to uphold their 
land and marine management regimes in ever encroaching ‘constitutionally justified 
paramountcy over Aboriginal rights’.515 In a sense, by applying the reflections of Berlin to flesh 
out the undercurrents of the existing tensions we can currently understand the evolving 
Aboriginal title conversation as a conflict of Berlin’s ‘positive rights’, where Canada continues 
to exercise the Crown’s version of its own positive rights over First Nation’s territories and seeks 
to resolve conflict by ascribing ‘islands of non-interference’ (‘negative’ land rights through 
Aboriginal title) to restrictively enable First Nations a limited exercise of their own positive 
rights. 
From such a philosophical vantage point, we can further see that the modern treaties 
treatment of emergency management presents as a good example of how this winds up looking 
on the ground in an issue specific contest over management of a particular aspect of the broader 
‘generic right’ of a treaty land-based right. Where there is no impediment of the Crown’s 
exercise of its positive rights, and some autonomy is agreed to for emergency management 
                                                 
513 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 2.  
514 Ibid. at paras 77-88. 
515 Where the infringement test is characterised as resolving paramountcy conflicts, as takes place in division of 
powers disputes. An interesting analysis might be to consider whether the Tsilhqot’in expression of the 
‘infringement test’ is more in-line with a ‘watertight’ compartments view of federalism (see e.g. Canada (AG) v 
Ontario (AG) [1937] UKPC 6, [1937] AC 326 and see Quebec (AG) v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 14 at para 146 
“According to the “classical” approach favoured by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council until 1949, the 
heads of power constituted “watertight compartments”, and overlaps between them were to be avoided to the full 
extent possible”) or with more modern views of federalism that take a more flexible approach (see e.g. Quebec (AG) 
v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 14 at para 147 “This conception “recognizes that in practice there is significant overlap 
between the federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction, and provides that both governments should be permitted to 
legislate for their own valid purposes in these areas of overlap” [references omitted]).  
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purposes, islands of non-interference result with the frontiers negotiated and renegotiated in 
accordance to when Crown and First Nation powers come into conflict at the boundaries. For 
example, emergency response planning that is allocated by agreement restrictively to a particular 
First Nation and specific to that First Nation’s treaty area and financed through a fiscal scheme 
also mutually ascribed to, we have in effect drawn and implemented an effective ‘island of non-
interference’. Where there is the potential for both a First Nation and Crown exercise of ‘positive 
rights’ to come into conflict, (say) in the exercise of declaring and acting on a ‘local state of 
emergency’, the modern treaty First Nations are statutorily constructed as ‘local authorities’ 
across the board, with decision-making authorities constructively subservient to those of the 
Crown (as outlined above).516 Again, through the philosophical lens Berlin offers, the Crown’s 
positive rights prevail, irrespective of the affront on the exercise of First Nations’ own positive 
rights. Depending on the circumstances, the positive rights contest may or may not be 
problematic. This thesis is concerned with the outcomes of such contests that result in avoidable 
harm to First Nations. In this example, the Crown exercise of positive rights operates to the 
diminishment of First Nations’ own positive rights. Where that exercise of the Crown’s unilateral 
positive rights results in avoidable harm to a given First Nation, weaknesses in the islands of 
non-interference approach to First Nations’ governance scope become apparent. 
Statutory guidance acknowledging First Nation section 35 Aboriginal rights that embraced a 
‘recognition rights’ approach to First Nations governance roles in emergency management would 
help to ameliorate the harms that can result in the gap between an ‘islands of non-interference’ 
approach and an overt ‘positive rights’ contest approach. In this sense, ‘recognition rights’ fit 
nicely within the guidance Slattery offers, who also characterises Aboriginal rights in partial 
accordance to ‘recognition’. Slattery however frames his argument primarily though a broad 
historical and jurisprudential review of the “Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title’ wherein he 
argues in particular for a sui generis, generative interpretation of Aboriginal title incorporating 
                                                 
516 See e.g. Maa-Nulth Final Agreement, supra note 352 at ss 13.26.3, 13.26.4, 13.26.5 (“13.26.3 Federal Law or 
Provincial Law prevails to the extent of a Conflict with Maa-nulth First Nation Law under 13.26.1”; “13.26.4 
…each Maa-nulth First Nation Government may … exercise the powers of a local authority in respect of local 
emergencies in accordance with Federal Law and Provincial Law …but any declaration and any exercise of power 
is subject to the authority of Canada and British Columbia under Federal Law and Provincial Law” [emphasis 
added]; “13.26.5 Nothing in this Agreement affects the authority of: a. Canada to declare a national emergency; or b. 
British Columbia to declare a provincial emergency, in accordance with Federal Law or Provincial Law”).  
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the ‘Principles of Recognition’ and the ‘Principles of Reconciliation’.517 Slattery’s analysis is 
useful to my argument in other respects. In particular, he concludes that “…section [35] 
recognizes a body of generative rights, which bind the crown to take positive steps to identify 
aboriginal rights in contemporary form, with the participation and consent of the Indigenous 
peoples concerned”.518 Slattery’s interpretation of Aboriginal rights as generative rights binding 
the Crown to take ‘positive steps’ echoes the positive aspects of Aboriginal rights as ‘recognition 
rights’ distinct from ‘negative rights’ or non-interference rights approach. 
Slattery’s piece helps to round out an interpretation of Aboriginal rights as ‘recognition 
rights’ as he reasons that there exists a direct (and necessary) role for Indigenous peoples 
themselves in framing the content of Aboriginal rights understood as generative rights,519 
echoing the Supreme Court that “Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the usual sense. 
Rather, it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982”.520 Once again, Aboriginal rights philosophically framed as ‘recognition rights’, or 
Aboriginal (title) rights as generative rights informed by the Principles of Recognition and the 
Principles of Reconciliation,521 mirror the content of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.522 Aboriginal rights understood as recognition rights thus include 
all of: traditional negative freedoms, positive freedoms on the part of a given Aboriginal People 
(in the context of this thesis, a given First Nation), positive obligations on the part of the Crown 
                                                 
517 Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 367.  
518 Ibid. at 286.  
519 Ibid. at 281-2 (“As seen earlier, Principles of Recognition govern the nature and scope of aboriginal title at the 
time of Crown sovereignty — what we have called historical title. This title provides the point of departure for any 
modern inquiry and a benchmark for assessing the actions of colonial governments and the scope of Indigenous 
dispossession. By contrast, Principles of Reconciliation govern the legal effects of aboriginal title in modern times. 
They take as their starting point the historical title of the Indigenous group, as determined by Principles of 
Recognition, but they also take into account a range of other factors, such as the subsequent history of the lands in 
question, the Indigenous group’s contemporary interests, and the interests of third parties and the larger society. So 
doing, they posit that historical aboriginal title has been transformed into a generative right, which can be partially 
implemented by the courts but whose full implementation requires the negotiation of modern treaties.”). 
520 Ibid. at 286 [emphasis in original] citing Haida, supra note 208 at para 32.  
521 But see Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, ibid. at 282 (where he argues that Aboriginal title requires both an 
incorporation of the Principles of Recognition and the Principles of Reconciliation: “Unless we distinguish between 
these two sets of principles, we may fall into the trap of assuming that historical aboriginal title gives rise 
automatically to modern title, without regard to its broader social impact. Such an assumption fosters two judicial 
tendencies. The courts may be led to construe historical aboriginal title in an artificially restrictive way, in the effort 
to minimize conflicts with modern societal and third party interests. Alternately, an expansive view may be taken of 
the processes whereby historical title is extinguished, whether by Crown action or the passage of time. These 
tendencies, if left to operate unchecked, will diminish the possibility of reconciliation ever occurring.”). 
522 UNDRIP, supra note 31. 
131 
 
and an indispensable Indigenous voice setting out the appropriate degree of Indigenous agency 
necessary to effect reconciliation (shared or mutual governance).523 
Brian Slattery evokes both his taxonomy concept of specific and generic rights as well as his 
generative approach to Aboriginal rights as informed by the ‘Principles of Recognition’ and the 
‘Principles of Reconciliation’ in his article “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights”.524 
Again, Slattery’s work is useful toward further drawing out the content of what I call 
‘recognition rights’ in line with the description offered by Berlin of a third sort of freedom that 
lies apart from both ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights. While Slattery limits his use of the term 
‘recognition’ to qualify a judicial goal of “the identification of the central attributes of Aboriginal 
societies in the period before European contact”,525 I attempt to use the term more holistically 
and include not only all of the attributes of Aboriginal societies in the period before European 
contact, but those of today which collectively would inform the content of the right of self-
determination. I argue that the term recognition serves equally well in each usage. 
In fact, my proposition speaks directly to the shortcomings that Slattery identifies in Justice 
Lamer’s reasoning in the Van der Peet test where he explains that Justice Lamer: 
does not take into account the historical modes of reconciliation that occurred when 
the Crown established relations with indigenous peoples, nor does he consider the 
need for new modes of reconciliation today. The result is that Aboriginal rights are 
identified in an almost mechanical manner, without regard to the contemporary 
needs of Aboriginal peoples, the rights and interests of other affected groups, or the 
welfare of the body politic as a whole.526 
Berlin’s third category of rights (what I have called ‘recognition rights’) between ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ freedoms addresses the shortcomings of the Van der Peet articulation of Aboriginal 
rights that Slattery identifies. As Slattery puts it, the idea of ‘recognition rights’ acknowledges 
that “[t]he desire for recognition is a desire for something different: for union, closer 
understanding, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice”.527 
In short, it seems Berlin, some 50 years before the fact, essentially identified what would become 
the content of both of what Slattery frames as ‘recognition’ and ‘reconciliation’ principles 
                                                 
523 And see Chartrand, Constitutional Legitimacy, supra note 115.  
524 Slattery, “Generative Rights”, supra note 383.  
525 Ibid. at 597. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 158. 
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(summarizing his interpretation of leading aboriginal rights jurisprudence) within Berlin’s own 
articulation of that third broad area of freedoms that contrasts both negative and positive rights. 
Likewise, Slattery’s treatment of the wording of s. 35 fits neatly into Berlin’s broader 
philosophical analysis on rights generally. Slattery states: “[i]n saying that Aboriginal rights are 
“recognized”, the section seems to focus on rights in their original, historically-based forms. The 
word “affirmed” by contrast seems more concerned with the way these rights are to be treated in 
contemporary times—as living rights that serve the modern interests of Aboriginal peoples and 
at the same time promote reconciliation with the larger society”.528 The content of both 
‘recognition’ and ‘affirmation’ from the wording of s. 35 that Slattery identifies fit within 
Berlin’s framing of what I have called ‘recognition rights’ as “something akin to, but not itself, 
freedom; although it entails negative freedom for the entire group [Slattery’s ‘recognized’], it is 
more closely related to solidarity, fraternity, mutual understanding, need for association on equal 
standing”.529 The latter fits with what Slattery suggests are ‘affirmed’—“living rights that serve 
the modern interests of Aboriginal peoples and at the same time promote reconciliation with the 
larger society”.530 
In line with Slattery’s preference to interpret Aboriginal title as ‘sui generis’ (or of their own 
kind),531 Berlin’s struggle to name that nebula between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ rights 
accentuates and philosophically validates the sui generis nature of ‘recognition rights’. In my 
reading of Slattery, both his and my version of Aboriginal rights are neither best understood as 
positive rights nor best understood as negative rights, but something else—something sui 
                                                 
528 Slattery, “Generative Rights”, supra note 383 at 623. 
529 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 158. 
530 Slattery, “Generative Rights”, supra note 383 at 623. 
531 Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 367 at 257 (“only the sui generis approach does justice to the complexities 
of the subject [conceptions of Aboriginal title]”); Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at paras 12, 14, 72 (“The principles 
developed in Calder, Guerin and Sparrow were consolidated and applied in the context of a claim for Aboriginal 
title in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. This Court confirmed the sui generis nature of the 
rights and obligations to which the Crown’s relationship with Aboriginal peoples gives rise, and stated that what 
makes Aboriginal title unique is that it arises from possession before the assertion of British sovereignty, as 
distinguished from other estates such as fee simple that arise afterward. The dual perspectives of the common law 
and of the Aboriginal group bear equal weight in evaluating a claim for Aboriginal title.” (para 14) “The 
characteristics of Aboriginal title flow from the special relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group in 
question. It is this relationship that makes Aboriginal title sui generis or unique. Aboriginal title is what it is — the 
unique product of the historic relationship between the Crown and the Aboriginal group in question.” (para 72)).  
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generis—outside the more dominant tracts of philosophical thought, as Berlin describes the 
nebula (again restated here): 
What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply 
unhampered liberty of action for their members [negative rights], nor, above 
everything, equality of social or economic opportunity [positive obligations (or 
affirmative action) of the Crown], still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, 
organic state devised by the rational lawgiver [rejection of sequestering to the 
passive status as ‘the consulted’ thereby entrenching the exclusive positive rights 
of the Crown]. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition … as an 
independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending 
to act in accordance with it (whether it is good or legitimate, or not), and not to be 
ruled, educated, guided, with however light a hand, as being not quite fully human, 
and therefore not quite fully free.532  
Whether approaching the rights interpretation question from an intensive (and perhaps even 
conservative) historical jurisprudential review as Slattery has, or through the application of 
specific philosophical treatment as I attempt to do in this thesis, we come to the same conclusion. 
An exclusively negative rights approach toward interpreting the scope and content of Aboriginal 
rights fails to reflect their purpose and nature and in turn frustrates reconciliation and all it 
implies. 
Ultimately, I am arguing for a shift in the underlying philosophical approach that seems to be 
informing much judicial thought in Aboriginal rights jurisprudence—that is, I am arguing for a 
fundamental departure from the apparent increasing ascription to a ‘negative rights’ premise in 
framing s. 35 Aboriginal rights. Rather, I am suggesting that approaching Aboriginal rights 
through a ‘recognition rights’ analysis would ultimately better serve the Crown in meeting a 
reconciliation agenda. While the conversation could and likely would continue to involve and as 
such evolve ‘islands of non-interference’ there would also be space and precedent for respectful 
collaboration and even friendship in the administration of jurisdictional areas of mutual concern. 
In the area of emergency management, this could involve both application of current models 
where First Nations exercise areas of absolute autonomy as well as application of a new model 
that seeks to prioritize First Nation agency in all areas of emergency management. Just as other 
                                                 
532 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 156 (“…when I demand to be liberated from, let us say, the status of political 
or social dependence, what I demand is an alteration of the attitude towards me of those whose opinions and 
behaviour help to determine my own image of myself. And what is true of the individual is true of groups, social, 
political, economic, religious, that is of men conscious of needs and purposes which they have as members of such 
groups”). 
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constitutional priorities are afforded statutory recognition in emergency management 
frameworks, the ‘recognition approach’ to respecting constitutional Aboriginal rights in the same 
way would likely necessitate similar statutory acknowledgment. There would thus be tangible 
guidance respecting First Nation inclusion to those exercising what has been traditionally 
supported as exclusively Crown (‘positive rights’) driven functions of state. 
3.4.1.2 THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE DURING EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
A significant challenge in fleshing out the Crown’s duty to consult in emergency 
management lies in identifying definitively who holds the obligation to consult and 
accommodate—a question I contemplate in another context later in this thesis as I attempt to sort 
out who is the Crown when contemplating the ‘obligations of the Crown’. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, in her determinations on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, declared unequivocally: “[w]here title is asserted, but has 
not yet been established, s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 requires the Crown to consult with 
the group asserting title and, if appropriate, accommodate its interests”.533 However, as explored 
briefly in the first part of this thesis, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Neskonlith 
that municipalities (and by extension ‘local authorities’) do not have a duty to consult.534 As 
outlined above, the Neskonlith precedent produces a troubling gap of First Nation exclusion 
given practically any given First Nation’s traditional territories, as well as potential Aboriginal 
title territories, currently lie in the jurisdictional ambit of provincially contrived ‘local 
authorities’ for the purposes of emergency management as a result of British Columbia 
delegating a substantial portion of its emergency management powers to local authorities.535 If it 
is so that local authorities are not under a duty to consult with First Nations, an arguably 
egregious and harmful jurisdictional conflict lies simmering throughout the expanse of British 
Columbia. 
                                                 
533 Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 2. 
534 Neskonlith, supra note 220.  
535 Emergency Program Act, supra note 76; Local Government Act, supra note 140; Environmental Management 
Act, supra note 133; Wildfire Act, supra note 129 (note this legislative list is exemplary, not exhaustive as discussed 
in the first part of this thesis).  
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While a detailed analysis exploring the duty to consult jurisprudence in the context of the 
larger emergency management statutory regime outlined above was outside the scope of this 
thesis, a few additional points have bearing on the analysis at hand. First, a targeted appraisal of 
the federal government’s duty to consult and accommodate in the area of defining the harms that 
in turn informs risk management priorities could be a useful contribution to discussions as to 
whether there is adequate inclusion of First Nation particular interests in especially the recovery 
funding frameworks. As mentioned above, there could be real departures in perceived areas of 
priority respecting particularly recovery and mitigation efforts where there is a lack of agreement 
on what constitutes harm.536 So, where for example, a particular local food fishery might be 
conceived as very low on the list of priority potential harms from a federal Crown perspective, as 
demonstrated in the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (which does not currently fund 
resource recovery but will (say) fund rebuilding a public picnic area)537, the continued integrity 
of that food fishery might be of paramount importance to a given local First Nation who is both 
culturally and pragmatically dependent on that fishery for survival. Analysis as to what 
constitutes sufficient consultation and accommodation on this point could be very useful toward 
clarifying current ambiguities in the framework. For example, analysis of the consultation gap 
and a prescriptive survey at potential solutions might result in some sort of process where (say) 
high level First Nation organizations could consult and inform high level federal funding 
strategies that better prioritise First Nations at an individual emergency management level – 
strategies that could then be considered for opt-in by individual First Nations. Similar approaches 
could potentially be imagined as operating at the Provincial level, or both. Whatever the 
outcomes or preferred approaches by both First Nations and the Crown, the point is—a 
conversation is desperately needed.  More analysis however is required to ascertain the current 
consultation and accommodation requirements and prescriptive approaches in light of the current 
gaps in engagement I have attempted to expose in this thesis. 
                                                 
536 See e.g. James [Sákéj] Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism”, SaskLR 1994 vol 58 at 327-8 
(“Existing federal and provincial laws cannot be perceived as impersonal or neutral public rules, for these are the 
exclusive voice of the colonialists. Treaty First Nations have never formally participated as equals in the 
implementation of these federal laws nor have they consented to them. If they had any role in the legislation, it was 
as lobbyists or influence peddlers. These laws, like most provincial laws, are seen as embodying only the goals and 
values of the colonialists.”). 
537 DFAA Guidelines, supra note 239. 
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Second, what is immediately apparent is that British Columbia Crown servants are basically 
operating without a publicly discernible statutory mandate and direction to consult with First 
Nations during any stage of emergency management – the ultimate sound of silence. In the 
sections that follow, I question whether in addition to the duty to consult, a recognition rights 
approach would help close the gap where First Nations are constructively left out of the current 
statutory emergency management frameworks. 
3.4.2 ‘RECOGNITION’ ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
In the following section, I argue that adopting a ‘recognition rights’ approach inspired by 
Berlin’s categorization of rights and utilizing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples for content, s. 35 Aboriginal rights can be understood as ‘recognition rights’. 
I further suggest that South Africa’s socioeconomic rights could likewise be understood as 
recognition rights. By likening Canada’s Aboriginal recognition rights to South Africa’s 
socioeconomic recognition rights, a range of precedent on the justifiability of South African 
recognition rights becomes relevant for analysis in the Canadian Aboriginal rights context. 
Further, understanding these rights as recognition rights as opposed to positive rights might 
contribute to dispelling potential fears that a judicial enforcement role over elected governments 
would undermine democracy. Rather, I argue that ‘recognition rights’ would ultimately operate 
to serve democratic processes when put it their context of addressing the facts of Canada’s 
colonial history.538 
3.4.2.1. FROM RIGHTS TO RECONCILIATION - WHO IS THE CROWN? 
The Constitution Act, 1867 provides some guidance on who constitutes ‘the Crown’ under 
the constitutional make-up of Canada, as well as the power the Crown holds. “Section 9… 
provides that ‘[t]he Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared 
to continue and be vested in the Queen’.”539 Of course, conflicting theoretical perspectives could 
debate just whom the Crown is when used in the context of Aboriginal rights. Pragmatic 
                                                 
538 See Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 367 (for an account of Canada’s colonial history with First Nations 
leading to another similar interpretation of Aboriginal rights as recognition rights); and see Hoehn, Reconciling 
Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 73-75. 
539 Régimbald and Newman, Constitution, supra note 491 at 9 para 1.19; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20 at s. 
9. 
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guidance may be found in Canada’s oldest high court case deliberating the issue of First Nation 
land ownership. The Privy Council instructed in St Catherine’s Milling (1888) that: 
[i]n construing these enactments [BNA Acts 1840 & 1867], it must always be kept 
in view that, wherever public land with its incidents is described as “the property 
of” or as “belonging to” the Dominion or a province, these expressions merely 
import that the right to its beneficial use, or to its proceeds, has been appropriated 
to the Dominion or the Province, as the case may be, and is subject to the control 
of its Legislature, the land itself being vested in the Crown.540 
The Crown, as such, could be understood as a figurative symbol without any independent power 
to govern over the land base to which its “radical title” is vested.541 That governance is spread 
between the legislative, executive and judicial arms of the Crown in right of Canada respectively. 
Like colours of the same rainbow, these “arms” are not mutually exclusive; they are the entire 
Crown at the same time. 
In Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, “Dickson C.J. said that the relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Sovereign had never depended on who the particular representatives 
of the Crown were. Dickson said that ‘federal-provincial divisions that the Crown has imposed 
on itself are internal to itself’ and therefore these divisions could not alter the relationship 
between the sovereign and Aboriginal peoples”.542 As such, when the Court speaks of the 
Honour of the Crown, the Crown is all of the Crown, including the Crown in right of Parliament, 
the Crown in right of the legislatures, and the Crown in right of the executive (federal and 
provincial). 
The Crown takes on a somewhat more distinctive persona in the recent Grassy Narrows 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. On behalf of the Court, the Chief Justice concludes, 
“although Treaty 3 was negotiated by the federal government, it is an agreement between the 
                                                 
540 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen, [1888] UKPC 70 at 7. 
541 Ibid.; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 217 at para 69 (The Supreme Court of Canada re-affirmed the concept of underlying 
‘radical title’ vested in Crown in the recent Tsilhqot’in decision: “The starting point in characterizing the legal 
nature of Aboriginal title is Dickson J.’s concurring judgment in Guerin, … At the time of assertion of European 
sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the province.”). 
542 Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 369 at 54 citing Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85. 
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Ojibway and the Crown”.543 Further, “[t]he promises made in Treaty 3 were promises of the 
Crown, not those of Canada”.544 
Régimbald and Newman explain: 
it is important to note that despite the principle of the Crown’s indivisibility, a 
distinction must be made between the Queen in right of Canada and the Queen in 
right of a province. In these distinct capacities, the Crown acts as separate persons 
in the sense that the act of one cannot engage the responsibility of the other. In 
other words, the decisions of the federal executive and the provincial executives are 
distinct and unrelated.545 
It is interesting to consider the Crown’s divisibility in reference to the recent Grassy Narrows 
decision that identifies the Crown as the distinctive ‘treaty making’ persona and goes on to apply 
the divisibility of the Crown as a manifestation of government in terms of treaty responsibilities. 
The Court explains the overarching attendant duty of the Crown to “exercise its powers in 
conformity with the honour of the Crown”546 and states the Crown is “subject to the fiduciary 
duties that lie on the Crown in dealing with Aboriginal interests”.547 The Court emphasizes 
“[t]hese duties bind the Crown” [as distinct from government per se].548 Though the Court 
distinguishes the Crown emphatically in terms of the treaty relationship with the Ojibway, the 
Court explains that governments exercise the Crown’s power and in so doing “the exercise of 
that power is burdened by the Crown obligations toward the Aboriginal people in question”.549 
The Court makes a point of correcting “a misconception of the legal role of the Crown in the 
treaty context”.550 The Court explains: 
It is true that Treaty 3 was negotiated with the Crown in right of Canada. But that 
does not mean that the Crown in right of Ontario is not bound by and empowered 
to act with respect to the treaty551… Both levels of government are responsible for 
                                                 
543 Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 SCR 447 at para 30 [Grassy 
Narrows]. 
544 Ibid. at para 35. 
545 Règimbald and Newman, Constitution, supra note 491 at 9 para 1.20 [emphasis added]; Theodore v Duncan, 
[1919] A.C. 696 (Australia PC); J.R. Théberge Ltée v. R., [1970] Ex. C.R. 649 (Can. Ex. Ct.). 
546 Grassy Narrows, supra note 543 at para 50. 
547 Ibid.  
548 Ibid. [emphasis in original].  
549 Ibid. 
550 Ibid. at para 32. 
551 Ibid. at para 32. 
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fulfilling [the promises of the Crown made in Treaty 3] when acting within the 
division of powers under the Constitution Act, 1867.552   
Specific to the role of the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands 
Reserved for Indians” under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, the Court’s ruling means 
that a province does not need to obtain federal approval before it can take up land under a treaty. 
Rather “the applicability of provincial legislation that affects treaty rights through the taking up 
of land is determined by Mikisew Cree… and s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”553 
Standing in contrast to the common understanding that s. 91(24) is a central source of Crown 
fiduciary obligations owed to First Nations, Grassy Narrows stands for the principle that though 
Crown authority is divisible, its ‘generic’554 obligations are universal as between the Crown in 
right of Canada and the Crown in right of a province. So it would seem that where a Royal 
Prerogative that impacts First Nations is, or has been, displaced by legislation, the body that 
statutorily assumed the prerogative likewise assumed all the attendant Crown obligations to First 
Nations—the Honour of the Crown, the fiduciary duties owed by the Crown—arising from the 
‘special relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples’. 
The Court’s favoured approach of understanding Crown authorities relative to First Nations 
as divisible, with only Crown honour and fiduciary duties to First Nations as universal (or 
indivisible), risks placing First Nations in an impossible situation of attempting to realize Crown 
obligations (stemming from the honour of the Crown and Crown fiduciary duties to First 
Nations) and circling at the mercy of division of power disputes between the arms of government 
as to with whom a given authority (and its concomitant obligations) primarily vest. In fact, 
Grassy Narrows appears to further entrench an already inherent problem of federal and 
provincial governments offloading financial responsibility to First Nations under the auspices of 
division of power disputes. 
Jordan’s Principle555 arose from the tragic case of a Cree child who could not leave hospital 
to live with his family and community because of a funding dispute between the federal and a 
                                                 
552 Ibid. at para 35. 
553 Ibid. at para 37; Mikisew Cree, supra note 342 (as cited in Grassy Narrows); Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 
23 at s. 35.  
554 I borrow here Slattery’s taxonomy concept for Aboriginal rights. 
555 See First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, Jordan’s Principle, online: 
<http://www.fncaringsociety.com/jordans-principle> [Jordan’s Principle] (Jordan's Principle calls on the 
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provincial government as to who was responsible for his medically necessary home care. After 
two additional years of languishing in a Winnipeg hospital, 800 kilometers from his family 
home, Jordan died at five years old in hospital without ever having lived in a family home. The 
enormous strain and expense his family bore as a result of the funding dispute as well as the 
inhumane disregard of Jordan’s best interests, is exactly the type of damaging real world 
scenario that arises from ambiguity as to who holds the authority to realize obligations to First 
Nations.556 
While Jordan’s principle was upheld in Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada557, emphasis 
was placed on the principle as ‘child-centered’, with little remonstration of the Crown for the 
appalling abuse of an ‘internal Crown division’ for the express purpose of avoiding a financial 
obligation to a First Nation member.558 While the Canadian federal government recently dropped 
their appeal of the Pictou Landing decision (a decision favouring application of Jordan’s 
Principle to another child with complex medical needs), the federal Crown continues to advance 
an interpretation of Jordan’s Principle as children-oriented and medical-specific.559 The honour 
of the Crown does little to advance ‘the special relationship of the Crown to First Nations’ when 
an arm of government can (correctly at law) claim a particular duty is ultra vires given the limits 
of its particular scope of authority. Governments make these claims irrespective of the fact that 
the duty arises from a service or an institution enjoyed by other Canadians unfettered by the 
fiscal controversies inherent to financing First Nation services and institutions. 
Land management, including emergency management in Aboriginal title territory (and now 
in treaty territory since Grassy Narrows) off-reserve is subject to similar jurisdictional funding 
concerns inherent to Jordan’s Principle. INAC budgets are limited and often involve extremely 
onerous reporting requirements. As the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples 
identifies: “…many of Canada’s laws, in particular the Indian Act, still do not permit the 
                                                 
government of first contact to pay for the services and seek reimbursement later so the child does not get tragically 
caught in the middle of government red tape). 
556 Ibid. 
557 Pictou Landing Band Council v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 342.  
558 Ibid.; Jordan’s Principle, supra note 555.  
559 Ibid. 
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effective exercise of indigenous self-government.”560 “..As well, “[f]unding priorities and 
amounts are unilaterally, and some say arbitrarily, determined by the federal Government.”561 
The Special Rapporteur also explained that the federal government’s “funding mechanism also 
leads to reporting requirements that were repeatedly described to the Special Rapporteur as 
onerous”.562 The Special Rapporteur related that “[t]here is clearly a perception among 
indigenous leaders that third-party management can be imposed for punitive or political 
reasons”.563 He further identified a new ‘own-source revenue’ policy, which he claims will likely 
be phased in to all funding agreements between the federal Government and First Nations. The 
Special Rapporteur explains: “[u]nder this policy, First Nations will be expected, as they are able 
and over time, to contribute to the costs of their government activities, with the expectation that 
indigenous reliance on federal funding will decline. Specifically aboriginal representatives have 
expressed the feeling that they are being “punished” when they demonstrate success, in the sense 
that their funding will be reduced”.564 The Rapporteur’s report echoes the view that First Nations 
are a burden on Crown sovereignty and that federal policy is obsessed with offloading the First 
Nation burden, another element of the widening ‘obligation gap’. 
                                                 
560 Anaya, UNHRC Report, supra note 38 at para 39 (“The Indian Act renders almost all decisions made by a First 
Nations government subject to the approval of the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 
including changes in band by-laws, funding for reserve programmes and infrastructure, and the leasing of land…”). 
561 Ibid. at para 42 (“Federal funding for First Nations governments under the Indian Act is structured through 
“contribution agreements” for which they must apply. Funding priorities and amounts are unilaterally, and some say 
arbitrarily, determined by the federal Government. Spending is monitored and reviewed to ensure that conditions the 
Government imposes are met, and funds are withheld if audits are not delivered on time—which forces indigenous 
governments to reallocate available funds to ensure programming continuity, making reporting even more 
difficult.”). 
562 Ibid. at para 43 (“This funding mechanism also leads to reporting requirements that were repeatedly described to 
the Special Rapporteur as onerous”. First Nation communities that receive federal funding under the Indian Act 
regime, 70 per cent of which have fewer than 500 residents, typically have to produce 100 or more reports a year for 
various federal agencies. The Government acknowledges that “reliance on annual funding agreements and multiple 
accountabilities…can impede the provision of timely services and can limit the ability of First Nations to implement 
longer-term development plans”). 
563 Ibid. at para 44 (“Furthermore, if a First Nation government functioning under the Indian Act has financial 
difficulties as a result of funding delays, reporting delays or other situations, it faces the potential imposition of a co-
manager or federally appointed third-party manager who takes over control of all the nation’s federally funded 
programmes and services. There do not appear to be significant financial management resources available from the 
federal Government for First Nations, at their own request, before they are in a default or deficit position. There is 
clearly a perception among indigenous leaders that third-party management can be imposed for punitive or political 
reasons.”). 
564 Ibid. at para 45. 
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AANDC budgets, by statute, are limited specifically to on-reserve activities and are arguably 
(by the Department of Indian Affairs and the Crown in right of Canada’s own rigorous policies 
superintending First Nation band budgets) too limited and too specific to be used for off reserve 
land and marine management. Yet, the Crown evades the golden key to effective consultation, 
which is a consistent and accessible fiscal regime to make consultation an affordable endeavor 
for First Nations whose band governments typically struggle in grossly under-resourced offices 
without the expertise and infrastructure to engage with material as the Crown presents it. 
Just like the circumstances leading up to Jordan’s Principle, both the federal and provincial 
governments can evoke credible arguments denying authority (or obligation) under the division 
of powers to finance off reserve land and marine management activities. This in turn leaves open 
the potential to accuse First Nations of a lack of good faith in frustrating consultation. That 
emboldens the respective governments to act unilaterally, to the detriment of First Nation 
interests, in the wake of failed consultation when the source of the problem may primarily lie 
with the absence of resourcing for First Nation off-reserve land and marine management 
activities. 
It goes without saying that Crown servants do not work for free.565 Members of Canada’s 
judiciary do not work for free.566 Legislators do not work for free.567 In fact, collectively, the 
workforce that constitutes the Crown is among the highest paid, and most secure, employment 
sectors in Canada. Why does the Crown appear to assume that the servants of Aboriginal 
                                                 
565 See Canada, Treasury Board, Rates of Pay for Public Service Employees, online: Treasury Board 
<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pubs_pol/hrpubs/coll_agre/rates-taux-eng.asp> (“The Government of Canada negotiates 
rates of pay for employees in the core public administration as part of the terms and conditions of employment. The 
Treasury Board, as the employer, negotiates 27 collective agreements with 15 different bargaining agents.” The 
Treasury Board website comprehensively links to the rates of pay of the several sectors of public service 
employees). 
566 See e.g. Judicial Compensation Act, SBC 2003 c 59; and see British Columbia, Report to the Attorney General of 
British Columbia and the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of British Columbia Pursuant to Section 5(3) of the 
Judicial Compensation Act, Final Report of the 2010 British Columbia Judges Compensation Commission (20 
September 2010) at 29 online: <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/judicial-compensation/info/2010-JCC-FinalReport.pdf> 
(’Comparison with Provincial Court Salaries’ for a table comparing salary levels for Provincial and Territorial Court 
Judges across Canada from 2009-2011. The 2009 salary low was in Manitoba at $197,736.00. The 2009 salary high 
was $248,057.00 in Ontario); and see Judges Act, RSC 1985 c J-1 at s 9 (“The yearly salaries of the judges of the 
Supreme Court of Canada are as follows: (a) the Chief Justice of Canada, $370,300; and (b) the eight puisne judges, 
$342,800 each”).  
567 See Salaries Act, RSC 1985 c S-3; and see Members’ Remuneration and Pensions Act, RSBC 1996 c 257 at s 
2(1) (“…effective April 1, 2007, the basic compensation for each member is $98000 per year.” The section goes on 
to explain how the annual compensation is adjusted from year to year in accordance to increases in the consumer 
price index”).  
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governments should work for free? While a plethora of policy objectives, regulatory regimes and 
even statutory guidance has imploded throughout Canada since the duty to consult was laid out 
in Haida, very little adjustment in terms of fiscal policy has evolved to finance aboriginal 
participation in consultation and accommodation activities. This aspect of the ‘obligation gap’ is 
particularly problematic given those Aboriginal servants are called upon to carry out the Crown’s 
own honour. Denying the resourcing to effectively engage in consultation denies First Nations 
any recognition of their self-determining interest in their territories.  
As outlined above, the exclusion of First Nations in both the federal and provincial 
emergency management frameworks off reserve is linked inextricably to the fiscal apparatus that 
finances emergency management as between the federal and provincial governments generally. 
The First Nation role in emergency management is largely a vacuum.  There are few to no 
requirements throughout even risk-specific legislation such as the Transportation of Dangerous 
Goods Act568 to engage with or to finance First Nations in emergency management within their 
traditional territories at any of the planning, mitigation, response or recovery phases.569 
The fiscal obligation gap is due, in part, to the lack of concerted treatment of Aboriginal 
rights by the three arms of the Crown. Focusing for a moment on the Crown in right of Canada, 
for over 30 years now the federal government has avoided replacing the retracted s. 37 
constitutional conferences on Aboriginal rights.570 It has ignored the recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. It has antagonistically participated as an intervener in 
practically every Aboriginal rights case to move through the courts, thus persistently positioning 
itself as an adversary rather than a reconciling friend of First Nations. It has dodged developing a 
fiscal federalism framework that recognizes (with dollars and cents) First Nation governance off 
reserve and equalization on reserve, which is another constitutional standard the rest of Canada 
enjoys. Clearly, the Crown in Right of Canada is not prepared to realize either the negative 
liberties interpretation of First Nations Aboriginal rights upheld in the written constitution, let 
alone a ‘recognition rights’ reading of Aboriginal rights that reflects the United Nations 
                                                 
568 TDG Act, supra note 96.  
569 Except where there is a modern treaty with specific emergency management provisions as outlined earlier in this 
thesis. 
570 See Parlinfo, supra note 380.  
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Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. At what point will the judiciary stop 
anticipating government-negotiated settlement of obligations to First Nations571 and better 
moderate First Nation disputes with the Crown? 
Remembering that from the Supreme Court of Canada’s own rulings, Crown divisions are 
internal to itself insofar as its relationship to First Nations is concerned572 and further, that sharp 
dealing will not be tolerated.573 As such, it would seem that the Court has an underdeveloped role 
in ensuring that the Crown in right of Canada and the Crown in right of a province does not use 
Canada’s federalism to widen any further ‘the obligation gap’ to which this chapter is devoted 
(which the Jordan’s principle demonstrates they have a propensity to do—even when the 
‘obligation-controversy’ at hand involves the needs and care of a vulnerable child). The 
following sections will explore a potential avenue to broaden judicial oversight over the Crown’s 
relations with First Nations. 
3.4.2.2. ARE ‘RECOGNITION RIGHTS’ JUSTICIABLE RIGHTS? 
If you don’t have a self-start, sometimes you need a crank. 
- Roy Edward Elander574 
Arguably, the judiciary’s role in advancing the Crown’s constitutional relationship with First 
Nations has thus far proven a conservative exercise of the judiciary’s powers, quite apart from 
the ‘judicial activism’ the Court is at times accused of. Returning for a moment to Berlin’s thesis 
setting out negative liberties from positive liberties and a liberty like ‘social freedom’ 
[‘recognition rights’], the judiciary has favoured a ‘negative liberties’ interpretation of s. 35 
Aboriginal rights that does not satisfy the ‘recognition rights’ aspect that might more accurately 
inform First Nation appeals for rights recognition in relationships with the Crown. Furthermore, 
                                                 
571 Haida, supra note 199 at para 14; and see Tsilhqot’in, supra note 208 (clarifying the purpose of s 35: “Section 
35  of the Constitution Act, 1982  represents “the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political 
forum and the courts for the constitutional recognition of [A]boriginal rights” .... It protects Aboriginal rights 
against provincial and federal legislative power and provides a framework to facilitate negotiations and 
reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with those of the broader public.” [references omitted, emphasis mine]).  
572 Grassy Narrows, supra note 543 at para 35.  
573 Haida, supra note 208 at para 42.  
574 I credit my grandfather with this quote as I often heard it in defense of my grandmother’s colourful insistence that 
the dishes get done. For those of this millennium, ‘a crank’ as used in this quote refers to the crank of an old 
fashioned automobile, usually located at the front of the car near the bumper, whose rotation was necessary to start 
the car engine.   
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the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples could be judicially invoked 
as a useful interpretative tool informing the ‘recognition rights’ content of s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights. Widening judicial treatment of the theoretical development and implementation of s. 35 
Aboriginal rights is necessary because of the Crown’s own antipathy toward implementing s. 35 
cases, honouring (the now repealed) s. 37 commitments and reluctance to follow the Court’s 
admonitions to resolve outstanding issues and achieve reconciliation through negotiation. 
The South African experience is perhaps a useful example of the areas in which judicial 
treatment of s. 35 Aboriginal rights could be enhanced to better meet the ‘recognition rights’ 
aspect of Aboriginal rights content. South Africa is currently recognized as a common-wealth 
country, coping with decolonization through (in part) constitutional reform that recognizes 
historical inequities between colonial (settler-state) governments and indigenous peoples. 
Though a comprehensive analysis of the South African constitutional experience is well 
outside the scope of this thesis, the South African example demonstrates that a judiciary within 
the Commonwealth may depart from the adage that the only justiciable rights are negative rights. 
Of particular interest are the remedies under development for breaches of socioeconomic rights 
in South Africa, which in the particular context of South Africa and its histories might also be 
better understood as ‘recognition rights’ as opposed to stark ‘positive liberties’. For the purposes 
of this section, I am simply adopting (rather than making more than a superficial case for) the 
view that there are parallels between South Africa’s constitutional socioeconomic rights and 
Canada’s Aboriginal rights significant enough to likewise frame South African constitutional 
socioeconomic rights as ‘recognition rights’, irrespective that the subject is of course open to 
dispute. I also survey some South African remedies that might serve as inspiration for Canadian 
courts to explore an expanded role of judicial oversight in the (narrow area) area of Crown/First 
Nation relations.  
Adopting a theoretical framework inspired by Berlin, where we understand South Africa’s 
positive socioeconomic rights’ as ‘recognition rights’, and recognition as inextricably linked to 
reconciliation, the idea of an expanded judicial role to ensure that Aboriginal rights (at least) 
serve to ameliorate inequities suffered by First Nations at the hands of the Crown may not seem 
so radical. 
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The South African constitutional experience is part of a dramatic transformation that took 
place in the later part of the last century. "In 1994, South Africa transitioned from apartheid into 
a constitutional democracy premised on the realization of human rights and transformation of the 
inequities of the apartheid years".575 Parallels might be drawn between the Canadian and South 
African colonial experience wherein an overt objective of the settler state was the subjugation of 
the indigenous population in order to further land acquisition and resource extraction benefiting 
the colonizers. Likewise, in the age of reconciliation (both South Africa and Canada now have 
government processes aimed at reconciliation with indigenous populations), parallels might be 
drawn in policy objectives between the South African constitutional right to health care (a 
recognition right) and the Canadian s. 35 constitutional right to accommodation (where Crown 
obligation is understood as the content of the right, accommodation is likewise a recognition 
right). 
Arguably, both the South African health care system and the Canadian consultation and 
accommodation system might be described as chaotic, fraught with inequities in outcome and 
uncertainty, under-resourced, and mismanaged with poor and fragmented policy development.576 
Also, both rights (recognition right to health care in South Africa and recognition right to 
accommodation in Canada) are part of a larger package of reforms aimed at meeting basic needs 
and furthering a departure from each Nations’ history of apartheid (South Africa) and 
subjugation and assimilation (Canada). Another common objective in the larger packet of 
reforms is arguably efforts to redress poverty inequity within target populations to equalise 
access to financial health and security: "[t]he poorest 10 percent of South Africa's population 
receive approximately 0.1 percent of total income, while the top 10 percent receive 
approximately 51 percent".577 The Government of Canada reports that “Aboriginal people face 
significant earnings and income disparities compared to non-Aboriginal people in Canada”.578 
                                                 
575 Lisa Forman & Jerome Amir Singh "The Role of Rights and Litigation in Assuring More Equitable Access to 
Health Care in South Africa" in The Right to Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study eds 
Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 288 at 289 [Rights South Africa].  
576 Ibid. at 299.  
577 Ibid. at 291, fn 19. 
578 AANDC, Aboriginal Income Disparity in Canada by Dr. Ravi Pendakur & Dr. Krishna Pendakur (Ottawa: the 
Strategic Research Directorate of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2013) online: AANDC <   
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1378411773537/1378411859280>.  
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Some argue that poverty and unemployment in South Africa have worsened since the 
development of a government mandate to reform inequities: “[m]any households experienced 
limited access to education, health care, electricity, and clean water [also all too common 
problems among Canadian First Nation reserves]. Levels of poverty and unemployment [in 
South Africa] have worsened since this time”.579 Income disparity appears to be a pressing issue 
in both Canada and South Africa, irrespective that there may well be differences in degree as to 
the income spread. 
In each of South Africa and Canada, multiple barriers arising out of the colonial experience 
may frustrate narrow government policy objectives. For example, other social conditions outside 
the narrow concern of Medicare access problems affect overall health goals in South Africa,580 
and in Canada other community problems may affect First Nation participation in consultation 
(i.e. lack of adequate resourcing581 to effectively participate in meetings) can frustrate Crown 
accommodation obligations. It appears issues also arise as to differences in views on the ideal 
approaches to implement the health care right in South Africa and consultation and 
accommodation obligations in Canada. South Africa has a White Paper for the Transformation of 
the Health System in South Africa that advocates a decentralized and localized approach to 
reforming health care system, 582 while in Canada challenges arise in affecting implementation of 
Crown s. 35 obligations throughout federal, provincial and local governments. 
While Canada’s constitutional (s. 35) Aboriginal rights, including the rights to consultation 
and accommodation, arise from the body of the Constitution itself (as opposed to being nestled in 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms), South African socioeconomic rights are primarily 
                                                 
579 Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 291. 
580 Ibid. at 292. 
581 Understanding ‘resourcing’ as not only funding to cover  travel and accommodation for possible regional or 
multiparty meetings, but also the financial costs of disseminating information throughout the community for 
consideration. Aboriginal rights are collective rights therefore, consultation requires the collective consideration of 
the right holders. In addition to fair compensation for time spent organizing, attending, recording and analyzing 
community response at community meetings, fiscal resourcing should also acknowledge any poverty burdens to 
community members contemplating meeting access, such as childcare and family food security needs for 
participants and also should consider the costs of any external professional support that might be required for the 
community to interpret complex data.   
582 Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 290-91. 
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protected in the 1996 Constitution’s Bill of Rights.583 "The universal health right is contained in 
section 27, which also entrenches rights to water, food, and social security”.584 The section reads: 
s. 27 (1)(a) Everyone has the right to have access to health care services, including 
reproductive health care; 
(b) sufficient food and water; and 
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their 
dependants, appropriate social assistance.  
s. 27(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.  
s. 27 (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment.585  
Like Canada’s s. 35 constitutional Aboriginal rights, the content of the health rights in the South 
African constitution is vague. Similar to the Canadian ‘empty versus full box debate’,586 in South 
Africa "the Constitution does not define the precise content of these duties, and the task of 
interpretation falls to the government as well as the judiciary".587 
Unlike Canada, South Africa has a constitutional court whose purpose is basically to 
adjudicate constitutional matters. The South African constitution is quite specific regarding the 
constitutional courts mandate: 
s. 167 (3) The Constitutional Court  
(a) is the highest court in all constitutional matters;  
(b) may decide only constitutional matters, and issues connected with 
decisions on constitutional matters; and 
(c) makes the final decision whether a matter is a constitutional matter or 
whether an issue is connected with a decision on a constitutional matter.  
… 
s. 167 (7) A constitutional matter includes any issue involving the interpretation, 
protection or enforcement of the Constitution.588 
As the Court itself describes, “[t]he Constitutional Court is South Africa's highest court on 
constitutional matters. So its jurisdiction - the scope of its authority to hear cases - is restricted to 
                                                 
583 Ibid. at 301-302.  
584 Ibid. at 301-302. 
585 Constitution, South Africa, supra note 20 at s 27.  
586 See generally supra, note 381. 
587 Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 303. 
588 Constitution, South Africa, supra note 20 at s 167.  
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constitutional matters and issues connected with decisions on constitutional matters”.589 Future 
work might beneficially explore the purposive approach within South Africa of clearly 
delineating a range of recognition rights within its new Constitution (health rights are but just 
one area of recognition rights within the South African Bill of Rights) and the decided oversight 
role ascribed to the judiciary. 
Arguably, an important specific intention of empowering the South African judiciary with 
such a significant oversight role is to determine whether “…Parliament … has failed to fulfill a 
constitutional obligation”.590 Contrary to subverting democracy (acknowledging that the driving 
purpose in the advent of democratic processes in Great Britain was to wrestle away powers from 
the Sovereign and his/her patrons, including the judiciary) South Africa perhaps sought to 
guarantee democracy by creating a ‘constitutional referee’ through the judiciary after the 
dramatic (global) recognition of the vast inequities between the colonizer and the colonized. 
Certainly the idea of importing constitutional reforms that involve an expanded judicial 
oversight role over Parliament to assist Canada in better meeting its Constitutional obligations to 
First Nations is a controversial proposition. However, South Africa may well prove in the long 
run that such reforms are actually necessary to safeguard democracy where there is an enormous 
difference in social power arising from histories of subjugation and violence ultimately requiring 
recognition of the needs and interests of the oppressed group in order to move toward peaceable 
and equitable governance relations. As noted above, in over 30 years of Aboriginal rights 
constitutional disputes in Canada, arguably very few rights have been ubiquitously recognized 
and implemented, in spite of copious (and expensive) jurisprudence on the matter. Without some 
kind of enforcement mechanism binding Canadian governments to meet the obligations of the 
Crown, it is difficult to see where a ‘negotiated’ shift will bear effective change – change that 
serves to redress the enormous inequities that continue to exist between First Nation and non-
First Nation populations in spite of 30 years of an Aboriginal rights framework. 
                                                 
589 South Africa, Constitutional Court of South Africa’s Website, About the Court,  Role of the Constitutional Court, 
online: Constitutional Court of South Africa <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/role.htm>. 
590 Constitution, South Africa, supra note 20 at s 167 (4)(e). 
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In Canadian Charter cases where a negative right has been infringed, the Courts might either 
strike down, or read in, legislation as the nature of the infringement requires for remedy.591 These 
remedies however strictly arise from ‘negative’ rights disputes – as per Berlin, those disputes 
where ‘the state is stopping me from doing something that I am free to do’.592 In the South 
African recognition rights example, the Court may adjudicate on the reasonableness of state 
action in compliance efforts to its socioeconomic rights obligations.593 In Grootboom, the Court 
laid out a standard of reasonableness, to be determined on a case-by-case, indicating that the 
state’s primary obligation was to act reasonably to provide the basic necessities of life to those 
who lack them.594 
The Court indicated that reasonableness required comprehensive programs, and 
that excluding a significant segment of society would be unreasonable, as would 
excluding the needs of the poor, given their reliance on the state for the basic 
necessities of life. In seeking to ensure that the basic necessities of life were 
provided to all, the state had to focus, in particular, on the needs of the most 
vulnerable, especially the poor, and those experiencing urgent and desperate needs. 
The Court interpreted "progressive realization" in line with international law to 
require the state to take steps to realize the rights as expeditiously as and effectively 
as possible, and that any deliberately retrogressive measures would need full 
justification in light of all the rights in the Constitution and available resources…595 
For the Court, reasonableness required the state to focus in particular on the needs of the most 
vulnerable in the course of administrating comprehensive programs that should likewise strive to 
avoid excluding a significant segment of society. Later, the South African Constitutional Court 
declared a state policy unconstitutional for breach of the standard of reasonableness: “[t]he Court 
found that government policy failed to meet constitutional standards because it excluded those 
                                                 
591 Matthew A Hennigar, “Players and the Process: Charter litigation and the Federal Government” (2002) 21 
Windsor YB Access Just 91 at 109, fn 44 (“Specifically, the government’s greater dissatisfaction with judicial 
amendment than with invalidation is probably motivated by how much freedom the remedy gives the government to 
respond legislatively. Invalidation offers the most freedom in this respect, while either form of amendment (“reading 
down” or “reading in”) offers the least and, as such, appealing a judicial amendment may offer an easier way to 
“undo the damage” to government policies.” (109) “To clarify, ‘judicial activism’ occurs when courts exercise their 
power of judicial review so as to block (‘negative activism’) or require (‘positive activism’) the action of the 
legislative and executive branches.”).  
592 Berlin, Liberty, supra note 430 at 122 (“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body of 
men interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act 
unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree 
unfree…”).  
593 Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 307- 8; and see Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others, [2000] ZACC 19, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) [Grootboom].  
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid. 
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who could reasonably be included where such treatment was medically required”.596 As a remedy, 
the Court ordered the government “to remove, without delay, restrictions on the drug and make it 
available in the public sector, provide for training of counselors, and take reasonable measures to 
extend testing and counseling facilities throughout the public health sector".597 
In a show of support for government efforts at instituting South African health care rights, “the 
Court held unanimously that the Medicines Act permitted regulations to provide for price controls, 
including setting a single exit price for drugs into the health system…”598 The decision came after 
"several pharmacy chains challenged the government's legislative efforts to create a national 
pricing system for medicines, which included a pricing committee, a single exit price for all 
medicines, and a fixed dispensing fee for pharmacists and dispensers of medicines”.599 Through 
obiter dicta, the South African court offered further clarity on the reasonableness framework: 
In particular, Justice Sachs held that "preventing excessive profit taking from the 
manufacturing, distribution and sale of medicines is more than an option for 
government. It is a constitutional obligation flowing from its duties under section 
27(2). Justice Moseneke reiterated this sentiment saying that "[p]rohibitive pricing 
of medicine… would in effect equate to a denial of the right of access to health 
care".600 
The South African justices emphasise that the government had reasonably regulated 
pharmaceutical price controls in order to meet their constitutional obligations as prohibitive 
pricing would equate to a denial of the right of access to health care. As it stands, Canadian 
governments have not yet legislated or regulated industry to consult with or accommodate First 
Nations, nor have Canadian governments sought to implement Aboriginal rights generally in 
contest with interests of other Canadians. As a Commonwealth court has upheld a government’s 
industrial regulation for the purposes of meeting that government’s constitutional obligations, if 
(say) British Columbia were to statutorily require industry to consult and accommodate First 
Nations where there may be a potential aboriginal rights infringement, that decision might 
withstand an industrial appeal in spite of the fact that the Court decreed in Haida that obligation 
to consult vested with the Crown. Further, the Canadian judiciary might even consider reading in 
                                                 
596  Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 310. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. at 310-11; and see Minister of Health & Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd & Others, 2005 (2) 
SA 311 para 661 (CC) (S.Afr.) [New Clicks]. 
599 Ibid.  
600 Ibid. 
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an industrial consultation obligation as a s. 35 infringement remedy on the basis of the South 
African finding that such prescriptive regulatory action furthers government held obligations to 
meet citizens’ positive rights.601 Likewise, the Canadian judiciary could ‘read in’ a statutory 
priority respecting Aboriginal (recognition) rights as a remedy for a given impugned piece of 
emergency management legislation, thus addressing systemic Aboriginal rights infringements 
(disrespecting First Nation agency) perpetuated by omission (or a failure by the Crown to 
reasonably act on Aboriginal rights). 
As hinted by the Court’s ‘progressive realization’ analysis in Grootboom,602 like in Canadian 
Aboriginal rights cases, South Africa’s Constitutional Court appears to have developed a 
‘justification’ standard offering some protection to the autonomy of the executive and legislative 
arms of government. Earlier, the South African court stated in Soobramoney that “a court would 
be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs … whose 
responsibility it is to deal with such matters.”603 In Maibuko, the Court clarified that while it 
“affirmed the democratic value of litigation on social and economic rights in achieving 
accountability, it concluded that it was inappropriate for it (and not the government) to quantify 
the content of …[the] right. The Court therefore concluded that the policy was reasonable”.604 
Some commentators on the South African jurisprudence critique the Court's approach to the 
Constitution's socioeconomic rights as creating nothing more than an administrative entitlement 
to accountability, which, to the detractors, fails to guide state efforts to assure ‘progressive 
realization’ and does not serve the key populations intended to be the beneficiaries of such 
rights.605 Likewise, critics point out that the equality potential of South Africa’s socioeconomic 
                                                 
601 Contra Haida, supra note 208 at para 53 (“It is suggested… that a third party’s obligation to consult Aboriginal 
peoples may arise from the ability of the third party to rely on justification as a defence against infringement. 
However, the duty to consult and accommodate… flows from the Crown’s assumption of sovereignty over lands and 
resources formerly held by the Aboriginal group. This theory provides no support for an obligation on third parties 
to consult or accommodate. The Crown alone remains legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and 
interactions with third parties that affect Aboriginal interests.”). 
602  Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 307- 8; and see Grootboom, supra note 593. 
603 Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwa-Zulu Natal), 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (S. Afr.)[Soobramoney] at 
para 29; and see Rights South Africa, supra note 575 at 306. 
604 Rights South Africa, ibid. at 315-16; and see Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others, 2009 (4) 
SA1 (CC) (S.Afr.) [Mazibuko]. 
605 Rights South Africa, ibid. at 316 (“The contrast between the Mazibuko and TAC outcomes may suggest that he 
Constitution's socioeconomic rights may only yield equitable outcomes in cases of extreme legislative 
noncompliance"). 
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rights is undercut by implementation problems, a familiar situation in Canada with respect to s. 
35 Aboriginal rights.606 The South African socioeconomic ‘recognition’ rights jurisprudence may 
provide interesting precedent for remedies where a federal or provincial ministry does not 
implement a judicial decision.607 
In the end however, it might be that even mere administrative accountability (a seeming 
compromise to proponents of South African socioeconomic rights) would go a long way toward 
Canadian Aboriginal rights implementation. Drawing upon the South African experience and 
case law dealing with their particular branch of ‘recognitions rights’ could serve as useful 
precedent toward developing creative remedies in Canada’s future. Obviously, the obligation 
gaps found in emergency management are but one area of Canada’s Aboriginal rights dialogue 
that could be improved with a shift and broadening of analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
606 Ibid. 
607 See discussion of the decision in ibid.; and see Christie, “Aboriginal Nationhood”, supra note 368 at 3 (“All too 
often while successful actions are restricted to the ‘victorious’ Aboriginal nation, all nations are exposed to the 
setbacks. Defeats become precedents, while victories are nearly always restricted to the particular situation.” 
[footnotes removed]); add see Canada v Long Plain First Nation, 2015 FCA 177 at paras 140-156 (For a brief 
overview of remedies available to First Nations in duty to consult cases. “I add that if Canada were to misconduct 
itself, many other remedies could be available. For example,…the respondents might be able to obtain remedies on 
short notice, where justified and appropriate, to prevent further disposition of the land or to require Canada to cause 
the land to be conveyed back to it. There may also be real estate remedies under existing Manitoba law, but I need to 
explore these here.” (para 155)). 
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SECTION 4 - CONCLUSION 
Through the writing of this thesis, I have attempted to draw out some fundamental mechanics 
of current emergency management practices in Canada and particularly within British Columbia. 
I began with acknowledging the standing global wisdom that reducing vulnerability is a critical 
objective toward improving outcomes when communities encounter hazards. Hazards that 
intersect with unprepared and/or vulnerable communities can quickly manifest into disasters – 
the greater the vulnerability, and the less preparation, the greater the costs – including all of 
human collateral and wellbeing, social and economic security, and health and safety of 
environment and infrastructure. From this starting point, a patently obvious emergency 
mitigation priority presents itself – all governments operating in Canada should be working 
toward improving the standard of living to at least average Canadian levels in those communities 
whose infrastructure, service delivery and wellness indexes are already well below sub-par – on 
a priority basis. Such a priority would have particular application in many First Nation 
communities. As the Panel on Enhancing Aboriginal Planning and Preparedness at the recent 
Disaster Risk Reduction Roundtable signalled, many First Nations are already living in the 
equivalent of disaster zones608 which can only amount to further disproportionate costs in the 
event of a natural disaster. 
The focus of this thesis has been the particular role First Nations currently play within the 
statutory and regulatory apparatus of natural disaster management in British Columbia. The 
current legislative and regulatory frameworks governing emergency management federally and 
in British Columbia are basically silent on the role of First Nations in managing emergencies 
within their tradition and Aboriginal title territories off reserve. The prevailing Crown 
assumption appears to be that First Nations will only play a passive role as ‘the consulted’ by 
others who are employed by British Columbia to manage emergencies, if they are consulted at 
all. As such, the British Columbia emergency management regime overwhelmingly positions 
non-First Nation organizations to manage emergencies on behalf of First Nations and further acts 
as a barrier to First Nations who seek to manage emergencies within their own territories and 
even at times on-reserve. 
                                                 
608 Canada RoundTable, supra note 12 at 15-16. 
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While there are some exceptions touched upon in this thesis, the overwhelming and glaring 
omission of any discernable protocols operating to protect and prioritize First Nations s. 35 
constitutional Aboriginal rights in all phases of Canada’s and British Columbia’s emergency 
management framework raises extremely troubling ethical and legal issues. 
If it is so that First Nations are constructively left out of emergency management, the 
question then becomes what is to be done about it. The answer is multifaceted, and priority 
themes of resolution are properly at the behest of impacted First Nations. To effectively 
contribute toward a dialogue on solutions, the second part of this thesis has been devoted to 
deconstructing why s. 35 Aboriginal rights litigation, as the jurisprudence currently stands, 
would likely produce unfavourable, or only moderately corrective, outcomes. I ask why there 
appears to be an overwhelming failure on the part of the Crown to implement Aboriginal rights 
in regular governance practices generally, with specific implications of a First Nations omission 
in British Columbia’s emergency management regime specifically. To put the issue into 
pragmatic context I ultimately sought to unearth whether Crown servants across the board in 
British Columbia’s emergency management framework are constructively aware of the existence 
of Aboriginal rights, particularly First Nations’ constitutional standing and priority, and further 
what it is they think they should do with those rights as servants of the Crown. Given there is 
apparently no legislative or regulatory direction prioritising s. 35 Aboriginal rights within the 
existing framework, it is difficult to surmise how it is Crown servants go about respecting those 
rights. Rather, it appears there is a suspension of First Nation constitutional rights in all four 
phases of emergency management in British Columbia, and most glaringly during a declared 
state of emergency. This suspension of rights is most troubling at the planning, mitigation and 
recovery phases of emergency management which can take years and can involve expenditures 
in the hundreds of millions of dollars over which First Nations in effect have virtually no say and 
no audit capacity. Such a suspension of rights takes place irrespective of whether a given First 
Nation is disproportionately exposed to risk and consequentially most impacted by a given 
disaster. 
Given that the ‘obligation gaps’ in emergency management appear to be part of a larger, and 
deeply problematic obligation gap respecting Crown implementation of s. 35 Aboriginal rights 
generally, I have in the course of this thesis given theoretical treatment to what I view as the 
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Crown’s failure to act and act reasonably. I have attempted to demonstrate that a restrictive 
theoretical application of what Isaiah Berlin calls ‘negative rights’ as the philosophical 
underpinning of the content of s. 35 Aboriginal rights leads to projecting those rights as ‘islands 
of non-interference’, which ultimately views relationships as obstructions thwarting ideals of 
reconciliation and at a more insidious level, perpetuating the oppression and hierarchies of the 
settler state. With a restrictively negative rights approach to Aboriginal rights, what Isaiah Berlin 
identifies as the ‘positive rights’ of the dominant state are assured and furthered with tyrannical 
outcomes. 
I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s articulation of a third sort of right, which I called ‘recognition 
rights’, offers a far more helpful philosophical basis to interpret Aboriginal rights within the 
Canadian jurisprudential context – where the goals of safeguarding s. 35 Aboriginal rights 
include reconciliation and upholding the Crown’s honour. I applied Isaiah Berlin’s doctrine to 
the context of s. 35 Aboriginal rights in Canada framing the place in between a ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’ rights interpretation of s. 35 as the area of ‘recognition rights’. I suggest that s. 35 
Aboriginal rights constructed as ‘recognition rights’ would logically and quite simply absorb the 
content of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. I then went a 
step further and likened Canadian s. 35 Aboriginal ‘recognition rights’ to South Africa’s 
socioeconomic rights. South Africa’s socioeconomic rights are predominantly understood as 
‘positive rights’, an anomalous occurrence in the commonwealth that in effect creates justiciable 
government obligations. Basically I suggest that South Africa’s socioeconomic rights are not 
quite ‘positive rights’ and Canada’s section 35 Aboriginal rights are not quite ‘negative rights’ 
and both, given the shared histories of colonialism and commonwealth legal traditions, are 
perhaps better framed as ‘recognition rights’. Comparing the justiciable socioeconomic rights in 
South Africa’s constitution and Canada’s constitutional Aboriginal rights highlights the 
precedential value of the South African experience, thereby widening the judicial scope for 
oversight of reconciliation itself. 
I raise concern about the courts’ ongoing deference to governments that fail to effectively 
negotiate and in particular fail to implement outcomes and obligations, as opposed to 
condemning government inaction. I claimed that there is an avenue for the courts to play a more 
critical role in compelling government affirmative action without demolishing democratic 
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process (a common concern raised when debating the appropriate sphere of the judiciary). I 
further argued that where Aboriginal rights are understood as ‘recognition rights’, a failure to act 
by the government (or a failure to act reasonably) with respect to the implicit obligations s. 35 
conveys would be justiciable. I concluded that even if the result is only to provide First Nations 
with some (albeit process ridden and expensive) mechanism toward Crown accountability in its 
obligations to First Nations there potentially could be a dramatic improvement with respect to the 
Crown’s implementation of s. 35 obligations generally. Crown suspension of s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights when exercising emergency management powers would likewise be justiciable where 
Aboriginal rights are understood as ‘recognition rights’, Particularly, a ‘recognition rights’ 
approach might provide First Nations leverage to further self-determination and self-governance 
objectives wherever the Crown fails to give First Nations due priority and agency in the design 
and execution of emergency management frameworks. 
As I have identified in the body of this thesis, it is certainly not the case that there is never 
any First Nation involvement within the existing Canada and British Columbia emergency 
management framework. However it can be fairly stated that under the current shroud of silence 
as to statutory and regulatory direction on the constitutional implications of s. 35 Aboriginal 
rights within all four phases of emergency management, execution of the s. 35 consultation and 
accommodation obligations within emergency management – currently the most proactive form 
of Aboriginal rights Crown obligation – takes place in an unregulated ‘nebula’. There are no 
standards and so no audits; there are neither compliance checks, nor any measure of public 
scrutiny as to best practices or priority outcomes. This basically leaves First Nations at the mercy 
of the Crown’s own courts or forced into direct action in order to achieve any corrective 
outcomes. 
I offer here a few additional thoughts around potential solutions, outside a litigation sphere, 
intended only to be of some use toward further critical analysis and commentary. Given the 
precedent of successive modern treaties in British Columbia, I suspect in the years to come we 
will see a growing impulse (particularly on the Crown’s part) to move emergency management 
powers from regional districts and instead divest emergency management powers directly to First 
Nations under British Columbia’s Emergency Program Act. In that way the resourcing (fiscal 
and capacity building) currently flowing to regional districts would instead flow to First Nation 
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governments who would then have the acknowledged authority to trigger and execute emergency 
response and management plans generally and would have the collaboration status that regional 
districts enjoy within the Provincial Emergency Program. This appears to have been the favoured 
approach to tackling First Nation emergency management within the sprinkling of modern 
treaties that have been concluded in British Columbia, even though the approach conceptually 
places First Nations on par with lesser local governments.609 This approach also seems to be 
reflected in the ‘mutual aid agreement’ approach between local authorities and on-reserve First 
Nation fire authorities for fire suppression activities where fires or threats of fires exceed the 
capacity of the given fire suppression authority. In a recent Emergency Management British 
Columbia reimbursement policy, First Nations again were likened to ‘local authorities’ for the 
purposes of executing the policy constructed to disperse resources.610 It might be that First 
Nations and settler state governments will prefer to model emergency management for natural 
disasters generally in accordance to existing mutual-aid fire suppression models. More analysis 
should be done, with a particular focus on the current fire suppression emergency response 
framework specifically (which was outside the scope of this thesis) and how it might be 
broadened to improve First Nation / Crown emergency management frameworks generally. 
Another corrective approach could involve realigning the emergency management 
framework beginning at the federal level. Rather than the federal government and provinces 
monopolizing the power to declare emergencies within their geographical boundaries as per the 
federal Emergencies Act outlined above (again, emergency management is not within the 
enumerated heads of power and so constructively falls within the federal POGG power),611 First 
Nations recognized as ‘governments’ as opposed to ‘stakeholders’ under such a framework could 
potentially then execute equivalent powers to declare and manage emergencies within their 
                                                 
609 Maa-Nulth Final Agreement, supra note 352 at ss 13.26.3, 13.26.4, 13.26.5 (“13.26.3 Federal Law or Provincial 
Law prevails to the extent of a Conflict with Maa-nulth First Nation Law under 13.26.1”; “13.26.4 …each Maa-
nulth First Nation Government may … exercise the powers of a local authority in respect of local emergencies in 
accordance with Federal Law and Provincial Law …but any declaration and any exercise of power is subject to the 
authority of Canada and British Columbia under Federal Law and Provincial Law” [emphasis added]; “13.26.5 
Nothing in this Agreement affects the authority of: a. Canada to declare a national emergency; or b. British 
Columbia to declare a provincial emergency, in accordance with Federal Law or Provincial Law”). 
610BC Fires Bulletin, supra note 22 (“Local governments, for the purposes of this bulletin, include local authorities 
as defined in the Emergency Program Act and First Nations band councils.”).  
611 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 20 at s 91 “It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of 
Canada…”). 
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respective territories, without being constructively reduced to ‘local authorities’. Under such a 
model, the flow of resources currently expended on provincial emergency management strategies 
could then be redirected to build capacity within First Nation organizations to deliver the same 
scope and quality of disaster management services off reserve (in all four phases: planning, 
preparation, response and recovery) currently disproportionality monopolized and executed by 
provincial bodies and their contractors throughout a given First Nation’s traditional territories. 
Further analysis is required to determine whether this line of approach is in line with the 
guidance offered in the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Report. 
I argued earlier in this thesis that because of First Nations’ particular constitutional status 
evoking necessary relationships with all manner of Crown administrative bodies, First Nations 
are perhaps the optimum governments for centralizing and streamlining emergency response 
within their traditional territories, protecting not only their own but settler populations inhabiting 
their traditional territories as well. Local authorities do not have nearly the administrative and 
fiscal management scope with commensurate inter-governance relations that most First Nations 
effect. It seems bizarre from a simply pragmatic viewpoint that regional districts, with their 
relatively more meagre budgets and reduced service delivery capacities, would be preferred over 
First Nations as the governing body executing emergency management delivery, particularly for 
emergencies of a scale that disaster response is required. 
Irrespective of where the dialogue will next turn, of critical importance is that an effective 
dialogue take place – one that acknowledges the lack of constructive inclusion of First Nations in 
all phases of British Columbia natural disaster management, and that the lack of inclusion is 
deeply problematic in all of an ethical, legal, and pragmatic sense. Without statutory and 
regulatory protections in place, First Nations s. 35 Aboriginal rights can easily be suspended in 
the name of emergency management. Perhaps the same vigilance protecting other constitutional 
values during times where extraordinary measures are required needs to be directed toward 
protecting s. 35 Aboriginal rights. The unfortunate truism within Canada’s current socio-
economic landscape is that First Nations generally constitute Canada’s most vulnerable 
communities, and therefore First Nations collectively are most at risk from hazards becoming 
disasters. On this point alone, there is not only a legal but also a moral imperative to reconsider 
First Nation roles in emergency management throughout their traditional territories. 
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A further reality that warrants careful attention are the facts of colonialism that led to 
Canada’s current relationship with First Nations, with particular attention to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s account of First Nation cultural genocide at the hands of the settler 
state.612 While a thoughtful and detailed exploration of cultural genocide was outside the scope 
of the thesis, my research and thinking upon this topic, particularly with respect to the broad 
implications of the constructive exclusion of First Nations from the disaster management 
framework, led me to a deeply disturbing question. Where a ‘disaster risks assessment’ of a 
proposed largescale industrial project demonstrates potential critical harm to all of a given First 
Nation’s essential (and culturally specific) food sources, spiritual and ceremonial sites, health of 
environment, and stability of infrastructure – does the Crown commit First Nation specific 
genocide if the project is approved anyway and the worst case scenario takes place? The ethical 
and legal considerations in this question are of profound importance within the current political 
landscape of British Columbia and I hope the content of this thesis exploring disaster 
management has offered some contribution toward such a debate. 
  
                                                 
612 TRC Report Summary, supra note 457. 
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